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The 1970s were a pivotal decade for the creation of twenty-first century economic 
inequality, and the loss of union power was one important driver away from shared U.S. 
prosperity.   Yet why did U.S. labor grow so weak? Much recent scholarship shifts blame 
for labor’s decline to unions and the working class, and asserts that private-sector 
workers were simply no longer trying to organize by the mid-1970s.
 
  
The dissertation instead paints the 1970s as a decade of working-class promise 
and reveals a previously-unstudied wave of half a million workers a year who tried to 
form unions in the private sector.  Many of these workers were the women and people of 
color who had long been excluded from the nation’s best jobs and from some unions, yet 
who had recently gained new access through Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  
Once these workers got the coveted jobs, many went knocking on labor’s door.  This 
dissertation explains how after World War II union organizing became the narrow door 
through which workers could access the most secure tier of the U.S. employer-provided 
social welfare system: collective bargaining.  Increased resistance to union organizing 
among employers by the 1970s, however, thwarted these workers’ organizing attempts.  
 
 
When fewer workers could access unions, the stage was set for growing economic 
precarity and inequality.   
This dissertation features four case studies: the largest union election ever in the 
South which was among Newport News, Virginia shipyard workers in 1978; campaigns 
in 1974 and 1985 by Cannon Mills textile workers in Kannapolis, North Carolina; the 
1979 campaign among 5300 department store at Woodward & Lothrop in Washington, 
DC; and the women office workers’ group “9to5” in Boston who forged a new kind of 
labor organizing.  Sources include government statistics, oral history, local and national 
union records, business organization archives, polling, periodicals and previously 
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Prospects were promising for the American working class in the early 1970s, and Jan 
Hooks wanted in.  Real incomes had roughly doubled since the 1940s, income inequality 
was low by historical standards, and employer-provided health care and pensions were 
common, especially among union members.
1
   Hooks remembers when the Newport 
News shipyard in Virginia began hiring scores of women in 1973 following a series of 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) suits.
2
  After getting hired as a 
shipwright -- and as one of the new generation of women in the yard -- she joined her 
19,000 co-workers in winning a union election in 1978, the largest such election of the 
decade.  In doing so, Jan Hooks became part of a wave of workers who tried to form 
unions in the private sector in the 1970s - - a wave which heretofore has been largely 
invisible within labor and working-class history. These organizing drives often were led 
by young baby boomers just entering the workforce, many of whom were women and 
people of color.  Such workers had long been excluded from the nation’s best jobs and 
from some unions, yet had recently gained new access through Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.
 3
   In the pages that follow, I argue that once these workers got the coveted 
                                                             
1 Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 2010) xi-xii, 1-8; Chad Stone et al, “A Guide to Statistics on Historical 
Trends in Income Inequality,”  (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015) 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3629 (accessed on February 20, 2015); Thomas Piketty and Arthur 
Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2014) 24-25;  Lawrence S. Root, Fringe Benefits: Social Insurance in the Steel Industry 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982) 185-196.  
2 Jan Hooks, interview with the author, Newport News, Virginia, October 27, 2010. For more information 
on the EEOC suits, see chapter four of this dissertation.  
3 For more of the impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on workers see Nancy MacLean, 




jobs, many went knocking on labor’s door, hoping to shore up their economic security by 
organizing unions.  Increased resistance to union organizing among employers, however, 
thwarted these workers’ organizing attempts and blocked their access to collective 
bargaining, a key economic equalizer in the U.S.’s employer-centered social welfare 
system.  When fewer workers could access unions, the stage was set for growing 
economic inequality.   
In the years since Hooks first entered a ship’s hold, working people’s economic 
prospects have dimmed - - not only in the U.S, but across developed nations.  Many 
workers face a new economic insecurity, laboring all hours of the day, juggling part-time 
jobs, and barely scraping by on low wages and paltry benefits.  In the U.S., production 
workers’ wages have fallen, work hours have increased, insurance and pension coverage 
has shrunk, and the gap between the wealthy and poor has become a chasm. 
4
  The 1970s 
were an economic turning point. The post-war economic boom ended by 1974 when the 
economy collapsed into inflation and unemployment, and the trend toward egalitarianism 
began to reverse.  Never again would production and nonsupervisory workers take home 
as large a weekly paycheck in real dollars as they had in 1972. When the economy 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Sage; Harvard University Press, 2006) 76-154; Dorothy Sue Cobble, The Other Women's Movement: 
Workplace Justice and Social Rights in Modern America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004) 174-177, 215-221; Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize the Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in 
the American South, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013) 107-121;  
Timothy J. Minchin, Hiring the Black Worker: The Racial Integration of the Southern Textile Industry, 
1960-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) 43-65. 
4 Arne L. Kalleberg, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in 
the United States, 1970s to 2000s (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011) 1-18; Guy Standing, The 
Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011) 30-39; Lawrence Mishel, 
Josh Bivens, Elise Gould, The State of Working America (12th Edition) (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2012); 
Stein, Pivotal Decade, xi – xiii; Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of 
Leisure (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1992) 1-15; Timothy Noah, The Great Divergence: America's 
Growing Inequality Crisis and What We Can Do About It (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2012) 23-27; 




rebounded in the late 1980s and 1990s, those with high incomes prospered, but 
America’s working men and women never fully shared in the recovery.
5
   
In part, the reasons for this growing inequality were rooted in the economy’s 
shifting structures. A new international division of labor forced workers from all across 
the globe to compete for jobs, and the well-paid jobs in the manufacturing sector lost 
ground to far worse jobs in retail and service.
6
  Yet U.S. workers’ shrinking access to 
labor unions also fed the nation’s growing economic divide for it meant that fewer 
workers were able to benefit from collective bargaining’s equalizing effects.
7
  In 1973, 
twenty-four percent of workers in the U.S. private sector were members of a union.  That 
figure fell to a mere eleven percent twenty years later and to a paltry six percent by 2013, 
a nadir not seen since in the U.S. since 1900.
8
  The precipitous decline in union density, 
or the percentage of the workforce with a union, meant that the American working class 
lost an important tool for countering neoliberal policies and for maintaining broadly 
shared prosperity in the face of globalization and economic structural change.  Between 
one-fifth and one-third of early twenty-first century economic inequality can be traced to 
the loss in union density between 1973 and 2007. For blue-collar men, the effect of de-
                                                             
5 Mishel, Bivens, Gould, The State of Working America (12th Edition) 184; Noah, The Great Divergence, 
26-27.  
6  Eric John Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century: 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 
2003) 277-280; Niall Ferguson, The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010) 8-11;Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 
1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 14-25; Standing, The Precariat, 41-45.  
7 Jake Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014) 2-4.  
8 Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson,“Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS,” 
(www.unionstats.com  accessed February 21, 2015).  The 1900 union membership figure is calculated from 
United States Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of the United from Colonial Times to the 




unionization has been especially stark.  The decline in union density accounted for three-
quarters of the growth in the blue-collar / white-collar wage differential for men from 
1978 to 2011.
9
   
Scholars offer a number of explanations for labor’s demise, commonly placing the 
blame squarely on the unions, which they portray as inept and complacent, and a working 
class which they argue lost interest in organized labor. Private-sector organizing declined 
in the 1970s, so the story goes, when unions stopped reaching out to workers and workers 
turned away from unions.
 
  Scholars often cite as evidence AFL-CIO President George 
Meany’s response when asked in 1972 why AFL-CIO membership was sinking as a 
percentage of the workforce: "I don’t know. I don't care…Why should we worry about 
organizing groups of people who do not appear to want to be organized?...The organized 
fellow is the fellow that counts."
10
 Yet few historians have dug underneath this leader’s 
utterly tone deaf statement to see that the very next year, in absolute numbers, was the 
historical peak of union organizing elections, and that the entire decade was one of huge 
contestation around organizing.
11
 The narrative about weak and indifferent unions is 
pervasive in much of labor history, dominating even textbooks. “Despite some continuing 
                                                             
9 Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld, "Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality," American 
Sociological Review 76, no. 4 (2011), 513. On de-unionization’s effects on blue-collar men, see Mishel, 
Bivens, Gould, The State of Working America (12th Edition) 268 – 279, especially 274-275. 
10 “US Needs ‘30,000 New Jobs a Week Just to Break Even’: Interview with George Meany, President, 
AFL-CIO,” U.S. News and World Report, February 21, 1972, 27. Versions of this quotation are abundant in 
the literature on the decline in organizing.  See, for example, Richard B. Freeman, America Works: The 
Exceptional U.S. Labor Market (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007) 77; Rick Fantasia and  Kim 
Voss, Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004) 125; Steven Henry Lopez , Reorganizing the Rust Belt : An Inside Study of the American Labor 
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 3.  
11 National Labor Relations Board annual reports, 1949-1999, Tables 10, 11 and 13 




populist rhetoric, most unions became agents acting on behalf of their dues paying 
members on a shrunken field of combat.   With but a few exceptions, (Teamsters, 
ILGWU, SEIU), no great organizing drives were undertaken by major national unions or 
the AFL-CIO itself for decades” asserts one such labor textbook.
12
  This framing 
undergirds Jefferson Cowie’s recent much-acclaimed Stayin’ Alive. Cowie finds that 
unions were striking and even organizing at the start of the 1970s, but he then misses the 
enormity of organizing throughout the entire decade, arguing that by mid-decade the 
“record-breaking strikes… and vibrant organizing drives that had once promised a new 
day for workers were reduced to a trickle.”
13
  Scholars often place the white working 
class - - many of whom were union members - - at the center of this narrative about 
weakening labor, citing the vicious riots against school busing, for instance, or the male 
construction workers who beat up Vietnam War protestors as the roots of conservative 
“Reaganism.” Scholars also assert that an individual “rights consciousness” growing out 
of the Civil Rights movement undermined the collectivity of the New Deal thinking and 
                                                             
12 Philip Yale Nicholson, Labor's Story in the United States (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 
2004) 281. Other scholarship which holds that unions’ decline is due to a lack of organizing efforts include 
Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987); Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism (London; New York: 
Verso, 1988); Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the 
US Working Class (London: Verso, 1986); Thomas Geoghegan, Which Side are You On?: Trying to Be for 
Labor When It's Flat on Its Back (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Plume, 1991); Leo Troy, "Twilight for 
Organized Labor," in The Future of Private Sector Unionism in the United States, eds. James T. Bennett 
and Bruce E. Kaufman (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Fantasia and Voss, Hard Work; Staughton 
Lynd and Alice Lynd, The New Rank and File (Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 2000).  
13  Jefferson Cowie, Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: New 




that by the 1970s a newer civil rights-based legal and political paradigm eclipsed that of 
labor.
14
    
The story changes dramatically, however, if we shift the gaze of labor history 
away from the white, blue-collar men who already had unions in the 1970s and toward 
the people who were outside labor’s ranks, trying to get in.  Doing so quickly complicates 
the common narratives for labor’s decline and reveals that, in fact, many workers were 
actively organizing unions throughout the 1970s and many of these would-be unionists 
were women and people of color who sought to use a combination of labor and civil 
rights law to win economic security.   It turns out that roughly half a million private-
sector workers each year voted in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections in 
the 1970s, a level of organizing attempts which was more or less consistent from 1949 
(the first year for which full data is available after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act) 
until the early 1980s.  (See Appendix A) Add to this number the roughly 400,000 public 
sector workers who were successfully joining unions each year throughout the 1970s, and 
                                                             
14 Cowie; Stayin’ Alive, 135-138, 236-250; Dominic Sandbrook, Mad as Hell: The Crisis of the 1970s and 
the Rise of the Populist Right (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011) 47-64; Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary 
D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: 
Norton, 1991). For more on the construction workers attacking protestors, see Joshua Benjamin Freeman, 
Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II (New York: New Press: Distributed by 
W.W. Norton, 2000) 237-240. On busing see Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, 
and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991) and Anthony 
J. Lukas, Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American Families (New York: 
Knopf, Distributed by Random House, 1985). On the individuality of rights consciousness eclipsing New 
Deal communitarian values see Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor, 
Revised and Expanded Edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013) 191-211, esp. 192 .  See 
Lichtenstein’s new introduction for a discussion how historians have contested and expanded on this 
concept.   A legal and political analysis of this dichotomy is found in Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African 
Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008). On discussion of civil rights changes opening the door to more free market thinking, see 
Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality 




it becomes clear that the decade was a time of tremendous organizing efforts.
15
  Though 
the proportion of the total private-sector workforce voting in union elections declined 
somewhat by the 1970s compared to earlier decades, the precipitous drop off did not 
happen until the early 1980s.  The high level of private-sector organizing in the 1970s is 
especially remarkable considering the enormous increase in employer resistance to union 
organizing in that decade. From 1970 to 1980, the number of all charges of employer 
unfair labor practices more than doubled, as did the number of illegal firings.
16
  Though 
workers were trying to form unions, increasingly they lost their union elections.  While 
workers won roughly 80 percent of the union elections in the 1950s, by the late 1970s 
workers won fewer than half.
17
 
A reconfigured working class led the way in organizing unions in the 1970s, often 
seeking the protection of unions against economic downturn.   Women and people of 
color had long been excluded from the full promise of the New Deal’s liberal economic 
policies.  They could not get the kinds of jobs covered by New Deal social security 
programs, such as old age pensions, nor join the unions sanctioned by its legislation.
18
 
The Wagner Act (1935), which protected industrial workers’ right to organize and 
bargain collectively, excluded domestic and farmworkers entirely, occupations held by 
                                                             
15 Based on National Labor Relations Board annual reports, 1949 – 1999. See Appendix A for an in-depth 
discussion of this data.  The 400,000 figure for annual public sector unionization growth in the 1970s is 
derived from Table 1f, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment Among Public Sector 
Workers, 1973-2007, in Hirsch and Macpherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data Book, 16.   
16 See Appendix D.   
17 Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 90 - 91.   
18 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005); Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: 
Women, Men and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th Century America (Oxford, New York: Oxford 




many black and female workers.  Yet the Civil Rights Act of 1964 finally resolved some 
of the New Deal’s contradictions and lowered the barriers to workforce entry for millions 
of previously-excluded workers.  The result was that the 1970s were far from the “last 
days of the working class,” as asserted by Cowie.
 19
   Rather, they were the first days of a 
reshaped working class full of women, people of color, young workers and Southerners 
who readily combined old working-class tools - - like unions and the Wagner Act - - with 
newer laws from the Civil and Women’s Rights movements in order to shore up their 
prospects in a changing economic environment.   These groups of people had long been 
members of the working class, of course, through their paid employment, neighborhoods 
and families.  What was new by the 1970s, however, was that they now had greater 
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Scholars have too often conflated unions’ declining efficacy with working-class 
motivation and action. Knocking on Labor’s Door reveals that in scholars’ rush to explain 
the decline in union density and power they have overlooked the magnitude and breadth 
of the organizing efforts that a transformed working class waged in this crucial decade.
 
  
This study of private-sector union organizing campaigns ruptures assumptions about a 
hard-hatted, silent majority, and instead identifies the 1970s as a decade of working-class 
promise.  It does so by asking a new set of questions about the working class at a pivotal 
historical moment and by looking at what many working people were actually doing in 
the 1970s: trying to organize unions.  Who were these would-be unionists and what 
happened to their efforts?  What did they think they would gain by forming unions?  If 
workers were still actively forming unions in the 1970s, how does that change our 
understanding of the rise of a new conservatism and the shaping of late-twentieth century 
capitalism?   
In the pages that follow we will see that manufacturing workers struggled to form 
unions in the 1970s, as did bank tellers, hospital workers, university clericals, nurses, 
flight attendants, wait staff, and athletes. Even security guards who worked for Pinkerton, 
the notorious strike-breaking firm, successfully won a union in this decade.
21
   Though 
NLRB statistics do not indicate the race or gender of the voters in union elections, this 
study uses a host of sources to unearth the complexity of the workforce going to the 
union voting booth in the 1970s.  Polling, oral history interviews, news accounts, union 
records and even the records of corporate, anti-union attorneys reveal that many of the 
                                                             
21 See NLRB election report: cases closed in NLRB monthly reports, 1970 – 1979.  The Pinkerton election 




workers who wanted to form unions were young, female and/or black - - exactly the sort 
of new workforce that had gained access to the nation’s good jobs following advances 
achieved by the civil and women’s rights movements.  Many were among the two million 
African-Americans who began a reverse migration to the Southern states after 1970, and 
who carried with them union experience gained up North.
22
  They were people like 
Edward Coppedge, one of four African-American men who were so dissatisfied with the 
pace of change at the Newport News shipyard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that 
they launched a campaign to overthrow their company union in 1978.
 
 They were  people 
like Rosa Halsey, a young, black retail worker who fought against declining labor 
standards in that industry by winning a union at the Woodward & Lothrop department 
store in Washington, DC in 1979.  They were workers in the ascendant Sunbelt who in 
the 1970s organized at a rate higher than in surrounding years, even as companies moved 
south to avoid the more unionized areas in the North. And increasingly, they were service 
and retail workers - - - a quarter of NLRB voters in the 1970s worked in the service, retail 
or finance sectors, nearly double the percentage of the late 1960s.
23
  
When you shine the historical spotlight on the working people who tried to form 
unions in the 1970s, it becomes clear that the set of factors that led to unions’ demise is 
far more complicated than what can be explained by lousy labor leaders or an 
individualistic working-class culture. Knocking on Labor’s Door identifies increased 
employer resistance to organizing as the main culprit in late twentieth-century labor’s 
decline and shows how the U.S. system of labor law did little to curb it. Unions’ demise 
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in the 1970s and beyond is rooted in a key development in the post-World War II social 
welfare system regarding collective bargaining and labor organizing.  The U.S. first built 
a national social safety net through the New Deal, but the net was thin and much of it 
depended on employment.  After World War II, even as European governments bolstered 
their state-based social welfare provisions - - such as through universal health care and 
pension plans - - the U.S. turned to a more privatized system that depended on employers 
to provide such social welfare benefits. Employers were not required by law to provide 
health care plans or good retirement pensions, however.  Rather, unions in the U.S. 
negotiated with employers for much of citizens’ social welfare through collective 
bargaining, the scope of which expanded after the war to include health and welfare 
plans.
 24
  At that same historical moment, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made it more 
difficult for people to enter those same unions and to benefit from collective bargaining.  
America’s working men and women thus needed unions to negotiate with employers for 
greater levels of economic security, even as employers gained new legal power to block 
workers’ ability to join unions.  Employers in the U.S., meanwhile, had a higher incentive 
than employers in other nations to fight union organizing because so much of the nation’s 
social welfare provision now came through employers.
25
 After all, if workers won a 
union, employers would most likely be on the hook for not only higher wages, but also 
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better retirement and health benefits and perhaps even supplemental unemployment 
compensation.   When employers faced escalating global competition in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, they took greater advantage of the opportunities to resist unionizing that had 
first opened up under the Taft-Hartley Act.  They increasingly resisted workers’ 
organizing efforts, became quicker to hire anti-union consultants and broke labor law 
more frequently, firing union supporters and threatening to close down if the workers 
chose to have a union.  Employers effectively narrowed workers’ access to unions and 
fewer workers than ever could benefit from collective bargaining’s power to improve 
their social welfare.  
When workers knocked on labor’s door, did unions answer?  Did union leaders do 
enough to reach out to the reshaped working class of the 1970s?    Their record was 
mixed.  Although many more unions were organizing than scholars have realized, 
organizing efforts were still concentrated among too few unions.
26
   As the pressures on 
collective bargaining increased, leaders found themselves struggling to balance the need 
to shore up existing membership with the need to organize new members. Racism and 
sexism were still very real in unions in the 1970s and sometimes workers had to pry their 
doors open using charges under the Civil Rights Act.  Even as many women and people 
of color reached out to labor, unions were slow to diversify their staffs, and the pace of 
change at the leadership level was glacial.  Yet unions’ mixed record on reaching out to 
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these workers should not obscure workers’ propensity to organize in these pivotal years.   
Workers often pulled wary union officials into their organizing efforts as, for instance, at 
Newport News where the organizing director of the USWA thought the workers did not 
have a chance of winning a union, but agreed to run a campaign if the workers gathered 
enough union cards.  The shipyard workers’ win turned out to be the largest in that 
union’s history.  In the end, Knocking on Labor’s Door reveals that structural 
impediments to organizing were more decisive factors in labor’s decline than were union 
leaders’ bigotry or working-class complacency.   
This study offers an interpretation of labor organizing spanning the post-World 
War II years, and the bulk of its focus is on the years from 1968 to 1985.  I roughly 
divide this time span into two periods: 1968 to 1981, or the “long 1970s,” and 1982 to 
1985, when organizing dropped dramatically.
 27
  In 1968, labor was still strong even as 
global competition began to deepen, and liberal social movements were potent enough to 
shape the administration of President Richard Nixon.  The long 1970s ended in 1981 
when President Ronald Reagan took office and many neoliberal theories became national 
policy. This study’s second time period covers the years from 1982 to 1985, the nadir of 
union organizing when unions struggled with the enormity of the need to transition to a 
new kind of union organizing.  I include the entire 1968 to 1985 time span in each of the 
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chapters, and concentrate on the 1982 – 1985 time period in the conclusion. I argue that 
the years that followed, from 1986 through the close of the twentieth century, were a 
distinct period in the history of labor organizing when unions began to regroup and try 
new methods to address the kinds of obstacles I describe in these pages.  I touch on this 
post-1985 time period in the conclusion, but it is not a major focus of this dissertation.   
Though roughly half a million workers a year voted in NLRB union elections 
during the 1970s, in 1982 union organizing plummeted. Half as many workers voted in 
union elections that year as in 1979.  By 1983, a mere 165,000 workers voted in NLRB 
elections.  To this day, the number of workers voting in NLRB elections has never again 
risen anywhere near that of the 1970s when millions of members of a newly-transformed 
workforce picked NLRB elections as their class weapon of choice.
28
  When we fully 
appreciate the breadth of union organizing efforts in the 1970s, then the impact of 
employers’ resistance to those efforts is revealed as all the more calamitous.  America’s 
working people were finally poised to lay claim to an inclusive and broadly-shared 
economic prosperity, one which had been promised by the New Deal but only started to 
bear fruit by the late 1960s after years of protest by social movements.  Yet in this same 
historical moment, employers faced increasing global competition, and they reacted to 
the reconfigured working class’s organizing efforts by attacking workers’ organizing 
efforts.  In fact, we will see how workers’ union organizing served as one impetus for a 
new political activism among conservative employers. In closing the door on union 
organizing, employers limited workers’ access to robust economic security and helped set 
the terms for a more precarious twenty-first century U.S. economy.    
                                                             




Historiographical Interventions  
Knocking on Labor’s Door intervenes in U.S. working-class and labor historiography on 
three levels:  first, it corrects depictions of the 1970s working class; second, it offers fresh 
context for the rise of conservatism in that decade and; third, it identifies union 
organizing’s precarious role within the post-World War II social welfare regime as a key 
contributor to the weakening of New Deal liberal economic policies.   
First, and most importantly, this study fundamentally challenges the narrative 
among labor and working class historians that by the 1970s, workers and unions were 
simply no longer organizing very much.  In fact, America’s working people waged a 
fierce battle throughout the entire 1970s for more economic security and broadly-shared 
prosperity during the formative years of neoliberal conservatism, and they did so on 
many fronts, including strikes, popular union democracy movements and NLRB union 
elections.  This worker-centered study serves as a necessary correction to Jefferson 
Cowie’s cultural study of the 1970s which found that the idea of a working-class 
collectivity lost salience by the close of the decade.   While Cowie roots his analysis of 
the early 1970s in statistics, the denouement is situated within pop culture.  We hear more 
from Archie Bunker and Merle Haggard in the late 1970s than we do from the workers 
themselves.  Stayin’ Alive has no place for a working class that was vibrant, active and 
organizing throughout the entire decade.
29
   
When scholars have taken note of the potency of the 1970s working class, they 
have missed the level of new private-sector organizing.  In Rebel Rank and File, a 
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number of authors argue that the 1970s was a moment of rank-and-file militancy marked, 
for instance, by the 1970 wildcat strike among postal workers, yet none focuses on 
private-sector union organizing.
30
   When 1970s union organizing has received scholarly 
attention, it is often in the public sector.   Joseph McCartin, for instance, correctly argues 
that public-sector organizing in the 1960s and 1970s was a wave of activity that rivaled 
the private-sector wave surrounding World War II.  Yet private-sector organizing remains 
key to understanding working-class history in the postwar period.  After all, 81 percent of 
the nation’s workers in the mid-1970s were in the private sector.
31
   
 Private-sector union organizing does make appearances within the historiography 
of post-World War II labor, yet the focus is often on organizing in the 1940s through the 
1950s, such as in Robert Korstad’s work on tobacco, Michael Honey’s look at Memphis, 
and Barbara Griffith’s study of the CIO’s post-war attempt to organize the South, 
Operation Dixie.
32
  Fewer historians have focused on private-sector organizing in the 
years after the 1950s. Important exceptions include Timothy Minchin’s history of the JP 
Stevens union organizing effort as well as Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg’s work on 
hospital organizing by District 1199, both of which were key building blocks for this 
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  Like the home health care workers Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein describe in 
Caring for America, the office workers I examine in chapter seven also struggled with 
NLRB organizing in the 1970s and 1980s, ultimately choosing to explore a different 
organizing model. 
34
 Lawrence Richards, in Union-Free America, also examines private-
sector labor organizing in this period, yet we come to very different conclusions.  
Richards finds that unions were losing power because workers no longer wanted unions, 
yet he bases his thesis on the faulty consensus that the number of workers trying to form 
unions had dropped dramatically by the 1970s.
35
 
Why have so many scholars overlooked workers’ 1970s organizing push in the 
private sector?  In part, they simply were not looking for it.  Labor scholars often choose 
as their key variable union density figures or the number of workers actually winning 
union elections, both of which turned downward in these years.  Few look at the number 
of workers voting in union elections, which held more or less steady until 1982.  Yet the 
problem is deeper than data sets. New Left historians were profoundly disappointed by 
labor’s pro-war stance on the Vietnam War and wrote from a deep-seated suspicion of 
organized labor which led them to overlook the continued level of union organizing.  In 
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his recent introduction to the new edition of Labor’s War at Home, Nelson Lichtenstein, 
eminent labor historian, puts his work within the context of the ideas of the New Left 
generation who saw trade unions as “positively anathema to many of us.  The AFL-CIO 
remained a firm backer of the war in Vietnam; moreover, even the more progressive 
unions…appeared so strapped by bureaucracy, law, contracts and political allegiances 
that they hardly seemed an appropriate vehicle to advance the class struggle.”
36
  Yet even 
as Lichtenstein wrote his seminal 1974 dissertation and 1982 book, the labor movement 
was engaged in what may prove to be its last great wave of private-sector union 
organizing.   
A new generation of leftist scholars followed the New Left scholars’ lead.  Kim 
Moody and Mike Davis, for instance, asserted that labor had become so bureaucratized 
and weak by the 1970s that unions were no longer organizing.  Thomas Geoghegan’s 
widely-read 1991 Which Side Are You On? urges liberals to be for labor despite unions’ 
lethargic ways, but Geoghegan’s narrative on union organizing lacks historical context  - 
- he overlooks the breadth of workers’ attempts to unionize all the way through the 
1970s.
37
    
In my efforts to reclaim workers’ organizing efforts, I have benefitted enormously 
from the recent work of labor historians who find a conjuncture, rather than a disconnect 
between the civil rights, women’s rights and labor movements.  Knocking on Labor’s 
Door thus builds on the work of Nancy MacLean, Kathleen Barry and Dennis Deslippe 
who reveal how workers agitated to make real the promises of Title VII of the Civil 
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Rights Act.  MacLean focuses on women who fought their way into construction jobs, for 
instance, and Barry shows how white, female flight attendants were among the first 
workers to show up in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission offices to file 
charges about routinely getting fired at age thirty-five.
38
   I bring union organizing into 
this discussion, adding to this scholarship the idea that many of these same workers not 
only fought to win the jobs from which they had been excluded, but went on to form 
unions after they won that coveted access.  My research found that women in shipyards 
and department stores, for instance, joined the office workers, flight attendants and 
domestic workers who Dorothy Sue Cobble showed were acting collectively and 
organizing in the 1970s as part of “workplace feminism.”
39
  I build on Judith Stein’s 
assertion in Running Steel, Running America that unions and the liberal order could 
stretch enough to bring in those who had been left out -- and I add that the demise of the 
freedom to organize served as a key factor in the unraveling of that liberal order.
40
   
Having established that the working class was active and organizing in the 1970s, 
Knocking on Labor’s Door’s second intervention puts this reframed working class in 
dialogue with the rise of conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. I argue that though 
politically conservative employers may have tilted a rapidly changing economy in their 
favor, they did not do so with a free hand.  Rather, working-class labor organizing helped 
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inspire employers’ growing resistance to labor law and unions, which in turn served as 
the impetus for some of their first political organizing efforts.   
A number of scholars have identified business leaders’ pivotal role in the turn to 
conservatism, following how capital moved, squeezed labor, and broke its promises to 
workers in these years.  Kim Phillips-Fein in Invisible Hands reminds us that business 
anti-unionism was hardly new and conservative business and political activists never 
accepted the New Deal and liberalism’s ideas. Yet many scholars do find that business 
leaders and groups helped launch an anti-union ideology that would hold particular sway 
starting in the 1970s.  Sophia Lee studies how conservative business groups co-opted 
civil rights language in the 1970s, for example, and Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson’s 
Winner-Take-All-Politics and Benjamin Waterhouse’s Lobbying America trace the rise of 
political lobbying among corporate groups.
41
  Yet where are the workers themselves in 
these studies? In fact, they remain rather uncomplicated victims in this developing 
narrative of business conservatism.   Scholars may have missed the potency of the 
emerging working class, but employers did not.  Employers were keenly aware that 
America’s working class was transforming and mobilizing, and they faced a bevy of 
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viable union organizing drives.  For instance, a number of scholars note that General 
Electric (GE) officials played a central role in shaping 1970s business conservatism, 
helping to start the Business Roundtable, for instance.
42
  Knocking on Labor’s Door 
unearths union records revealing that GE officials developed these conservative 
organizations while the company’s workers triggered an impressive 437 separate NLRB 
elections at GE facilities from 1961 to 1982.    When such corporate leaders helped build 
a rightward-focused political economy, they did so in reaction to unions that they 
perceived as a potent threat.  
When workers do appear in the literature on 1970s conservatism, they are often 
painted as having either succumbed to Nixon’s class strategy or being driven by a racial 
backlash.  Robert Self, Lisa McGirr, Thomas Sugrue, and Matthew Lassiter, for instance, 
all find that as the white, working class moved to the suburbs, it nurtured a right-wing 
analysis that was anti-state and anti-tax and which was rooted in a reaction to the changes 
wrought by the civil rights movement.
 43
  In highlighting interracial organizing campaigns 
and the interracial unions that resulted, Knocking on Labor’s Door suggests that the 
historiography on white, grassroots conservatism has overlooked a key source of 
working-class radicalism, including that in the South.  Jan Hooks, the Newport News 
shipwright, was cut from the same cloth as other white working-class women - - those 
Wal-Mart moms - -whom Bethany Moreton describes as helping to bring in a god and 
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employer-based conservatism in the 1970s.  Jan Hooks, however, was a white woman 
active in a black-led union and she helped push for progressive politics, such as by 
marching for the ERA in Virginia.
44
  While it was certainly true that many white 
Southerners were deeply racist and conservative, there were also young, white 
Southerners who had grown up in integrated schools and in the wake of the Civil Rights 
movement and were more willing to join with the African-Americans who pushed 
through new unionization drives.  This study thus serves as a necessary corollary to 
studies of white, suburban-based conservative grassroots politics in the 1970s.  
This dissertation’s third intervention is to identify the structural limits on union 
organizing as a key factor in the unraveling of liberal New Deal economic policies and 
the “New Deal order” which Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle found had shaped the mid-
twentieth century American political economy.
45
  Knocking on Labor’s Door’s analysis 
differs from that of scholars who argue that the seeds of the destruction of workers’ 
power were sown in the 1930s, before the Wagner Act even passed, when unions 
accepted a compact with capitalism.
46
  Instead, like the work of Robert Korstad in Civil 
Rights Unionism, it finds that the National Labor Relations Act boosted workers’ power 
by giving workers what was, for a time, a potent, state-backed tool with which to battle 
capital.  However, when employers successfully resisted the majority of workers’ union 
organizing attempts by the late 1970s, they effectively rolled back the New Deal’s 
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protections for workers who wanted to form unions and cut off their access to the most 
secure tier of the U.S. social welfare regime.   
In order to make this intervention into the discussion of union organizing’s place 
within the New Deal order’s demise, I have benefitted from a rich literature on the 
development of the social welfare state. Scholars make clear that though the U.S. has a 
comparatively weak public social safety net, public policy has encouraged a much more 
robust private social safety net through employer-provided benefits.  A number of 
scholars of the U.S. social welfare system build on sociologist Gosta Epsing-Andersen’s 
argument that the concept of a “welfare state” does not capture the full range of public 
and private provisions which support social welfare. Epsing-Andersen identifies instead a 
social welfare “regime” as the mechanism by which “social risks are managed and 
distributed between state, market and families.”
47
  Jacob Hacker’s The Divided Welfare 
State, for instance, focuses on how federal public policy, regulation and tax law in the 
U.S. have positioned employers as the source of the most robust social safety net. He 
points out that the US citizens’ economic security is really determined not only by visible 
state programs, like Social Security, but also “hidden” government policies, like tax 
policy which undergird this employment-based system. Jennifer Klein labels this 
employer-dependent social welfare system the “public-private” welfare state, and Marie 
Gottschalk, who focuses on health care policy, calls it the “shadow welfare state.”  All 
these scholars identify collective bargaining as one such “hidden” intervention into the 
                                                             
47 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) 24; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford and 




U.S.’s social welfare state and a number of scholars, like Beth Stevens and Michael 
Brown, place collective bargaining at their studies’ centers.
 48
   
Yet when these scholars of the U.S. social welfare state focus on unions’ role 
within it, they only focus on unions that were already established.  I bring in union 
organizing into this discussion, and refocus the discussion on the workers who were 
outside the system and sought to enter it by triggering state-backed NLRB elections. 
Union organizing was the gateway through which these workers had to enter before they 
could fully access the most secure tier of this employer-centered social welfare regime.  
A number of scholars focus on how women and people of color had long had limited 
access to the U.S. social welfare state.
49
  I show how members of these groups were 
leading union organizing drives in order to gain full access by the 1970s.   Adding in 
union organizing to this discussion about the contours and limits of the U.S. social 
welfare model allows us to more clearly see how weak labor law around union organizing 
was one key factor narrowing workers’ access to robust social welfare provisions.  
Through signing up for federal NLRB union elections, many working people in the 1970s 
were using unions to deepen their demands on the state.  The fact that they were not able 
to win their unions - - and were denied access to collective bargaining’s economic 
security - - limited the efficacy of the New Deal’s economic policies in their lives.  
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Through such a lens, it is apparent that the New Deal push for security Jennifer Klein 
identified in For All These Rights extended well into the 1970s.  Here, the working 
people who organized in the 1970s are more akin to the coal miners who Robyn Muncy 
finds fought for an expanded social welfare regime in the 1960s, and are more in step 
with union leaders who Alan Derickson and Tracy Roof find continued to push for 
universal health care and progressive public policies well into the twentieth century. 
50
   
Unearthing the robust level of labor organizing in the 1970s allows us to more 
clearly see that the U.S.’s working class was more in line with those around the world 
than scholars have realized.  Workers’ labor unions grew throughout much of the globe in 
the 1970s as working people struggled against an incipient neoliberalism. Workers in 
Italy, Australia, England, Sweden, Germany, Canada and elsewhere all increased the size 
and strength of their unions. Of 23 developed nations, 18 saw their union movements 
grow during the 1970s.
51
  It was a decade of major labor unrest in Latin America as 
Mexico saw the largest strike wave since the 1940s and miners struck in Peru.  The 
shrinkage of manufacturing drove workers into the streets in Italy’s “hot autumn” of 1969 
and England’s “winter of discontent” in 1978-79. These massive strikes bookended a 
decade of turmoil in Europe.
52
   Scholars have pointed to declining union density rates in 
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the U.S. and have concluded that the U.S. working class by the 1970s was somehow 
different, more quiescent.
53
 Yet a metamorphosed U.S. working class did, in fact, join 
this worldwide uprising in the 1970s, and union organizing through NLRB elections was 
one of their chosen platforms.  U.S. workers were the first to face the sorts of anti-union, 
neoliberal impulses that would soon sweep the globe, such as the Thatcherism British 
miners faced soon thereafter.  By the 1980s and early 1990s, workers’ unions came under 
attack around the world.
54
  Yet a global perspective reminds us that though macro 
structural changes like globalization mattered, the particular way they unfolded mattered 
more.   In other nations, workers could enter unions far more easily, and many turned 
toward unions to help mediate change even as manufacturing shrunk. In the U.S., 
however, employers in manufacturing routinely used workers’ precarious position in the 
global economy as a threat to convince them to vote against unions.  Like the Knights of 
Labor activists Kim Voss identifies in The Making of American Exceptionalism, U.S. 
workers in the 1970s had much in common with their European counterparts and were 
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The comparison to Gilded Age workers is, in fact, an apt one.  Historians often 
compare the working class of the 1970s to that of the 1930s, finding it much weaker.
56
  
However as we gain greater distance from the twentieth century, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the entire “long 1970s” was a period of class contestation that 
more closely resembled the late nineteenth century. Workers in both eras found 
themselves at the beginning stages of seismic shifts in capitalism.   In the late nineteenth 
century, big firms first began to drive the industrial economy and the U.S. government 
expanded, shifting power from the local and state level to the national.    Workers waged 
numerous strikes and protests over the terms of their labor within that new form of 
capitalism, such as in the Uprising of 1877 and the Pullman Strike of 1894.  They never 
got a firm hold on capitalism’s shifts, but their children and grandchildren won increased 
power in the 1930s through the successful sit-down strikes and the New Deal’s Wagner 
Act.
57
  By the 1970s, a reshaped U.S. working class scrambled once again in the face of 
capitalism’s latest transmutation.  The new U.S. economy was more de-industrialized and 
the retail, service and financial sectors carried new economic weight. The big, Fordist 
structures started to break up as the economy shifted toward disintegrated firms and 
strings of world-wide supply chains.  The locus of economic power shifted once again, 
this time from the national to the global. In this frame, the people who organized in 
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America’s factories, stores, hospitals, and government jobs are seen not as the last 
generation of the New Deal, but rather as the first working-class generation to face the 
massive structural changes that would mark the 21
st
 century. Like their Gilded Age 
counterparts, workers in the 1970s fought to determine their fate in capitalism’s new 
paradigm.
58
   
 
Chapter Outline 
Part one - - encompassing chapters one, two and three - - offers a national level study of 
union organizing. This section’s structure mirrors a tri-partite model, and these chapters 
focus in turn first on the state, then workers and finally on employers.  Part two includes 
chapters four through seven.  It features four local cases studies of union organizing 
drives from a variety of industries through which I deepen my case for the breadth and 
depth of 1970s private-sector union organizing.  A short conclusion covers the nadir of 
union organizing in 1982 to 1985.   
Chapter one describes how U.S. workers sought to form unions in the 1970s 
because they saw unions as the key to economic security within the U.S.’s employer-
based social welfare system.  I marry a theoretical framework of the social welfare state 
with a description of how New Deal-based labor law developed in the fifty years after the 
Wagner Act’s passage, arguing that U.S. workers’ failure to win more organizing drives 
was structural.    Chapter two unearths the volume and breadth of private-sector union 
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organizing in the 1970s and so squarely challenges the declension narrative of working-
class history in this pivotal decade.  It starts with an examination of how the working 
class itself was being reconfigured as women and people of color won broader access to 
more jobs through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  We meet many of the 
people who, like Jan Hooks, led the nation’s new unionizing push: the baby boomers, 
women, African-American workers, immigrants and Southerners. Chapter three reveals 
how employers’ attacks on union organizing were a cornerstone of their turn toward 
conservative politics in the 1970s.  It details how mainstream corporations tried to roll 
back labor law in the late 1960s, and then sharply stepped up workplace resistance to 
union organizing, including widespread use of anti-union consultants.  By the close of the 
decade, employers had effectively narrowed the door through which America’s workers 
could gain more economic security.   
The case studies that comprise part two - - chapters four through seven - - 
demonstrate how these organizing workers, recalcitrant employers and weakened labor 
laws coalesced on the ground level in various industries and geographic areas.   Chapter 
four begins with the Newport News shipyard in Virginia where, in the largest NLRB 
election ever held in the South, 19,000 workers formed a USWA union in 1978.  Though 
other unions had tried four times to overthrow the yard’s company union over the 
previous forty years, the workforce that was finally able to do so included more women 
and people of color than ever before. Here, the fruits of the civil and women’s rights 
movements clearly fed the union’s fire.  But perhaps Newport News was an outlier?  
After all, Navy ships by law had to be built in the U.S., so these shipyard workers were 




Chapter five explores this question by examining two union elections among workers in 
another Southern industrial setting - - textile workers at Cannon Mills in Kannapolis, 
North Carolina.   This chapter brings the shop level struggle around unionizing into 
dialogue with trade policy and shows how they impacted the terms on which U.S. textile 
workers would experience globalization.   
But Newport News and Cannon Mills were both industrial sector employers, and 
much of the job market shift in the 1970s was into service and retail.  Perhaps unions did 
not try very hard to organize workers in these new sectors of the workforce?  Chapters six 
and seven argue that many workers did try to form unions in these growing sectors.  
Chapter six follows the successful organizing effort by 5300 department store workers at 
Woodward and Lothrop department store in Washington, DC and discusses how 
organizing efforts in the retail sector grew at nearly the same rate as did the retail sector 
itself in the 1970s.  Chapter seven focuses on the service sector, turning our attention to 
efforts by Boston’s female clerical workers who first organized for workplace power 
outside the increasingly fraught collective bargaining system through the organization 
called 9to5.  The dissertation’s conclusion focuses on the 1982 to 1985 period when 
unions pulled back from NLRB organizing in the face of recession, continued resistance 
from employers and the further weakening of labor law under the Reagan Administration.   
 
Sources and Methodology 
Knocking on Labor’s Door is a worker-centered history of union organizing in the 1970s.  




motivations and hopes of the workers themselves within the NLRB statistics, news 
reports, polling, and union and business archives that serve as this study’s sources.  I have 
conducted 33 interviews with workers, labor leaders and government officials, and have 
tapped a number of other oral history collections.  These discussions have proven 
indispensable for unearthing a previously-untold history of union organizing in this 
decade.  Oral history presents obstacles, on one hand, for memory is both fallible and 
malleable. Yet oral history opens up the possibility to learn not only what happened, but 
the meaning of what happened at a deeper level, such as people’s intentions. 
59
   Far too 
few recent historical studies purporting to analyze the working-class of the 1970s feature 
discussions with working people themselves.   
Labor archives have been an enormous resource, of course, though I have found 
that many union records for these years are still in unions’ storage facilities, or are not yet 
processed.  For the Newport News and Woodward & Lothrop studies, for example, I 
have largely relied on unions’ own stashes of newsletters and files, sometimes asking 
staff to pull dusty boxes out of closets or to pull records out of cold storage.  Though 
employer records are notoriously hard to come by, I accessed Cannon Mills and 
Woodward & Lothrop archival records (and found the latter scrubbed of issues of class 
conflict.)  I also unearthed a fresh employer source, the archival collection of a 
Baltimore-based anti-union lawyer, Earle K. Shawe.  The records of the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the Labor Law Reform Group were also instrumental. 
I have found NLRB reports to be a rich source and have carefully chosen one 
NLRB statistic - - the number of workers eligible to vote in union elections - - as the 
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main variable for this study because it is the best available for unearthing worker intent.
60
  
I have supplemented these NLRB annual statistics with specific election examples from 
the NLRB monthly reports, which list out information on every single union election.  I 
also use polling statistics throughout the study, including national level surveys on union 
attitudes which include demographic break outs.  Local surveys of organizing workers at 
Cannon Mills and Woodward & Lothrop allowed me to better understand these workers’ 
motivations.    
 
Conclusion  
Knocking on Labor’s Door complicates the scholarly conversation about how unions in 
the U.S. so dramatically weakened in the late twentieth century.  The fact that many 
unions were still organizing and millions of workers were still trying to join unions in the 
pivotal 1970s - - often led by the female and black workers who had long been excluded 
from the nation’s higher-paying jobs and unions - - disrupts standard narratives about 
labor and liberalism’s ultimate decline.  Many workers may have possessed 
individualistic attitudes and unions certainly could have organized more, but these 
shortcomings were not the deciding factors in labor’s decline.  The barriers these 
organizing workers encountered were deeply structural and the contours of those barriers 
are only becoming clear with more historical distance.  Employers in the U.S. had a large 
incentive to fight unions because unions forced employers to provide citizens with the 
fullest social welfare benefits the U.S. had to offer.   Federal policy continues to embrace 
this firm-based social welfare model in the early twenty-first century, yet still has not 
                                                             




strengthened workers’ access to collective bargaining, nor has the state created other, 
newer tools strong enough to force employers to provide the levels of job security, good 
wages, and guaranteed pensions once won through collective bargaining. The result is 
that unions’ decline has contributed to widespread economy inequality, stagnant wages, 
and increasing precarity for America’s working men and women. Any twenty-first 
century attempt to build power for working people in the U.S. economy will have to 
wrestle with these structures which so clearly disempower working people.     
This fact that U.S. labor law was too weak to uphold workers’ rights to form 
unions set the terms on which U.S. workers would encounter a globalizing and 
deindustrializing economy.  When they turned to unions to shore up their security, far too 
few were able to enter through labor’s doors.  Knocking on Labor’s Doors’ case studies 
on retail and textile workers remind us that while a global economy and the rise of the 
traditionally non-union retail and service were certainly key factors in labor’s decline, 
scholars should be wary of the idea that capitalism’s latest shifts inherently precluded 
working-class power.  No natural law says retail and service jobs must be bad jobs, that 
global interconnectedness must mean class disparity, nor that broad economic prosperity 
is unattainable today.   
“I think more unions, more working people, are going to get together, statewide, 
nationwide.  We know what we want, we want a fair shake,” asserted Peggy Carpenter in 
1981 soon after she and her co-workers won a union at Newport News shipyard.
61
  
Carpenter, of course, was wrong: U.S. workers did not organize at unprecedented levels 
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in the 1980s.  Carpenter’s hope and optimism, however, reminds us that even as the 
Reagan Administration took office, workers had reason to believe that they could win 
greater power at the workplace and in government.  This study asks readers to dwell in 
that moment when U.S. unions were still relatively strong, and when labor’s decline 
seemed far less certain.   There were more union members in the U.S. in 1979, 21 
million, than at any other point in the nation’s history.  Though the percentage of workers 
who had a union - - union density - - had been on a slow decline since its peak in 1954, a 
quarter of America’s nonagricultural workers had a union by the end of the 1970s 
(compared to 11.3 % in 2013).
62
   
In 2015, unions remain a state-backed income leveler for the few who can access 
them.  Union workers make 27 percent more than workers without a union, and that 
union difference rises to 33 percent for women and 31 percent for African-Americans.  
Union members are also far more likely to have good health care coverage and defined-
benefit pensions than are workers without a union.  This union differential was very 
similar in the late 1970s.
 
What has changed is that far fewer workers are privy to this 
more robust level of social welfare, and so declining unionization has helped drive the 
nation’s growing economic inequality. 
63
  
                                                             
62 1970s union density statistic found in Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 
90-91; 2013 membership and wage and benefits statistics found at Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Union 
Members -  2013,” http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (accessed December 21, 2014).  Note 
that the private sector union density was lower than the overall union density figure, which includes public 
sector union membership.    
63 Wage and benefits statistics found at Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Union Members -  2013.”   For 
information on unions and benefits and pensions see also Jake Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do and 
Richard Freeman, “Unions, Pensions and Union Pension Funds,” in Pensions, Labor and Individual 




Working people like Hooks and Carpenter had a vision for a very different 
economic future than the precarious, unequal one which actually developed by the end of 
the twentieth century.  They sought to win higher wages, good benefits, and control over 
the terms of their work by forming unions.  We will never know what would have 
happened if U.S. workers had succeeded more broadly in their organizing efforts.  We 
have no way of knowing what may have happened if working people had been allowed 
freer access to unions - -  as were those in other nations.  We will never know whether the 
resulting swell in unions’ ranks might have tempered neoliberal policies in the United 
States or tilted the political field in the working class’s favor.  What is clear is that when 
America’s workers faced a new economic structure in the 1970s, one which was more 
global and less industrial, they did so without having full access to unions and so faced 
those fundamental changes on much weaker footing.  What follows is the story of the 
working women and men who stood on the threshold of that change and who fought to 
















Organizing a Union for Social Welfare 
 
 Barbara Cash and her co-workers faced a social welfare dilemma in 1979.  Cash 
packed boxes for the Woodward & Lothrop department store in Washington, DC but she 
and her co-workers could not afford the company’s health care plan, and the few people 
who had pensions were the bosses.  Inflation was rampant, and nearly 70 percent of the 
workers had family incomes below what the federal government determined they needed 
just to get by.  While top management members had a carefully calibrated contract, 
including generous stock options and huge severance packages should they be laid off, 
Woodward and Lothrop’s rank-and-file workers had no such guarantee of economic 
security.  Though they had an independent union - - the Union of Woodward & Lothrop 
Employees - - it was a weak hold-over from a company union whose sole founding 
purpose had been to dodge the CIO in 1938.  “With a union you get a raise every 
year…with the independent union you got whatever they thought you should have, it 
wasn’t no set thing,” remembers Cash.
1
    Cash and her co-workers organized a new 
union with the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local 400 in 1979, and 
negotiated a strong collective bargaining agreement to shore up their social welfare.  
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They won an eight percent annual wage increase, a more robust retirement plan and an 




Barbara Cash’s story reminds us of the central role which firm-level collective 
bargaining played in the U.S. employer-based social welfare system.  If Cash had been 
born in another country - - in France, or Germany, for instance - - she would not have had 
to vote in a union election in order to receive robust social welfare provisions.  In fact, 
most of her social welfare would not have been determined by her employer at all.  
Rather, Cash would have received health care coverage and an ample retirement pension 
by virtue of citizenship, her wages would have been subjected to higher levels of 
government intervention, and her nation’s laws would have guaranteed her far more job 
protection.   In most European nations, collective bargaining covered far fewer social 
welfare issues than in the U.S, and it was also industry-wide, rather than firm by firm.
3
  
In the U.S., however, most citizens in the post-World War II era received social welfare 
provisions through their individual employers or a family member’s employer, a system 
one scholar labels a “public-private welfare state.”
4
  The government offered only a thin 
safety net, much of which also depended on employment, including a minimum wage and 
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Social Security provisions that benefitted mainly retirees.   In fact, many people in the 
U.S. received little to no social welfare at all, especially if they did not work for wages.  
So how did the U.S. ensure that its individual corporations continued to step up and fulfill 
their social welfare role?   The government provided some carrots, through what Jacob 
Hacker terms “hidden” state supports, like tax breaks for employer-provided health care.
5
  
It also relied on a big stick: firm-level collective bargaining through labor unions.    
Though at first glance collective bargaining - - negotiations over wages, benefits 
and working conditions - - seems to have been a private affair between a labor union and 
an employer, the government’s role was central.  Employers did not bargain collectively 
out of good will.  They did so because they were required by federal law to negotiate with 
employees who voted in a union. In fact, collective bargaining held a central place in the 
nation’s post-World War II “welfare regime,” the multi-layered framework of policies 
and public and private institutions promoting social welfare.
6
   Collective bargaining 
enabled unions to set higher wage and benefits standards not only for union members but 
for much of the industrial economy because employers routinely followed the lead of the 
unionized industrial giants in pay and benefits.
7
  Collective bargaining thus undergirded 
the most robust and secure tier of the U.S. public-private welfare regime.  “Organized 
labor wasn’t simply a minor bit player in the ‘golden age’ of welfare capitalism in the 
United States,” notes Jake Rosenfeld in What Unions No Longer Do.  “It was the core 
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  In the U.S., unions made sure that rising productivity translated 
into rising wages and thus bore the weight of economic redistribution that the state bore 
in many European countries in the post-World War II period.
9
  Collective bargaining did 
not lift everyone, however. Historians have made clear how the U.S. social welfare 
regime developed as stratified, with the highest tier reserved for the white men most 
likely to hold the unionized, industrial jobs at its core.
10
  Yet women and people of color 
gained new access to the nation’s best jobs following the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
many of them quickly turned to organizing new unions in order to shore up their 
economic security.  They understood that union organizing was the entryway into 
collective bargaining and a lever for increasing their levels of social welfare provisions.   
Scholars of the social welfare state have identified collective bargaining’s central 
place in the U.S. welfare regime, yet many treat the institution as static and monolithic.
11
  
In fact, from a worker’s perspective, collective bargaining was quite fluid.  Workers 
routinely dropped out of its reach when they or a family member lost a job.  Like Barbara 
Cash, they sometimes switched a weak union for a strong one.  Those who were not 
union members, meanwhile, had three ways to enter collective bargaining’s influence: 
they could organize a union, get a job in a unionized facility, or get a job with an 
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employer that matched unionized wage and benefit levels.  In each case, someone - - 
somewhere, at some point in time - - had to organize a union.  Union organizing thus held 
a very specific and heretofore understudied place within the U.S. public-private welfare 
regime.  It was the narrow door through which America’s working men and women had 
to enter before they could benefit from collective bargaining’s leavening effects and 
before they could harness the state’s full redistributive power.   
Union organizing, however, turned out to be an Achilles heel when it came to 
achieving broad, sustained economic prosperity.  When the U.S. developed an employer-
based social welfare system after World War II, unions took on the responsibility of chief 
negotiator for the social wage and the new employer-provided benefits. Yet at that same 
historical moment, developments in labor and employment law - - triggered by the Taft-
Hartley Act - - gave employers new power to narrow workers’ access to those very same 
unions.  This contradictory situation limited the post-war reach of that liberalizing 
economic and political project scholars have called the “New Deal Order.”
12
   Employers 
in the U.S. bore an outsized role in social welfare provision, and they had a higher 
incentive to resist workers’ union organizing efforts than did employers in nations where 
the state provided more social welfare.  Nevertheless, it was not until they faced 
increased global competition in the 1970s that employers moved en masse to close off 
private-sector workers’ access to union organizing, such as by successfully attacking 
workers’ organizing efforts at the workplace.
13
  In rolling back organizing, employers 
limited their own future social welfare obligations. Yet they also restricted workers’ 
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access to the public-private welfare regime’s most secure tier, and hastened the nation 
toward increased economic inequality and precarity.   
 
How U.S. Workers Won and Lost the Right to Organize a Union 
Private-sector workers in the U.S first gained a permanent right to organize unions with 
the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or the Wagner Act.  This New Deal 
legislation grew out of Progressive Era experiments with government support for 
collective bargaining.
14
  Congress mandated that workers had the “full freedom of 
association” and protected their right to “designation of representatives of their own 
choosing, for purposes of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment…”
15
 
Under the Wagner Act, if the government certified that the workers had a union, then the 
company was obligated to enter into collective bargaining.  Not only that, but the Wagner 
Act made it the “policy of the United States” to protect this right.
16
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In its early years, the NLRA’s enforcement agency, the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), required employers to remain neutral on the issue of a union.
17
   In the 
first five years after the NLRA’s passage, the NLRB even certified workers’ unions 
without an election in about a quarter of cases if workers could prove through a petition, 
strike list, or show of membership cards that a majority supported the union.
18
  The 
employer was not supposed to weigh in on the election process because, according to the 
NLRB, an “employer cannot express his opinion in a vacuum. Behind what he says lies 
the full weight of his economic position, based upon this control over the livelihood of 
his employees.”
19
 When the NLRB came under fire from conservative members of 
Congress in 1939, it began to change policy and generally required elections.  In 1941 the 
Supreme Court decided employers could weigh in during those elections as long as they 
were not “coercive.” One management journal fully appreciated the significance of the 
chance to electioneer, calling it “a bargaining tool par excellence for industry” and 
lamented that so few employers actually used that tool.
20
  Before and during the war, the 
board’s enforcement remained vigorous and employers remained relatively in check. U.S. 
workers were still routinely able to form unions and won more than three-quarters of 
union elections in the 1940s, though they had less success and ran into more employer 
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resistance in the South.
21
  Unionization efforts soared to all-time highs during World War 
II, when more than a million workers each year voted in union elections.
22
  Yet 
conservative lawmakers and employers never truly gave up, pushing legislation to 
weaken the NLRB in the 1940 Smith Act, for instance.
23
  
The U.S. political economy was deeply in flux following the war, and it was not 
at all clear whether the U.S. would weaken or strengthen the state’s role in citizens’ 
social welfare. Labor demanded a more robust state presence and pushed for, though 
failed to pass, universal health coverage in the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, full 
employment legislation that would guarantee all workers a job, and even legislation that 
would link wages to prices.
24
  Meanwhile, the Republican-dominated Congress 
successfully pushed through the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, overriding a presidential veto.  
Taft-Hartley constituted a major revision to the Wagner Act and dramatically weakened 
unions on many fronts, including making it harder for workers to form unions.  It 
required an election for certification, unless the company waived that right, and codified 
employers’ right to campaign speech, short of making threats. It also gave management 
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the right to trigger union elections in certain cases.
25
  Taft-Hartley opened the door to 
increased employer influence on union elections by reinserting employers squarely into 
the election process, and so marked a turning point in workers’ freedom to organize.
26
   
Most employers, however, did not make full use of their new prerogatives to resist union 
organizing until the 1970s when they faced increased global competition.  
Even as the Taft-Hartley Act set the stage for employers to restrict workers’ 
access to unions, those same unions began to take on a far greater responsibility for 
negotiating citizens’ social wage after World War II.  While labor had long pushed for 
universal benefits and scorned employer-provided ones, unions shifted tactics in the mid -
1940s.  United Mineworker (UMW) President John Lewis first demanded a company-
funded, union-based health and welfare provision in the 1945-46 round of bargaining, 
and United Auto Worker (UAW) President Walter Reuther also began to prioritize health 
care for the first time in 1946.  They did so because their legislative attempts to build a 
cradle to grave social safety net had failed when conservative lawmakers refused to 
expand social welfare programs.  They also needed ways to secure economic advances 
for members that would not fall under the growing income tax.  Taft-Hartley’s “right-to-
work” provision allowed states to ban the union shop, and union leaders also turned to 
negotiating health and retirement plans as a way to offer members new reasons to remain 
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within the union’s fold.  Union-negotiated benefits could provide the kind of glue that 
unions needed to make workers stick with them.
27
  
Companies and conservative lawmakers resisted unions’ efforts to increase their 
role in negotiating the nation’s social wage.  They did not want workers to have a say in 
employer-provided benefits, arguing that benefits were not issues that should be subject 
to government-mandated collective bargaining. After all, employers had traditionally 
only offered health care and retirement policies to a few select managers. They 
understood that such benefits were the new shop-level battle, and they wanted to drive 
unions farther away from their members.  Historian Jennifer Klein describes how 
employers successfully pushed Taft-Hartley’s sponsors to outlaw the kinds of union-run 
benefit plans with which the movement had been experimenting.
28
  Instead, union welfare 
trust funds were only permitted if administered jointly with employers, what would 
become known as “Taft-Hartley” plans.  Employers won this class battle at the 
Congressional level with the passage of Taft-Hartley.  But then the judicial and executive 
branches legitimated labor’s ability to bargain over health and pension benefits.
29
  The 
1948 Inland Steel NLRB decision opened the door for unions to bargain on health care 
and retirement plans, and a 1949 Truman fact-finding board on a major steel strike 
ordered the company to bargain on issues of benefits.
30
  The next several years were 
contentious ones as employers and workers struggled over the developing public-private 
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social safety net.  Fifty-five percent of the strikes in 1949 and 70 percent in the first half 
of 1950 were over health and welfare issues.
31
   
The end result was that collective bargaining became a centerpiece of the public-
private welfare regime from the 1950s through the early 1980s.  By 1954, three-quarters 
of union members were covered by a health plan or pension through collective 
bargaining, up from one-eighth in 1948.
32
  At first, these gains were limited to union 
members, but over the ensuring decades these union benefits spread.  A mere 16 percent 
of workers had regular medical coverage in 1950, but nearly 70 percent did 25 years 
later.  Only 23 percent of U.S. workers had a pension plan in 1950.
33
 By 1979, 83 percent 
of unionized workers had a company-provided pension as did 39 percent of workers 
without a union.
34
  “Taft-Hartley” plans, meanwhile, developed into collectively-
bargained, multi-employer health and welfare funds covering millions of workers, 
especially in the building and construction trades.
35
   Unions continued to lift workers’ 
wages, too. By the time Barbara Cash formed her union in 1979, workers with a union 
earned 27 percent more than those without a union.
36
  Workers also used their unions to 
improve their control over their work lives, building a system of workplace jurisprudence 
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that allowed them to make sure the most senior workers were promoted first, for instance, 
or to appeal supervisors’ unfair penalties.
37
  
Collective bargaining impacted even workers without unions as employers in 
major industries matched unionized gains. Ninety-six percent of manufacturing 
employers, for instance, reported in 1979 that they did wage surveys to set rates, a 
practice which allowed union-negotiated rates to drive up standards.
38
  One business 
school professor studied 26 non-union companies - - such as Black & Decker, Eli Lilly, 
Gillette, IBM, and Polaroid - - over 30 years, and found that they followed organized 
companies in setting wages and benefit rates up through the early 1980s.
39
  When some 
workers within a big firm had a union and others did not, many firms adopted the 
unionized rates in order to contain unions.
40
 “You get the same benefits - - union or non-
union,” one GE executive assured a group of workers who were about to vote on whether 
to form a union in Bangor, Maine in 1978.
41
    
In fact, union organizing itself helped drive up wages and benefits, even when the 
workers never won their unions.  One 1970 study of employers facing unionization drives 
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revealed that 92 percent changed their employment policies during the time of the 
campaign, including 52 percent who gave their workers raises and 23 percent who raised 
benefits.
42
  The textile workers union - - in an industry that was only ten percent 
unionized in the South - - proactively used the threat of Southern unionization to raise all 
textile workers’ pay.  In doing so, they also sought to lift union wages in their Northern 
shops.  For over twenty years, the union engaged in what it called “Southern wage 
agitation drives” in which each year they would pick dozens of non-union plants to target 
for mass leafleting  before going to the bargaining table for unionized workers.
43
  “Good 
things don’t just happen,” urged one such leaflet, with a tear off union card at the bottom.  
Sometimes these leaflets did generate organizing leads, but mostly they were a strategy to 
force management’s hand, remembered the union’s former research director, Keir 
Jorgensen.
44
  Management’s fear of unions drove up wages. One management consultant 
urged all employers to follow “union-free standards” and give workers “competitive 
wages and benefits equal to (or preferably better than) that of both union and non-union 
competitors…”
45
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By the late 1960s, the most secure tier of the U.S. employer-based welfare regime 
was finally opening up to people like Cash, an African-American woman, under pressure 
from the Civil Rights movement and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   In 
previous decades, many women and people of color had found themselves beyond 
collective bargaining’s reach.
46
  Partly this was a matter of jurisprudence.  The policy 
makers who created the New Deal effectively excluded many people of color and women 
from the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the law that gave private-sector 
workers the right to form unions.  Like the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1938 Fair 
Labor Standards Act, the NLRA did not cover the jobs women and people of color were 
most likely to hold, such as those in agriculture and domestic service.
47
  Yet the fact that 
women and people of color had long found themselves outside collective bargaining’s 
sphere of influence was also a matter of de facto injustice.  Many employers refused to 
hire them for the good, industrial jobs most likely to be covered by or influenced by 
collective bargaining, and many unions excluded them from membership.
 48
 As many 
black and women workers entered the workforce, they turned to organizing unions.  By 
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the late 1970s, nearly one in four black women who worked in the private-sector was a 
union member.
49
   
Cash got her job at Woodward & Lothrop in 1966, just as the company began 
hiring more than a few token black workers. Cash was part of a younger, more diverse 
workforce which was very keen on pushing out the company-influenced union, and 
organizing its own new union in order to improve workers’ jobs.  Yet by the time Barbara 
Cash and her co-workers formed a union with the UFCW in 1979, they found that union 
organizing in the U.S. had become a very onerous process. It would not be enough for a 
majority of them to sign union cards, as was the case in much of Canada, or to simply 
declare their interest in a union, as in Sweden.  They had no guaranteed legal right to a 
union in every workplace, as in Germany.
 50
   Rather, Barbara Cash and the Woodward & 
Lothrop workers would first have to prove to the government that at least 30 percent of 
them wanted a union - - usually by signing union cards.  Then they would have to endure 
what was typically an eight to ten-week campaign period in which employers 
campaigned against the union, routinely pulling employees off their jobs and forcing 
them to listen to anti-union propaganda. Their employer could even prohibit them from 
speaking in these meetings.  The union, meanwhile, would be barred from entering the 
workplace.  By the time of Cash’s union election, 30 percent of employers facing a union 
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campaign fired at least one worker.
51
  Yet such employers did not incur large fines or 
penalties if caught - - they simply had to rehire the worker, pay the lost wages, and hang a 
blue and white sign in the break room stating they had broken the law.  Only if half of the 
workers were still willing to vote for a union after this fraught campaign would the 
NLRB mandate that the employer sit down and negotiate a worksite-specific collective 
bargaining agreement which would finally provide job security and better wages and 
benefits.  This dysfunctional union election process became the mechanism by which 
many U.S. workers, like Cash, had to access their nation’s fullest social welfare system.   
How had it gotten so difficult to organize a union by the late 1970s?  While over 
the decades after Taft-Hartley’s passage the NLRB fluctuated in how it interpreted 
organizing law (often depending on which political party held the White House), the 
general thrust was that the NLRB steadily ceded its role as referee. Employers then 
pressed that advantage, starting in the 1970s.
52
  Consider, for instance, the issue of 
whether employers could force their workers to attend company meetings against the 
union, often known as “captive audience” meetings.  The original Wagner Act’s 
neutrality rule barred such meetings and, in fact, the Board explicitly prohibited such 
meetings in the 1946 Clark Bros. Co case.  The Board reversed position, however, citing 
Taft-Hartley as the reason in its 1948 Babcock & Wilcox decision, which allowed 
employers to force workers to attend meetings against the union.
53
  The Truman NLRB 
ruled that unions had the right to reply if employers held such meetings in the 1951 
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Bonwit Teller case, but then in 1953 the Eisenhower board stripped unions of that same 
right in the Livingston Shirt Corp case.
54
  A series of decisions in the late 1960s further 
determined that employers could prohibit workers from discretely leaving the room 
during such meetings while at the same time also could refuse to let union supporters join 
the meeting.
55
  By the mid -1970s, the end result was that employers could legally cherry 
pick out the workers who were undecided about the union, force them to attend coercive 
meetings against the union, and never be required to allow the union equal say.  For 
example, when textile worker Cynthia Hanes spoke up in favor of a union during such a 
mandatory meeting at Cannon Mills in 1985, the company threw her out.  “I wanted to go 
to a meeting so when they started telling their lies, I could embarrass them…That’s why 
they didn’t want me in there.”
56
 This was a far cry from the neutrality required by the 
original Wagner Act.   The number of employers requiring such meetings increased by a 
third in the thirty years between 1968 and the late 1990s, when nearly all employers held 
mandatory-attendance “captive audience” meetings.
57
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Or consider the NLRB’s treatment of companies’ threats to shut down if the 
workers voted in a union.  The NLRB first softened Taft-Hartley’s impact soon after its 
passage in the General Shoe decision in 1948, requiring that union elections must take 
place in “laboratory conditions” free from such coercion.  Even if an employer did not 
expressly violate the law, if it created a coercive atmosphere, the election could be 
considered invalid. 
58
  Nevertheless, in the early 1950s the NLRB decided that an 
employer was within legal bounds when it predicted it would have to close to meet 
unions’ wage demands.
59
  The board reversed that rule in 1962, deciding that such 
predictions of company closure were actually threats. 
60
  Yet in the 1970s the board 
reversed policy yet again, making such threats legal as long as the company did not 
threaten to close solely because of the union.
61
  By the 1990s, half of all employers facing 
worker organizing campaigns threatened to shut down if the workers formed a union.
62
 
Organizing a union also became more difficult because, in the 1970s, a new breed 
of management consultants began to teach employers exactly how to threaten their 
workers and use their legal advantage in union organizing contests.  “The employer’s 
greater opportunity to communicate with its employees, the virtually complete access to 
the minds of the voters during working hours, and the control management could exert 
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over employees gave the employer a considerable advantage over his union 
counterparts,” asserted Alfred DeMaria, one of the most well-known anti-union 
consultants of the decade.
63
  Employers began to break the law far more frequently, and 
state penalties were scant.  The number of unfair labor practice charges around such labor 
law violations as threats and harassments increased sevenfold between 1950 and 1980 to 
over 30,000 a year.
64
  Though technically unions could commit unfair labor practices too, 
like making threats, the NLRB found that employers were at fault in 82 percent of the 
cases with merit.
65
  But even when the NLRB faulted the employer, little happened.  
Anti-union consultant Fred R. Long of West Coast Industrial Relations Associates, for 
instance, was captured on tape in 1976 telling a room of clients, “What happens if you 
violate the law.  The probability is you will never get caught.  If you do get caught, the 
worst thing that can happen to you is you get a second election and the employer wins 96 
percent of those second elections.” 
66
  
A contrast with public sector union organizing is instructive and serves as a foil 
against which to track the trajectory of private sector union elections.  When public sector 
workers tried to form unions, they were usually successful in doing so, even during the 
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1970s and 1980s when private sector workers faced such heavy employer resistance.  
Public sector employers rarely fought their efforts with the same vehemence.  Federal 
government workers first won the right to collective bargaining in 1962 when President 
John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988, covering two million federal workers.  
State and city-level public sector workers won the right to form unions over the course of 
the 1960s and early 1970s when many states passed new laws allowing public workers to 
collectively bargain. By 1975, public workers could legally collectively bargain in 36 
states.
67
   Whereas in the mid-1950s, virtually no public sector workers had unions, by the 
mid-1980s over 40 percent of public sector workers were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, compared to 14 percent in the private sector.
68
  Public sector union 
organizing continued its momentum into the 1970s as an average of 400,000 government 
workers flocked to unions each year, including many women and people of color. 
Teachers, fire fighters, public office workers and sanitation workers all organized and 
successfully won the right to enter into the collective bargaining relationship, even as 
their counterparts in the private sector found their unionization wave broken apart by the 
shoals of unchecked employer resistance. 
69
     
When employers manipulated weak labor law and made it more difficult for 
workers to walk through labor’s door, unions were hard pressed to fulfill their obligations 
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as chief negotiators for the social wage.  They sunk increasingly scarce resources into 
negotiating and servicing the collective bargaining agreements which redistributed the 
nation’s corporate wealth, but too often they found they had to do so at the expense of 
fresh organizing.   Union leaders were thus stymied when they essentially had to 
administer parts of the employer-based social welfare state and simultaneously expand its 
limits.  “There is a strong tendency, given the many frustrations of organizing and 
servicing demands for staff time, to slip away from organizing,” the AFL-CIO’s 
Organizing Director Alan Kistler wrote to its president, Lane Kirkland, in 1980.
70
  Union 
leaders felt the pressures of the competing demands.  “Some unions, including our own, 
have shifted from organizing to bargaining and servicing,” said Ken Brown, president of 
the Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU) in a 1984 top-level AFL-CIO 
strategy session in which leaders wrestled with how to handle plummeting union 
membership.   “By the very regularity of contract,  bargaining is regularly thrust upon us; 
We have to do that.” 
71
  By the mid-1980s, unions had pulled back on union organizing 
efforts through the NLRB, and were bringing half as many workers to the union voting 
booth as in the 1970s.
72
 
After employers successfully limited workers’ ability to organize new unions, 
they no longer feared union organizing, and so stopped trying to avoid unionization by 
meeting unionized wage and benefit standards.  The result was that employers effectively 
shirked the social welfare role for which collective bargaining had been the big stick.   
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Collective bargaining does still make quite a difference for the people covered by union 
contracts.  Union members’ wages were more than a fourth larger than those of workers 
without a union in 2015 and union members had twice the level of employer-provided 
benefits. But there simply are fewer union members in 2015, and so fewer people benefit 
from this union premium. 
73
  Unions are no longer able to lift many boats in the way they 
once did and, after the 1970s, union and nonunion wages and benefits became decoupled.  
The pull of unions on the nonunion wage market has shrunk by as much as 40 percent 
since the early 1970s and this, in turn, has deepened income inequality.
74
  Though today’s 
inequality is often seen as a product of stratospheric pay rises at the top of the scale, such 
as among lavishly-paid CEOs, falling wages in the middle and at the bottom are also a 
key driver. 
75
  Median family income doubled between 1949 and 1979, growing along 
with productivity, but then growth slowed to a crawl as the wealthy few began to earn far 
more than average people.
76
  Globalization and technological change fed the inequality 
gap, yet so did de-unionization.  One-third of the income inequality among men, and one-
fifth among women, was due to the drop in union density between 1973 and 2007, 
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according to Bruce Western and Jack Rosenfeld.  Their research controls for education 
levels and also examines the union effect on nonunion wages - - such as through the 
threat of union organizing.  They found that the decline of organized labor among men 
contributed as much to men’s wage gap as did pay stratification by education.
77
    
The shortening of collective bargaining’s reach also weakened workers’ access to 
employer-provided health and retirement plans. The late 1970s was the peak of the levels 
of such plans.  Nearly half of all workers received pensions and 80 percent of Americans 
were covered by private hospital and surgical coverage by the end of that decade, the 
same moment when union membership peaked in absolute numbers.
78
  When union 
membership shrunk and unions became less of an organizing threat, employers were free 
to sever the link between union and non-union benefits.  While unionized workers have 
seen the benefits portion of their compensation rise 50 percent since the 1970s, the 
nonunion share has increased only 33 percent.
79
   The state, meanwhile, has done little to 
fill in the nation’s shredded social welfare net. Wages lag, guaranteed pensions have gone 
the way of the dinosaurs and workers’ health care costs continue to climb (though the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 has offered a step in the other direction.)   
In the 1970s, however, this overall downward trajectory in union membership, 
income equality, and social welfare provision was by no means certain. America’s 
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workers - - like Barbara Cash and her co-workers at Woodward & Lothrop department 
store - - understood that if you wanted economic security and social welfare guarantees in 
the U.S., a union contract was your best bet.  They joined the ranks of millions of 
workers who tried to form union in this pivotal decade, knocking on labor’s door even as 
the economy was turning toward increased precariousness.  It is their story to which we 






America’s Newest Workers Went Knocking 
 
Henry Davison left his hometown of Monroe, Louisiana in 1965 because, as a 
young black man, “I couldn’t find a job…People in Monroe wanted to pay you two 
dollars an hour, but when you’d go out to buy a car it would cost the same as up 
North.”  Davison found work in Chicago at a Ford assembly plant and only returned 
home to Monroe in the mid-1970s to raise his family.  He landed a job at General 
Motor’s new Guide lamp plant in 1976 where he was still getting paid less than 
workers up North: “It began to gnaw on me some - - a few of us began to talk about 
how it wasn’t right that we were being discriminated against.”   Davison and his co-
workers began to organize with the UAW and voted 323-280 in favor of the union in 
late 1976.  When they negotiated their first union contract in 1977, they won far more 
economic and social welfare security, such as an $80 a week raise and the same vision 
and dental plans enjoyed by GM workers who had long had a UAW contract. “I 
walked into that plant today and felt like my job was secure for the first time since I 
started working for GM,” said Davis as he began working under the new agreement.
1
 
Historians have overlooked stories like that of Henry Davison.  The dominant 
historical narrative of working-class decline in the 1970s has no place for a black man 
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who returned to the South and successfully unionized his auto plant.
2
  Yet Henry Davison 
was far from alone in his desire to form a union in order to improve his job and his 
family’s economic standing; he was part of the unstudied wave of private-sector workers 
who pushed to form unions in the 1970s.
 
  More than five million workers voted in NLRB 
elections in this decade.
3
  Who were these workers and what did they want?  They were 
the women and people of color who in previous decades had been denied full access to 
the nation’s best jobs but by the 1970s benefitted from the new laws and expectations 
about the workplace won by the Civil Rights movement.  Many were Sunbelt workers 
whose unionizing efforts increased dramatically in the 1970s.  These Southern efforts 
were buoyed by people like Davison who were among the more than two million 
African-Americans who have joined the reverse migration to Southern states since 1970.
4
   
Immigrant workers in urban areas led unionizing attempts. The organizing workers also 
included many young boomers who had a new sense of their rights, having grown up 
amidst the nation’s Civil Rights and Vietnam era protests.  They were just entering the 
workforce and assumed the U.S. economy would continue to grow and prosper.  They 
wanted to share in the economic feast.
 
  
 These workers’ expectations of continued economic expansion turned out to be 
unfounded, however, for the nation’s growth reversed sharply in the 1970s.  The troubles 
started in the late 1960s when America’s corporations faced their first substantial global 
competition since World War II, and began to see their profits squeezed.  Though some 
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industries like steel and textile had struggled for years, in the years between 1965 and 
1973, the rate of profit growth for all private business fell sharply.  Many were alarmed 
when the nation imported more merchandise than it exported starting in 1971, for the first 
time since 1893.  The U.S. then faced quick external economic shocks, such as the oil 
crisis and the end of the fixed currency world system put in place following World War 
II.  Then in 1975, a recession rocked the nation.  Unemployment rose to 8.5 percent, and 
inflation reached a postwar high of 9.1 percent.
5
  It was no cyclical crisis.  Instead, it was 
the beginning of a new economic paradigm of much slower growth and falling wages, 
which grew from long-term structural changes underneath these quick economic shocks.  
Wages had risen along with productivity for decades, but starting in the 1970s they were 
decoupled.  By the early 1980s, working people’s share of the economy, or the gross 
domestic product, started to decline - something that many economists thought would 
never happen.  Meanwhile, inequality deepened.  Eighty percent of the total increases in 
American income went to the top one percent of Americans, from 1980 to 2005.  Starting 
in the 1970s the jobs themselves began to change and America’s working people faced an 
economy that was increasingly global, focused on service, retail and finance, and marked 
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by much more temporary and part-time work.  The 1970s held the beginnings of the 




   
 Many scholars of the working class have focused on the dissociation that resulted 
when this mix of racial and gender progress, growth expectations, and protest met with 
the economic crisis.  They highlight the rising support for George Wallace, the protests 
against integrated school busing, and the planting of the grassroots conservative seeds 
that led to the era of Reagan.   The unionized construction workers who beat up Vietnam 
War protestors figure prominently in narratives of the dissociation within the white 
working class which, in the words of one writer, was “mad as hell.”  In this narrative, the 
old institutions of labor had less relevance and power: the individual rights consciousness 
that grew out of the Civil Rights movement held more salience in the public’s 
imagination than the New Deal collectivity that had once built up unions.
7
   
There was indeed dissociation within the 1970s working-class experience.  
Racism and hatred drove people apart when there was less money to go around.  Yet 
there was also a re-formation to make up something new: a reconfigured and newly-
energized working class.  Women, African-Americans, Hispanics and other people of 
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color had long been part of the working class, of course.  Some members of these 
groups had worked for wages for over a century and a half, and even when they were 
not wage earners, they were part of the working-class through their families and the 
neighborhoods in which they grew up.
8
  Nevertheless, by the 1970s, these groups had 
gained new access to far more positions in the U.S. workforce.  Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination on the job by race, sex and nationality, 
marking the single biggest challenge to employers’ workplace power since the 
passage of the Wagner Act.   These new employment standards would also be 
available to new immigrants entering the country after the passage of the 1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart Cellar Act).  White male privilege at work had 
been dealt a heavy blow, and the wave of young baby boomers just entering the 
workforce found a changed landscape.  Whole groups of people had permanent 
opportunities open to them that simply had not been available to their parents, whether 
that meant young black workers pouring into Southern industry or women building 
careers.  As these groups entered the workforce in new ways, they demanded full 
access to the coveted, highest-paying jobs.  After all, they too shared in assumptions 
of growth and had come of age in a period of protest.  They were ready to push for 
their rights.  Thus, when their path to economic security seemed threatened by the 
recessions and economic turmoil, they used their new understandings about their 
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rights to take on their employers in numerous venues, including collectively through 
union organizing campaigns.
9
   
 Working men and women passed out union cards in the nations’ factories, stores, 
restaurants and hotels in the 1970s.  Flight attendants rallied to demand unions, 
secretaries wrote manifestos, professional football players insisted on their unionizing 
rights, and hospital workers embraced with gusto their new legal right to organize.   
Employees of the Midwest Stock Exchange unionized as did bicycle couriers and bank 
employees in Washington, DC.  Auto workers at Volkswagen, the nation’s first foreign 
car assembly transplant, went union in 1978. When 450 mostly young employees of the 
Yosemite Park and Curry Company said they wanted a union in 1976, NLRB agents rode 
on horseback out to their remote camps with collapsible ballot boxes strapped to the 
horses’ sides.  The workers voted in a union two-to-one.
10
  
Private-sector union organizing efforts were not the only realm in which this 
reconfigured working class fought for more footing and rights. Strikes, campaigns for 
union democracy and public sector union organizing were also key.  The strike wave of 
the early 1970s was unlike any the nation had seen since 1946.  In 1970 alone, one in six 
of the nation’s union members went on strike, such as the huge (illegal) walkout among 
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150,000 postal workers – including many people of color.
11
  Jefferson Cowie misses the 
mark when he argues that the big strikes were over by the end of the decade. Though 
there were fewer strikes by the end of the decade than at the high-water mark in 1970, 
workers kept walking out in impressive numbers right up until 1979. There were 11 
strikes in 1979 that involved 10,000 workers or more, including over 200,000 truckers 
and 47,000 workers at United Airlines.
12
  Miners struck for 110 days in late 1977 and 
early 1978, forcing President Carter to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act to get them back to 
work.
13
  A comparison to later years puts the breadth of even the late 1970s strike activity 
into sharp relief.  In 1979, workers in large workplaces idled the nation for more than 
20,000 manpower days, a number that would plummet to a mere 7000 by 1985 and an 
almost non-existent 290 by 2013.
14
  
The 1970s were also the years of huge movements aimed at making unions more 
democratic and inclusive. Young rank-and-file members pushed the boundaries of their 
unions’ bureaucracies. Union members in the Teamsters, United Mineworkers (UMW) 
and the United Autoworkers (UAW) all formed internal democracy organizations and 
women banded together to form the Coalition of Union Women (CLUW).  Black trade 
unionists disillusioned with the union movement’s slow progress on racial inclusion 
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formed a range of groups from the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU) to the 
Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM).  Ed Sadlowski made a failed bid for 
the presidency of the Steelworkers union, running on a platform of more militancy and 
racial inclusion through the Steelworkers Fight Back organization.
15
    
The same energy that pulsed through these strikes and internal union reform 
efforts fed unionizing efforts in both the public and private sectors.  In 1971, the AFL-
CIO’s organizing department urged its leadership to build on this momentum, arguing 
that after the “civil rights revolution of the 60’s…blacks and Mexican-Americans … see 
the relationship of progress toward first-class citizenship to their organizational activity 
with respect to job rights and economic progress…”
16
 In fact, an average of half a million 
private-sector workers a year attempted to form unions in the 1970s, a level of organizing 
that was akin to that of the 1950s and 1960s.  By the 1970s, however, the landscape of 
union organizing had changed in two ways.  First, the union organizing attempts were led 
by a reconfigured working class.  Second, these working people were far less likely to 
win their union elections than were working people in previous generations.   While 
workers won roughly 80 percent of the union elections in the 1950s, by the mid-1970s 
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they were losing more than half of the time because they faced increasingly activist 
employers and weakening state support for labor law.
17
   
Scholars, however, have too often conflated workers’ union election losses with 
their union organizing activism. This blind spot privileges the end result of the corporate 
attack on unions, and obscures workers’ sustained and energetic interest in union 
organizing. What follows is thus a broad, national-level look at workers’ union 
organizing attempts - - their hopes and efforts, their successes and failures.   Only 
through such a broad lens is it possible to see the promise of a newly-diversified 
workforce of the 1970s, and to fully understand the magnitude of the loss when the 
corporate attack on union organizing closed off these workers’ access to the most robust 
version of the U.S. social welfare regime.   
 
Young Boomers Sought Unions 
Driving much of this class tumult were the baby boomers who entered America’s 
workplaces in the 1960s. By 1976 nearly half the nation’s workforce was under the age of 
35.
18
 Some scholars have found boomers individualistic and despondent by the 1970s, 
and far less likely than their parents or grandparents to turn to the collectivity of unions.
19
 
                                                             
17 For further information on employer resistance to unions in the 1970s, see chapter three.  Goldfield, The 
Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 90-91; Freeman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, 221-
245.  
18 Robert I. Lerman, Stefanie R. Schmidt, An Overview of Economic, Social and Demographic Trends 
Affecting the US Labor Market, Table 1 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1999) accessed June 2, 





Yet polling shows that young workers were, in fact, more open to unions than were older 
workers.  Forty-five percent of blue-collar workers under 25 said they would vote yes in a 
union election, nearly twice as much as the 28 percent of over 55’s who would vote yes, 
according to study funded by the Department of Labor in 1977.  Gallup polling showed 
that a higher percentage of people under 30 approved of unions than did the general 
public in 1981.
20
 Local surveys of working people facing actual unionization drives 
confirm that young people were the most interested in organizing.   Workers under the 
age of 35 at the Woodward & Lothrop department store, for example, were nearly twice 
as likely as were older workers to support a union.
21
  
Young workers’ interest in organizing unions was part of their wider discontent 
and new sense of rights, both in work and society at large.   That discontent drove the 
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well-publicized 1972 strike among young insurgents at the Chevy Vega plant in 
Lordstown, a cross-race rebellion in which workers sought to seize back control over 
their lives on the production line.
22
   Yet young workers also pushed the boundaries in 
their work lives in ways that did not make the headlines, such as in high rates of 
absenteeism, quitting, and doing poor work.  At one Ford plant, the quit rate hit 25 
percent in 1972.
23
  New expectations about their rights shaped this younger generation’s 
work experience.  Alton Glass, for instance, followed his father into the Newport News 
shipyard.  His father was the son of sharecroppers and spent most of his life in a 
segregated South. As a young black man of the 1970s, Glass felt more able than did his 
father to engage in activism and take on racism in the yard:  “Where my Dad would tell 
me to shut up… I wouldn’t shut up. And my supervisors, who were older and white, 
would expect me to shut up.  And I wouldn’t.”  Glass later went on to serve as president 
of his local union.
24
  
Boomers’ experience with the Vietnam War also mattered to union organizing in 
two ways.  A number of middle-class, anti-war activists from the New Left developed 
into labor activists, often getting manufacturing jobs with the intent of organizing them, 
or serving as union organizers among health care and clerical workers.
25
  Meanwhile, 
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Vietnam veterans often led unionizing efforts when they returned to the workforce. Upon 
returning from Vietnam, Jacob Little helped organize a union at the Eagle and Phenix 
mill in Columbus, Georgia in 1979.  As a young black man who had grown up in the 
segregated South, he built his unionizing efforts on the confidence he gained from 
supervising white soldiers.
26
  “The employer has to realize that he owns the plant, but he 
doesn’t own the employees,” asserted Bernard Mings, a Vietnam veteran fired for trying 
to form a union at Ingersoll-Rand in Campbellsville, Kentucky in 1976.
27
    
Employers were well aware that their young workforces were pushing back at a 
new level, and they worried about the impact of young workers’ new-found freedoms.  
“They want - - and, indeed demand - - relevant and significant jobs from the beginning of 
their career.  If such jobs are not assigned to them they are very inclined to leave the 
company and look elsewhere,” complained one executive of Union Carbide 
Corporation.
28
  In a book entitled, “How to Maintain Non-Union Status,” anti-union 
consultants warned that employers must deal with young workers’ changing attitudes in 
order to combat unions.   “Those of you who deal with younger workers often hear: ‘This 
job is boring.  This job is dull.  Why do we have to do this?’” The consultants urged 
employers to do career planning with young employees and open up paths to job 
advancement in order to avoid unions.
29
 
                                                             
26 Minchin, Hiring the Black Worker, 246 – 247. 
27 “For Labor Law Victims: Time to Be Heard,” AFL-CIO American Federationist, June 1978, 4.    
28 Sam Zagoria, “Rebellion and Reform: Workers in Revolt,” The Washington Post, February 6, 1972.  
29 Cornelius Quinn, Thomas Hill, and James L. Nichols, Maintaining Nonunion Status (Boston, Mass.: CBI 




An influx of young black workers sometimes tipped the scales toward the union 
as these workers organized at new levels, especially in the South. Consider the case of 
Monroe Auto Equipment Company in Hartwell, Georgia, where in the early 1960s a 
nearly all-white workforce hung Walter Reuther in effigy, beat union organizers, and held 
a mock funeral for the UAW after it was voted down at this auto parts transplant from 
Michigan.   Their mock grave marker read: 
Less (sic) we forget, Here Lies UAW, 




The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would shake up Southern workplaces 
like Monroe Auto Equipment and force employers to diversify their workforces.  The 
company began to hire black workers for a variety of positions in 1966, and a cross-race 
coalition of union supporters narrowly prevailed in a second election in that year.  They 
did so despite the fact that the company hired as its consultant John Tate, the man who 
pioneered a new breed of union busters and who would later serve as the architect of 
Wal-Mart’s anti-union citadel.
31
    
Meanwhile, Marion Crawford, a young black man, graduated from the local high 
school in Hartwell in 1964, and applied for a job at Monroe Auto Equipment. 
Management told him they only hired black workers as janitors, and they did not need 
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any janitors. Instead, Crawford entered the army and served in South Korea until 1967.
32
  
By the time Marion Crawford finally landed a job at Monroe Auto Equipment in January, 
1968, the company was refusing to negotiate with the workers who won their union in 
1966, and the company and union were deep in the midst of what turned out to be a 
fifteen-year battle. Crawford remembers that the company’s new hires -- many of whom 
were young and black -- were key to the union’s continued support:  “Most of the 
younger people just wanted to have a fair shot…. Young people were shifted around, 
moved around, got all the dirty jobs… and young people were interested in benefits.”  
Though African-American workers were a minority in the plant, they were a majority of 
the union supporters.   Like Crawford, most grew up in the South and had no direct 
experience with unions, but many of them learned about the benefits of union contracts 
from relatives who had moved north to escape the South’s racially unjust workplaces.
33
   
In 1973, the workers still did not have a union contract.  The NLRB ordered the 
company to bargain, but sixteen months later the workers still could not get the company 
to move on issues as simple as a grievance procedure.  “We strongly urge you to continue 
this fight,” Marion Crawford and two other leaders wrote to UAW vice president Irving 
Bluestone in 1975. “To lose now would set back (the) labor movement in the small towns 
of the South for many years.”
34
  Meanwhile, a former Piggy Wiggly grocery store 
consultant showed up in Crawford’s town of Hartwell and suddenly began a union 
campaign as an “independent” union, the kind of tactic typically masterminded by John 
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Tate. While the independent union garnered only a handful of supporters, it was enough 
to trigger an election in 1976 that the UAW lost.
35
  The UAW successfully persuaded the 
NLRB to overturn that election, arguing that it should not count after the company broke 
labor law.  Then the conglomerate Tenneco bought the plant, and the new owners finally 
agreed to negotiate a contract in 1978.
36
  The workers won free health insurance, better 
pay, and a grievance procedure, which Crawford, by then a 33-year-old electrician, called 
the “top accomplishment.”
37
   Young workers like Sammy Lewis, a white, 29-year-old 
toolmaker helped buoy the win:  “One man, he ain’t got a chance: it takes sticking 
together.” 
38
 Yet Tenneco showed the same tenacity in fighting the UAW that it would 
display in fighting workers at another of its holdings, the Newport News shipyard.  As 
soon as the first contract was up in 1981, an independent union again triggered an 
election, and the UAW lost.  “They had their representatives campaigning against the 
union… they told people the company would shut down if the union remained,” 
remembers Crawford.  Though the workers had lost their union in 1981, the benefits of 
the single, three-year contract continued to influence company policy for years to come, 
especially around such issues as employer-funded health insurance and job safety. 
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Crawford worked there for 42 years, and retired in 2010 as an electrical engineering 
technician, though he never again was a union member. 
39
   
 
“I Should Be Screaming from the Rafters”: Working Women Organized 
Women were central to the reconfigured U.S. workforce and helped drive the new 
wave of unionization attempts.  Their rate of workforce participation jumped nearly 
nine percentage points in the 1970s and grew nearly twice as fast as over the previous 
two decades. 1978 marked the first year that a majority of U.S. women worked for 
wages.
 40
  There were a whopping 12 million more women in the labor force by the 
end of the decade than at its beginning, and increasingly they were mothers of small 
children.
41
  For many women, working for wages was a necessity given the economic 
downturns of the 1970s; when families hit hard economic times, they reacted by 
sending women into the workplace.  It was a new situation for many white females 
but a very familiar one to black women whose workforce participation had long 
outstripped that of white women.
42
  
As women entered the workforce, many brought with them new ideas about 
their rights generated by the women’s movement and transferred that energy to unions 
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and other workplace-based organizations.  According to Karen Nussbaum, a founder 
of the women’s clerical group 9to5, “In the early 1970s, when I was starting out as a 
clerical worker and then an organizer, an insurgent consciousness propelled a wide 
cross section of women to reconsider their role in life, be open to collective action, 
and challenge their employers.  They believed change was possible.”
43
   Women were, 
in fact, more open to unions than were men.  In 1977 polling, 46 percent of blue-collar 
women told pollsters they would join a union tomorrow if given the chance, compared 
to only 35 percent of blue-collar men.
44
   One AFL-CIO survey on NLRB elections 
showed that when women made up less than half the workforce, the election win rate 
was 33 percent, but in units of at least three-quarters women, the win rate jumped to 
57 percent.
45
   In all, nearly three million women joined unions’ ranks between 1960 
and 1980, a figure which includes newly-organized workers as well as women hired in 
unionized workplaces.
46
  The influx of organizing women helped equalize unions’ 
gender balance.  In 1960, only 18 percent of all union members were women, but by 
1978 women made up nearly a quarter of union membership, a figure that climbed to 
30 percent by 1984.
47
  
                                                             
43 Karen Nussbaum, “Working Women’s Insurgent Consciousness,” in  The Sex of Class: Women 
Transforming American Labor, ed. Dorothy Sue Cobble (Ithaca: ILR Press, 2007) 159.  
44 Quinn and Staines, Quality of Employment Survey (QES), 1977; Freeman and Medoff, 29.  A 1984 Louis 
Harris poll also showed that women were more interested than men.  See Table 20, “A Study on the 
Outlook for Trade Union Organizing,” Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., November 1984, for LIPA and 
AFL-CIO, Box 17, Kistler papers.   
45 “AFL-CIO Organizing Survey, 1986-87, NLRB Elections,” Folder 9, Box 10, Kistler papers.   
46 Alan Kistler, "Union Organizing: New Challenges and Prospects," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 473, The Future of American Unionism (May, 1984), 96 - 107.  
47 BLS, Perspectives on Working Women, 94.  “Labor Woos Women,” Dunn’s Business Month, September, 




  Three-quarters of the women pouring into the workforce in the 1970s worked 
in service, retail and “professional” jobs like nursing, clerical work and teaching - - 
jobs in which unions had made few inroads, especially in the private sector.
48
  
Increasingly, these workers turned to unions.  A quarter of NLRB voters in the 1970s 
worked in the service, retail or finance sectors, nearly double the percentage of the 
late 1960s.
49
 (See Appendix C) In retail alone - - an industry in which women made 
up 70 percent of sales clerks - - the number of union voters increased 28 percent in the 
1970s over the 1960s, following closely the 39 percent employment growth rate in 
that industry.
50
   Unions were not organizing fast enough in these white collar and 
service sectors and represented only seven million out of a potential pool of 39 million 
workers by 1980. Yet their efforts in these female-intensive sectors were clearly 
growing.
51
   
Clerical workers were the locus of energy for the women’s unionization 
movement of the 1970s in the way that garment workers had been at the turn of the 
twentieth century.
52
  More women worked as clericals than in any other job and while 
women had long worked as office workers, they were now more likely to see their place 
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in the workforce as a permanent one and to be the sole supporters for their families.
53
   
Building off the new ideas of the women’s movement, many secretaries sought to 
redefine their jobs as professional and essential, rather than as the office wives who got 
the coffee and pampered their male bosses.   A 1972 survey of clericals by Harvard 
Business Review found “burgeoning discontent” as “clerical employees are beginning to 
feel like mere cogs in a great impersonal bureaucracy.”
54
 They led the way in forming not 
only unions, but by founding more than a dozen workplace-based and women-centered 
organizations for secretaries in the 1970s.  Such women workers and activists founded 
Women Employed, for instance, in April of 1973 as an organization to represent non-
managerial women office workers in downtown Chicago.  The women used publicity, 
public hearings and worksite confrontations to win major back pay suits and force 
employers to develop comprehensive affirmative action plans.  A similar group for office 
workers formed in New York City in 1974 under the banner of Women Office Workers 
(WOW). In Boston, clericals formed an organization for women office workers, 9to5, in 
October, 1973. They then shopped around with unions to find the one that would give 
them the most autonomy and in 1975 created SEIU Local 925 (later District 925) as a 
companion organization.
55
  Not all secretaries rode the women’s movement’s momentum.  
“We do not feel we’re subservient or put down,” asserted Margaret Dillon, president of 
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the National Secretaries Association in 1972, a group that argued for secretaries to 
maintain their separate female sphere within the business world.
56
   Yet many who drove 
the decade’s unionization wave shared the attitude of one clerical at Boston University:  
“I work my tail off, I produce work for all kinds of professors,” Barbara Rahke 
remembers.  “I am getting paid nothing, and…I should be screaming… from the 
rafters.”
57
   
In fact, private universities like Boston University became hotbeds for clerical 
unionizing in the 1970s after the NLRB folded colleges into its jurisdiction in 1970, and 
by the end of the 1980s some 70 percent of these campaigns resulted in union 
representation.
58
  Many women clericals in higher education were no longer satisfied 
with the slight elevation in prestige that came with their jobs.   Clericals at Columbia, 
Boston University, Brandeis, the University of Chicago, the University of Southern 
California, New York University, Seton Hall and Vassar were among those who initiated 
successful unionization drives at private-sector universities in the 1970s.
59
 Clericals at 
other universities, such as Tufts and Howard, found their efforts defeated by the kinds of 
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employer resistance that was increasingly rampant, even among esteemed universities.
60
  
A “union can guarantee absolutely nothing…employees could end up with less than they 
have presently,” asserted Virginia Tierney, Boston University Director of Personnel in 
1978 as part of a rather typical university anti-union effort that emphasized strikes and 
dues.
61
   Yale hired the notorious union-buster Seyfarth and Shaw to try to stop its 
clericals from unionizing in the early 1980s, the same firm that fought the Newport News 
shipyard workers and the lettuce workers who tried to unionize with Cesar Chavez’s 
UFW.  Nevertheless, university clericals found a greater level of success than did other 
white-collar office workers, in part because they had the support of some faculty and staff 




Bank workers’ experiences were more typical of what happened when private-
sector office workers who tried to unionize.   “We got smashed over and over,” 
remembers Karen Nussbaum in regard to SEIU District 925’s efforts to organize in banks 
and insurance.  “These businesses had not traditionally been unionized, and they were 
damned if they were going to be the first ones in the new wave.  We never had an easy 
                                                             
60 “Howard U. Union Bid is Rebuffed,” The Washington Post, June 16, 1974, B1; Local 925 Executive 
Board Meeting, October 6, 1980, Folder 4, Box 16, SEIU District 925 papers, Walter Reuther Library, 
Wayne State University (hereafter SEIU District 925 papers.)    
61 Virginia L. Tierney to Boston University Employees, May 4, 1978, Folder 30, Box 7, SEIU District 925 
papers.  See a series of letters in this folder for more examples of Boston University and Brandeis 
University tactics and messages to employees.   
62 “Yale’s Labor Law Firm: A Report to the Community by Local 35, Federation of University 
Employees,” c. 1983, Box 5, Kistler papers.  Toni Gilpin et al, On Strike for Respect: The Clerical and 
Technical Workers’ Strike at Yale University, 1984-85 (Champaign, Illinois: The University of Illinois 
Press, 1995). Richard W. Hurd and A. McElwain, “Organizing Clerical Workers: Determinants of 






   About 1.25 million of the nation’s two million bank workers were women 
by the late 1970s. 
64
  Many turned to unions in the 1970s to increase exceptionally low 
wages - - one Department of Labor study in Chicago found women’s wages in banks 
were 59 percent that of men.  They also hoped to gain some control as increased 
automation degraded their labor.
65
  The most well-known group of would-be-unionists 
formed the Willmar Bank Employees Association in 1977, and went on a 15-month 
unsuccessful strike in which they tried to win union recognition.  These bank tellers were 
featured in the documentary “The Willmar 8, ” produced by Mary Lee Yarrow (wife of 
Peter Yarrow of the musical group Peter, Paul and Mary) who was herself from Willmar, 
Minnesota.  None of the group claimed to be feminists, yet they attempted to use their 
union to take a stand against low wages and to protest promotions that favored men with 
less seniority.  Though they gained nationwide attention  - - even garnering a 60 Minutes 
feature - - their story was actually part of a much broader unionization effort among 
women bank workers nationwide who organized with a range of at least six different 
unions.
66
  It turned out to be a Sisyphean task as the banks rolled back nearly all their 
efforts.  Workers at Seattle First National Bank, for instance, won their first collective 
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bargaining agreement in 1968 after having had a small, independent labor organization 
for thirty years.  When the 4700 workers could not force the company to sign another 
contract in 1978, they interviewed eleven unions, and then affiliated with the Retail 
Clerks union (RCIA). Yet even an AFL-CIO national boycott could not force the 
company (then called Seafirst) to sign a contract, a struggle that became even more 
difficult when the bank merged into the Bank of America in 1982.  Though the union 
continued to push into the 1990s, the tellers never got another contract.   The tellers who 
unionized with the UFCW Local 876 at Wyandotte Savings Bank in Michigan in 1979 
also could never force a contract.
67
   The First National State Bank of New Jersey 
managed to repel a unionization attempt in 1977 by using the NLRB to force the workers 
to organize at all 21 branches at once.   Bank workers won a few victories, such as the 
600 workers at National Bank of Washington, D.C. and those at a few banks in Chicago, 
but by 1980 only 30 banks out of 15,000 were unionized.
68
  Nevertheless, bank 
executives were spooked by women workers’ unionization attempts. They flocked to 
anti-union seminars, for instance, and crowded to get a glimpse of the opposition at a 
screening of “The Willmar 8” at the American Bankers Association annual meeting.
69
  
Women bank workers met greater success when they organized outside the increasingly 
weakened and vulnerable NLRB process.  For instance, the 9to5 working women’s 
                                                             
67 “Largest Bank Workers Union in America Affiliates with Retail Clerks,” Retail Clerks Advocate, June / 
July, 1978, 10; Harry Bernstein, “Union Tries ‘Pension Power’ of BofA,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 
1990, D3; Foner, Women and the American Labor Movement, 484; CC Quarles to R.F. Harbrant and J.L. 
Fiedler, May 22, 81, Corporate Files W-V, Box 9, FAST unprocessed records, AFL-CIO archive.   
68 Perras, “Effective Responses to Union Organizing Attempts in the Banking Industry,"; Claudia Levy, 
“AS&T Union Drive Starts,” The Washington Post, September 10, 1974, D8; “Banks face new drive to 
unionize employes,” Chicago Tribune, January 10, 1977, D9; Bankers Flock to See Saga of ‘Willmar 8’ 
Before Public Does,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 1981.   
69 “His Business in Breaking Unions and Keeping them Out, “ Seattle Times, November 28,1982; Bankers 




association in Boston was able to get the Department of the Treasury’s help in opening 
up job opportunities at the New England Merchants Bank, as well as to get two other 
local banks to sign affirmative action agreements.
70
   
Flight attendants, 95 percent of whom were women, also built unions in order 
to shore up their place in the workforce in the 1970s, fighting to turn what were 
widely seen as temporary jobs for young, unmarried women into permanent, secure 
positions.  They wrested their union out from under the pilots’ union in 1974 to form 
the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) after the pilots realized that they could no 
longer legally refuse flight attendants access to their top offices.
71
  Marching with the 
unions bearing signs reading, “Storks Fly, Why Can’t Mothers?” they rolled back 
company policies to fire them when they got married or pregnant.  They used 
picketing, EEOC charges, and union contracts to beat back company weight 
requirements for attendants.  Mass protests followed when Ozark airlines, for 
instance, suspended a five foot eight inch tall woman for being four pounds over the 
maximum weight of 137 pounds.  Once they secured the jobs, they also fought for 
respect. When the airlines started using stewardess’ sexuality in order to sell seats - - 
such as in Continental’s ad campaign “We Really Move Our Tails for You,” - - the 
brand-new union protested to the company, the Civil Aeronautics board, the EEOC, 
                                                             
70 “9 to 5 Celebrates Five Years of Action,” Equal Times, November 6, 1978 found in folder 130, carton 5, 
9 to 5, National Association of Working Women Records, 1972 – 1980.  
71 Georgia Panter Nielsen, From Sky Girl to Flight Attendant: Women and the Making of a Union (Ithaca, 




and the public under their own headline, “Move your tails for somebody else.”
72
   
Flight attendants’ interest in unions was so strong that they continued to organize and 
vote in union elections throughout the 1970s, despite the fact that all major carriers 
except Delta were already unionized.  Many flight attendants still viewed the AFA as 
under the pilots’ union’s thumb, and flight attendants at National, Northwest and 
Continental, for instance, all voted to join new unions.  They also organized outside of 
unions’ ranks, such as in the Stewardess for Women’s Rights, founded in 1972.
73
 
Despite many women’s burning interest in unions, labor was inconsistent at 
best in its efforts to reach out to these new women workers.  On one hand, as early as 
1971, the AFL-CIO’s organizing department reported to its top leadership body, the 
Executive Council, that women were interested in unions and though “untouched by 
the phenomenon of collective bargaining for many years suddenly felt the press of 
economic stagnation and decided that it was ‘their turn.’”
74
   Yet some leaders were 
slow to change their views on women workers, and the pace of inclusion of women at 
the staff and leadership level was glacial.  Up until months before his death in early 
1980, AFL-CIO President George Meany remained unsure about women’s interest in 
unions: “Many women, forced into the job market by the pressures of inflation, are 
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grateful to be working at all.  Thus, there is initial resistance to a union…”
75
  Unions 
remained slow to hire women as organizers. As late as 1986, only nine percent of 
organizers were female according to an AFL-CIO survey, though their win rate was 
61 percent compared to 41 percent for male organizers.
76
  In 1983, the UAW had only 
one woman organizer in the entire South.
77
  When the newspaper where Jackie Ruff 
did layout fired her in 1974 after she tried to organize with the graphic arts union, she 
asked the union for a job and was told “Oh no, we would never have women 
organizing the union.”  She later served as Executive Director of the SEIU District 
925, a union devoted to organizing clerical workers nationwide.
78
 
The women who wanted to unionize in the 1970s were joining organizations in 
which women members themselves were struggling with deep-set sexism within the 
unions.   After the passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 2500 women 
filed gender discrimination charges in the first year alone, and hundreds of them 
named their own unions as defendants.  International Union of Electrical Workers 
(IUE) lawyer Winn Newman told the EEOC that women members faced substantial 
harassment from male members when they tried to win equal access to jobs, including 
“slashing the tires of women, gun shots in their homes…”. 
79
    Winn helped the 
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women in his union root out gender discrimination by using their contracts as tools to 
force employers to end sexist practices and, when that did not work, filing union-led 
charges with the EEOC.
80
   The new women unionists banded together in the first 
national, cross-union coalition in 1974. The Coalition of Union Women (CLUW) 
successfully pushed the AFL-CIO to support the Equal Rights Amendment, and 
included child care facilities and expanded maternity leave as some of its first goals.
81
  
The women’s movement had hit home for labor.  “As long as the organizing of 
women was external to the labor movement, those guys didn’t care,” remembers 
Judith Berek, a union organizer who attended the founding convention of CLUW. 
“Once it became internal, they had to care.”
82
  
Women continued to knock on labor’s door, and increasingly unions made 
these women the focus of organizing efforts.  For instance, an AFL-CIO survey of 
California union elections in the mid-1960s reveals that only a quarter of the voters in 
15 recent elections was female.  By the early 1980s, 69 percent of the NLRB elections 
in a survey of 225 elections involved units with a majority of women, and 32 percent 
involved units that were more than 85 percent female.
83
  Nurses, Catholic high school 
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teachers, waitresses, legal secretaries, textile workers, and cashiers were all among the 
millions of women who voted in NLRB elections in this decade.
84
   
 
African-Americans Led the Way 
If women were the bones of the American working class’s new unionizing efforts, 
African-American workers were its energizing blood.   A number of scholars have 
studied the African-American surge into public sector unions, especially after federal, 
then state and municipal workers, won the right to collective bargaining in the 1960s.
85
  
Far fewer have noted that the same surge flowed through the private-sector as well.  
Black women and men were the most likely groups to turn to private-sector union 
organizing in the 1970s, and often led all workers’ push into the union movement.  A full 
70 percent of blue-collar people of color in 1977 polling said they would vote for a 
union.
86
  One AFL-CIO study shows they did just that.  At workplaces where at least 
three-quarters of the workers were people of color, the NLRB election win rate was 65 
percent, compared to a win rate of a mere 38 percent among workforces where minority 
workers made up less than a quarter. 
87
  The black workers who organized unions joined 
those getting already-unionized jobs to boost black workers’ union membership rates 
above those of whites in the private sector.  In 1935, a tiny fraction of African-Americans 
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were union members.  By the 1970s, however, that story had changed dramatically.  Forty 
percent of black men in the private-sector and a quarter of private-sector black women 
workers were members of labor unions, the high point for both groups.  Black workers 
had the highest unionization rates of any racial or ethnic group by this pivotal decade.  
This was especially true for black women whose private-sector union membership rate 
outstripped that of white women by two-to-one by 1979.
88
  
African-American workers’ unionizing impulse was made possible by doors 
opening to black workers both in the larger workforce and the union movement.  African-
Americans became increasingly likely to hold jobs eligible for unionization - - those 
outside of agriculture and domestic service - - following World War II.  They nearly 
doubled their numbers in industrial jobs during the war.  By 1960, a fifth of autoworkers, 
for example, were African -American.
89
 Yet many jobs did not open up until after the 
legislative successes of the Civil Rights movement, such as those in Southern textiles.  
On the eve of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, less than five percent of textile workers were 
black, yet by 1980 African-Americans made up a full quarter of textile workers.
90
  Black 
workers were the core of renewed efforts by the textile workers union to organize in the 
1970s, including the successful union election among a majority black, female workforce 
at Oneita Mills in Andrews, South Carolina in 1973 and the Roanoke Rapids, North 
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Carolina J.P. Stevens plant in 1974. The J.P. Stevens campaign is perhaps the single most 
well-known private-sector union organizing campaign of the 1970s because the union’s 
consumer boycott of this linens manufacturer gained broad support and because the 
campaign was immortalized in Norma Rae, the 1979 blockbuster movie.  Yet to capture 
the true dynamics of this campaign, the movie’s heroine should have been African-
American.  The textile union had launched the JP Stevens campaign in 1963, and had all 
but given up in the face of what one Fifth Circuit judge called in 1969 the company’s 
“massive campaign to prevent unionization of its southern plants.”  Yet the influx of 
black workers into the Roanoke Rapids facility opened up possibilities for organizing that 
had seemed closed.  In five years alone, from 1970 to 1975, the black workforce in the 
plant increased from 19 to 37 percent of the plant.  African-American support helped the 
union win a narrow election in August of 1974, 1685 to 1448.  It took another six years 




Yet in order to organize, black workers first had to force many unions to open 
their doors.  African-American workers had been part of unions since well before the 
Civil Rights movement such as the half a million who joined CIO unions during World 
War II.  But many unions continued to exclude black workers from their ranks, and many 
of even the most progressive CIO unions had segregated locals in the South.
92
   Herbert 
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Hill, the NAACP’s labor director, found that as late as 1958 three national unions had 
constitutional provisions barring African-Americans and ten others had segregated locals. 
White workers often resisted national-level unions’ attempts to force integration.  Black 
workers used the EEOC as a tool to force open unions throughout the 1970s when the 
number of Title VII lawsuits against unions rose dramatically.   AFL-CIO records show, 
for instance, that 1600 charges of discrimination were filed against unions in 1973 and, 
by 1978, the EEOC still had a couple thousand such cases open.  The number of cases 
decided against unions rose 20 percent between 1977 and 1980.
93
  Even as union 
membership became more diverse, union leaders and staff often resisted accepting black 
members as leaders.  “There was huge resistance on the part of the older white 
leadership,” remembered Bruce Raynor, a young textile union staffer in the 1970s who 
later served as the clothing and textile union’s president.  “The staff was almost totally 




Some unions were more accessible than others to African-American workers.   
Frederick Simmons, for instance, saw family in St. Louis and Detroit win leadership 
positions in the UAW in the 1960s and was shocked to find that opportunities in the 
building trades were not the same for him as a black man by the mid-1970s. He entered 
an electrician apprenticeship program in Seattle where he helped organize a one-day 
protest when other construction workers objected to women and people of color on the 
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job.  After spending several years without seeing any other people of color on job sites, 
he organized an Electrical Workers Minority Caucus within IBEW Local 46 to build a 
community of support, and later became president of his local union in 1996.
95
  Todd 
Hawkins, an African-American ironworker in Seattle, remembers apprenticing with a 
white, racist journeyman who refused to teach him the trade, or even share the blueprints:  
“You’re walking around about to bust all day because you can’t be insubordinate to your 
journeyperson.”
96
   Nevertheless, black workers saw some of their largest gains during 
this period in the building trades. For example, African-American workers were a 
miniscule one tenth of one percent of the Asbestos Workers union members in 1968, but 
made up 10 percent of the membership by 1983.  African-American workers in Hawkins’ 
Iron Workers rose from 5 to 12 percent of the membership during the same period.
97
 
By 1971, one out of every three new union members was black, as African-
Americans swept into unions in the new organizing wave.
98
 African-American workers 
turned to unions in part because unions meant better pay and benefits.  The average 
median black income was still 58 percent of that of white families in 1970.
99
   Unions 
raised black workers’ wages nationally - - in 1979, a black male worker with a union 
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made 31 percent more than those without a union on the job, a higher union differential 
than the 14 percent for white workers. 
100
 A union contract also offered a state-backed 
insurance against discrimination on the job.  It cemented wage increases and offered a 
clear progression for job promotions, one that allowed for a legally-enforceable grievance 
procedure if a white supervisor picked favorites.  Though a number of scholars have 
pointed out a dichotomous relationship between the individual legal gains of the Civil 
Rights movement and the collectivity of the labor movement, from the black workers’ 
perspective, the movements simply offered different tools with which to forge a better 
life within a racially-stratified capitalistic economy.  In fact, many workers used their 
union contract to shore up gains made through the Civil Rights movement.  Edward 
Coppedge, for example, remembers why he and his co-workers turned to the 
Steelworkers at Newport News despite the fact that many blacks had won new jobs after 
their shipyard had been the site of one of the first EEOC consent degrees.  “Number one 
is promotion and wages. We had a department down there that had black folks that hadn't 
had a raise in years and couldn't get one…they really didn't move on civil rights until the 
Steelworkers got there…. they knew that the union was behind you.”
101
    
Unions were an especially strong leveler for African-American women who 
had long suffered a double discrimination in the workforce.  For decades, they were 
excluded from the best jobs and relegated to the domestic and agricultural sectors 
which were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Wagner Act 
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of 1935.  In 1940, 60 percent of black women worked as domestic servants.  Black 
women only began to move into better jobs during World War II, when 600,000 got 
good industrial jobs, but following the war were less likely to retain those jobs than 
were black men.  After the Civil and Women’s Rights movements, black women 
began to gain consistent access to the nation’s jobs and unions on a large scale.
102
  
African-American female union density peaked in 1979, when one in four black 
women working in the private sector was a member of a union.
103
  Union contracts 
helped narrow the racial gap among women.  By 1980, the wage gap by race for all 
women had narrowed to just under four percent and had nearly disappeared among 
union members. A black woman with a union earned wages very nearly on par with 
those of white female union members.   It turns out that the wage gap between white 
and black women widened in later decades, in part due to the decline in unions. By 
2007, white women earned wages 15 percent higher than those earned by black 
women. Rosenfeld estimates that had private-sector unions remained at their 1979 
levels, the wage gap between black and white women would be 12 percent lower in 
2009.
104
 “As a black woman, I know that the best hope for a decent standard of living 
for both women and blacks is effective trade union representation,” Coretta Scott 
King told a union convention in 1979.  “I know that, without union representation, a 
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woman is likely to be viewed by her employer as little more than a source of low 
wage labor.”
105
   African-American women also used unions to help mediate 
discrimination on the job.  “Some white women are given clean and easy jobs while 
black women with more seniority are given dirty jobs,” said Brenda Robinson, an 
African-American woman who helped form a union at the Newport News shipyard.   
“The Steelworkers…stands for equal treatment.”
106
  
Black workers - - especially women - - led much of the nation-wide push in 
hospital unionization.  While hospital workers had been organizing since the late 1950s 
and were quick to strike for recognition, more than one and a half million worked for 
non-profit hospitals.  These hospital workers had been barred from holding union 
elections until the NLRB changed its policy on hospitals in 1974.
107
  Nurses, licensed 
practical nurses, aides, dieticians, data operators, hospital food service workers and 
nursing home staff all drove through a massive effort at unionization as soon as they 
could do so.  Health care workers filed 200 petitions for elections in the first month after 
the NLRB’s decision through at least a dozen unions.  The SEIU alone filed 71 petitions 
in the first three months in 20 states.
108
  Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg identify how one 
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union active in hospital organizing, District 1199, developed what it called a ‘union 
power – soul power’ organizing model which built squarely from the civil rights struggle.   
“We were part of it all,” remembers Judith Berek who worked as an organizer for 1199.  
“If there was a civil rights action, we were part of it.”
109
  Often the civil rights and union 
struggles were one and the same, even into the late 1970s.  One workforce that was 90 
percent people of color and majority female, for example, voted overwhelming for the 
union at the Frances Schervier Home and Hospital in Riverdale, New York in 1978 and 
had to strike for a contract.  There, District 1199 ran a community-based campaign that 
alleged that the Catholic order ran the institution “in a manner that promotes racial 
disharmony.”
110
  Hospitals sometimes tried to use black workers’ strong support for 
unions to convince white workers not to unionize: “The hospital always tried to make the 
union seem like a racial issue, like it was blacks causing the trouble,” remembered 
Shirley Williams, a nursing assistant at the Tuomey hospital in Sumter, South Carolina.  
The interracial group overcame this tactic and won their union election in 1980.
111
 
It seemed that black workers might be the vanguard that would finally split open 
the South where industry had resisted unions for so long.   Race had long been a dividing 
line among Southern workers. The CIO’s Operation Dixie, the post-war effort to organize 
the South, foundered among white workers wary of uniting with blacks.
112
  Race still 
divided workers in the 1970s, and many white workers did not want to diminish their 
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white privilege by joining with what they often saw as black unions.  “Race is still a 
problem,” noted Jim Sessions, a white minister and civil rights activist, in 1979.  “White 
and black workers don’t entirely trust each other.  Even worse is that owners…tell the 
white folks to be careful because ‘all the blacks want is black power.’”
113
  Racial 
division, in fact, was key to J.P. Stevens’ anti-union campaign.  It frequently sent a letter 
to all workers - - white and black alike - - on the eve of a union election that read, “We 
would at this point like to say a special word to our black employees… it is among you 
that the Union supporters are making their most intense drive - that you are being 
insistently told…that by going into the Union in mass, you can dominate it and control it 
in this Plant… as you may see fit.”
114
  The company’s “special word” to black workers 
thus linked the union to black workers’ increased power, and played on many white 
workers fears that a union would further the erosion of their racial privilege.   
Rights consciousness, nevertheless, often served as a fresh tool for the entire new 
working class, available even to white men. As black workers moved deeper into 
Southern industries in the 1970s, their new assertiveness about their rights, born out of 
the Civil Rights movement, spilled over into private-sector unionizing efforts and helped 
white workers find new backbone for organizing.  “The confrontations and civil rights 
progress of the black people has had an impact on white textile workers,” explained the 
Textile Workers Union’s organizing director to his union’s president in 1970.   “The entry 
of blacks into textile plants and the manner in which blacks stand up for their rights has 
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made the docile textile workers sit up and take notice.”
115
 White Southern workers had 
never been solidly anti-union, and by the 1970s black workers’ unionizing spirt offered a 
new energy, especially to young whites.  Workers under the age of 30 and black workers, 
for instance, were the most pro-union groups among Cannon Mills workers in the 
notoriously anti-union, company town of Kannapolis, North Carolina.  There, even 44 
percent of young white workers self-identified as pro-union in the mid-1970s.
116
  Tim 
Honeycutt was one such white Cannon Mills worker. He fought “race wars” with black 
students when his high school desegregated, but found that his racial prejudice weakened 
when he worked with black workers in the mill and joined them in unionization efforts at 
Cannon Mills.  “We’re all after equal rights and freedom,” he later asserted, anchoring 
his explanation for his unionization impetus in rights-based language.
117
  At Duke 
University hospital, a 1976 failed unionization effort by AFSCME was sparked by a 1974 
walkout among black female clericals that inspired white workers.  “I don’t mind saying 
the blacks showed the way and I admire them for it.  I don’t think we could have taken 
the lead on our own,” said one white, skilled trade hospital worker who helped push 
unsuccessfully for a union.
118
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Sunbelt Workers Organized 
Industry followed the pull of air conditioning, highways, military contracts, and low taxes 
to the South and Sunbelt states in the 1960s and 1970s.   The South led all American 
regions in economic growth with employment in manufacturing expanding faster there 
than in any other part of the nation in the 1960s and 1970s.
119
  Sunbelt states’ share of 
employment grew by 10 points between 1967 and 1983, the same number by which 
“Snowbelt” states’ share dropped.
120
   South Central states alone (Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma and Texas) increased their share of the nation’s jobs from 5.7 to 8.8 percent in 
these years.
121
    Employers looked to the South and West as bastions of anti-unionism, a 
trait marketed by Southern boosters who sought to lure Northern industrial jobs to their 
towns.   “What are nice companies…doing in a place like this?” asked Greenville, South 
Carolina Chamber of Commerce recruitment ads marketing “a positive labor climate” 
and a “reasonable tax structure.”  That “positive” labor climate included laws prohibiting 
a union shop in nearly all Southern states. 
122
 In fact, unionization rates in Southern states 
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remained exceptionally low - - South Carolina, for instance, had the lowest rate at 7.8 
percent in 1980 compared to nearly New York’s near 40 percent union density. 
123
  
Though many scholars have noted industries’ move to the Sunbelt, few have 
noted the broad unionization efforts among workers there in the 1970s. NLRB reports 
show that unions intensified their efforts in the South and Sunbelt in the 1970s.  Forty-
four percent of the people eligible to vote in NLRB elections in the 1970s, for instance, 
were in Southern and Sunbelt states, up from 38 percent in the 1960s. The rate dropped 
down again in the 1980s to 41 percent. (See Appendix B)
 124
   Despite their reputation for 
being anti-union, many Southerners increasingly wanted unions.  Blue-collar Southerners 
who were not already union members were more likely than those in any other region of 
the country to report they would vote for a union in 1977.
125
   
The Deep South was the most formidable challenge to unions based 
geographically and culturally in the North.  Nevertheless, the 1970s seemed a moment of 
promise when unions might finally open new vistas in the South where they had been 
defeated so many times before.  Consider, for instance, the UAW’s reaction to what it 
labelled General Motors’ “southern strategy.”  GM had some presence in the South 
following World War II and operated a unionized Atlanta facility, for instance.  It 
accelerated its move south in the 1970s and built most of its new assembly and parts 
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plants there, opening nine new plants south of the Mason-Dixie between 1972 and 
1978.
126
  When workers at these GM plants tried to organize a union with the UAW in 
Clinton, Mississippi and Fitzgerald, Georgia in 1974 and 1975, the company responded 
with anti-union leaflets, meetings and threats.  An anonymous leaflet in Clinton featured 
a cartoon of white, cigar-smoking union officials standing over female production 
workers, half of whom were black.  Under the headline, “Northern Unions vs. Mississippi 
Working Folk” it blasted the union for trying to keep jobs in the North, asserting that the 
union “would just as soon that we were still working in the fields or doing domestic 
work.”
127
 However, the UAW still had great power within GM at that time as it 
represented 95 percent of the company’s 390,000 U.S. hourly workers.  The UAW used a 
series of “mini-strikes” to force GM to agree to a neutrality agreement in 1976 national 
contract negotiations.
128
   
This neutrality agreement buoyed Henry Davison’s unionizing efforts at GM’s 
Guide Lamp plant in Monroe, Louisiana after he returned to the South.  At first, Davison 
and his co-workers faced tremendous company resistance and the company attempted to 
screen out pro-union workers in the hiring and training process. Once the workers 
petitioned for an election in 1976, GM held what it called “commander call” meetings 
each Monday, mandatory attendance meetings in which the plant manager urged the 
                                                             
126 “UAW Wins Apparent Major Concessions from GM in Battle to Organize the South,” Wall Street 
Journal, September 12, 1978, 5.   
127 Don Stillman, “Runaways: A Call to Action,” Southern Exposure, Vol IV, 1-2, Spring, Summer 1976, 
50; Don Stillman, “Breaking GM’s Southern Strategy, “ Solidarity, January 28, 1977, Vo 20, no 2.; “UAW 
Warns GM of Confrontation Over Deep South Non-Union Plants,” The Washington Post, November 9, 
1976, A4.    
128 Stillman, “Breaking GM’s Southern Strategy,” “GM, UAW Reach Accord: ‘Shortest Strike’ is Over,” 




workers not to vote for a union. Local boosters fought the union.  “Give Yourself a 
Christmas Present - - Vote No on Dec 22” read road-side signs put up by the Louisiana 
Association of Business and Industry (LABI), a group which had spearheaded a 
successful “right-to-work” drive in that state.  Yet GM signed the neutrality agreement 
just weeks before the scheduled union vote in Monroe, and local management was forced 
to back off their anti-union stance.  Absent vicious company threats, Davison and his co-
workers were able to vote in their union and access the kind of robust level of economic 
security that had long eluded Southern workers.
129
   It was a point well understood by 
Betty Crosser, a 24-year-old machine operator who cited “mostly the security” as her 
reason for voting yes.  “I’m single - I may never get married – and I have to support 
myself. I have to think about my future, my retirement.”
130
 
In the end, the UAW was able to curtail much of GM’s Southern strategy and win 
unions in many of the new Southern plants, but not without a major fight.  Local 
management often ignored the company’s official neutrality policy. “I heard that one guy 
was talking about it and that he got fired, so I don’t want to know anything about it,” 
asserted one woman about a failed union drive in Saginaw, Alabama.
131
 The UAW 
struggled to prove its worth to Southern workers accustomed to lower pay.  Many 
workers shared the sentiments of one Alabama GM electrician who noted that his $12 an 
hour wages far outstripped local rates:  “I take what they give me and gladly spend it, but 
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  When GM built its first Southern major assembly plant in 
Oklahoma City, the union was particularly worried that the softness of the neutrality 
agreement would hurt its chances there.  It turned out that the Oklahoma City vote was 
scheduled a mere two days after the start of 1979 GM-UAW negotiations, and the UAW 
threw down the gauntlet.  President Doug Fraser went through the ritual hand shake and 
opening meeting, but then walked out of negotiations until GM agreed to send top 
officials to Oklahoma City to investigate charges that managers had handed out anti-
union t-shirts and leaflets.  The gamble worked, and Oklahoma City workers voted 1479 
to 658 for the union.  Workers at GM plants followed suit in Shreveport, Louisiana in 
1979 and Decatur, Alabama in 1982, for example, and the company agreed to recognize 
the union after a majority of workers signed cards in Alabama, Mississippi and 
Georgia.
133
  Though the UAW rolled back GM’s attempt to outrun the union in the South, 
the UAW was slower to meet other Southern workers’ broad demands for organizing.  
While two-thirds of workers’ organizing requests came from Sunbelt states, the UAW 
had no black organizers on its Southern staff as late as 1983 and few Southerners.
134
  
Internal organizing reports show that they were doing far more organizing in the Midwest 
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and Michigan than in the South throughout the decade, and the union did not even start a 
concerted Southern drive (beyond the GM effort) until 1977.
135
   
Unions tried a number of joint projects to organize in the South and Sunbelt, 
including in Florida’s “space belt,” Tupelo, Mississippi and Houston, Texas.
136
  The most 
successful of these joint efforts was the AFL-CIO’s Los Angeles – Orange County 
Organizing Committee (LAOOC) which began in the 1960s but remained unions’ most 
substantive joint organizing project into the early 1980s.   When IBT President Jimmy 
Hoffa first heard about the project, launched in 1963, he claimed it would “not organize 
50 people…it’s all propaganda and hot air.”
137
  In fact, this joint organizing campaign 
organized nearly half a million workers over 20 years.  The project was Walter Reuther’s 
brain child, and grew out of his 1961 push to force the newly-minted AFL-CIO to make 
good on its promise of deepened organizing efforts.  “Do we have the will, the good 
sense and the unity of purpose needed,” asked Reuther in his proposal to the AFL-CIO 
for a “comprehensive, cooperative, coordinated organizational drive.”
138
  Reuther had his 
eyes on burgeoning job growth in Southern California, and pushed the AFL-CIO to begin 
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a joint project through the newly-formed organizing committee.
139
 The project launched 
in 1963 and originally included 57 unions.  The level of coordination was impressive as 
unions had long jealously guarded their jurisdictions.  Each union submitted to the AFL-
CIO a list of its current locals in the two county area, and a list of potential organizing 
targets.  The unions then divided themselves into five sectors:  hard goods (lumber, steel, 
glass, etc.); soft goods (textiles, oil, chemicals, etc.); retail; government; and hotel and 
restaurant.  Each union agreed to contribute money and organizers, according to their 
size.  The original staff budget was for $230,000 a year, half of which the AFL-CIO paid, 
including for a director.  The unions in each sector then sat down and hashed out the 
acceptable organizing targets.  Unless the group agreed to the target, the unions would 
not organize there.  Unions would sometimes agree to petition jointly, or to confer with 
one another, but they would not oppose one another.
140
  
Reuther’s brainchild paid off. Before the project, the Los Angeles area had been 
losing union density, sliding from 37 to 30 percent from 1953 to 1962.   Yet the joint 
effort helped hold union membership in Los Angeles at 30 percent density from 1963 to 
1965, though density again later slid.  A core of about 35 unions stuck with the project 
for over twenty years.  They met each quarter, working out approved targets.  Many of 
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the elections were in traditional manufacturing, like UAW at Cadillac Gauge, USWA at 
Harvey aluminum and the IUE at Packard-Bell’s television plant.  Others were in newer 
industries, like the International Association of Machinists (IAM) win at Scientific Data 
Systems or the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers union (OCAW) wins at Shell 
Chemical Division and Bio-Sciences laboratory, the largest privately-owned clinical lab 
in the world.  The project served not only to coordinate organizing, but to spur it, for 
organizers routinely had to go sit next to their peers from other unions and talk about the 
state of their campaigns.  By 1978, the project had organized 358,000 workers, 217,000 
of whom came through NLRB elections, and about 114,000 of whom came through new 





Si Se Puede! 是的,我们可以!142  
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Cellar Act) did as much to shake up and 
recreate America’s working class as did Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for it 
brought millions of new immigrants into the nation’s workforce.  The new law changed 
the national origins quotas that had been in place since 1924 and that effectively excluded 
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most Asians and Africans.  The new U.S. immigration system still had quotas, but the 
quotas allowed immigration from all countries and focused more on immigrants’ skills 
and family relationships with citizens.
143
  Hart-Cellar was only implemented in 1968 and, 
by the early 1970s, the U.S. was still only 4.7 percent foreign-born, the lowest rate since 
before the 1840s.  Then roughly 10 million immigrants entered the U.S. between 1970 
and 1990, nearly doubling the nation’s numbers of first-generation immigrants to 20 
million.
144
  Meanwhile, undocumented immigrants also swelled the nation’s working 
class, with more than three million undocumented workers arriving between 1961 and 
1989.
145




As the numbers of immigrants grew nationwide by the close of the twentieth 
century, these immigrant workers spurred a number of union organizing drives, including 
among janitors, poultry and meat packing workers, and construction workers 
nationwide.
147
  During the 1970s and early 1980s, however, when immigration was just 
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starting to grow, immigrant workers’ union organizing efforts were concentrated in urban 
centers, especially in Los Angeles and New York.  Of the 3.3 million immigrants who 
arrived between 1975 and 1980, nearly 40 percent settled either in Los Angeles or New 
York.
148
   
Los Angeles immigrant workers turned to unions to help try to mediate their work 
experiences in auto plants, garment factories, restaurants, and furniture manufacturers in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, even though many were undocumented.  More undocumented 
workers headed to Los Angeles than to any other city - - up to a third of undocumented 
workers lived there by 1985.
149
  Many labor leaders, journalists and scholars deemed 
undocumented workers to be unorganizable:  “The millions of workers who are in this 
country illegally seldom join unions… because they fear deportation and the return of 
poverty in their homeland,” wrote LA Times labor reporter Harry Bernstein.
150
   Yet 
many did successfully organize, like the two hundred Mexican and Central American 
immigrants at Camagua Mattress Company, a water bed manufacturer in Los Angeles, 
who won an NLRB election in 1985 and launched a boycott to force their company to 
sign a first contract.
151
 Yet like native-born workers, Los Angeles’ immigrant workers 
often ran into a wall of increased employer opposition when they tried to unionize.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Community in the Nuevo New South (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Rick 
Fantasia, Kim Voss, Hard Work. 
148 Sabagh, “Los Angeles, A Work of New Immigrants: An Image of Things to Come?” 104.  
149 Ruth Milkman, “Undocumented Immigrant Workers and the Labor Movement,” in Lois Ann Lorentzen, 
Hidden Lives and Human Rights in the United States, Vol. 3 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger: An Imprint of 
ABC-CLIO,LLC , 2014) 35.  Hector L. Delgado, New Immigrants, Old Unions: Organizing Undocumented 
Workers in Los Angeles (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) 1. 
150 As quoted in Delgado, New Immigrants, Old Unions, 10.   




majority of High Tide Swimwear workers in Los Angeles who struck for a union in 1975 
were undocumented workers. They lost their NLRB election after the company fired and 
replaced 46 of the pro-union strikers.
152
  When undocumented workers at Vogue Coach 
Company, a Los Angeles manufacturer of recreational vehicles, formed a union and won 
a contract with the UAW in 1978, the company retaliated by triggering a raid by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) that swept up 90 workers a few days 
before the contract was signed.  Two years later, when the majority Hispanic workforce 
struck for 18 weeks for higher wages and more time off, one of their contract demands 
was that the company stop using these sorts of INS raids to intimidate workers.  Raids, or 
even the threats of such raids, became increasingly common employer tactics.  When 
workers at Rowe Furniture Company in Los Angeles formed a union in 1978, an 
immigration raid detained 18 of the 30 new union members.  When the mostly Japanese 
and Latino workforce at Horikawa Japanese restaurant in Los Angeles’ Little Tokyo tried 
to form a union with Local 11 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
(HERE) in 1980, the NLRB found that the company had illegally threatened the workers 
with deportation.
153
    
New York was also a center for immigrant union organizing, especially among 
the new Chinese immigrants in the Chinatown garment shops, numbering 25,000 by 
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 Katie Quan worked in these shops in the 1970s, and went on to become a union 
organizer and leader in the 1980s.  She remembers that the new Chinese immigrants 
getting jobs in New York’s sewing shops looked to the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union (ILGWU) to shore up security.  “Local 23-25 used to have new 
membership meetings with 75 to 100 workers per week joining the union… The first 
thing they wanted to do after getting off the plane…was to join the union so that their 
benefits would start right away.” 
155
    Unlike employers in much of the rest of the 
country in the 1970s, the Chinese-run sewing shops often did not resist the union because 
the union steered contracts to unionized shops.  The number of Chinese-owned unionized 
garment shops grew from 34 in 1965 to a peak of 430 in 1980.
156
 The union was slow to 
change its practices to fully incorporate these new members, long continuing to hold 
union meetings in English, for instance, despite the fact that so many members only 
spoke Chinese.  Nevertheless, when Chinese contractors reacted to increased foreign 
competition by trying to avoid signing union contracts in 1982, 20,000 garment workers 
took to the streets of New York City in a march that was reminiscent of the Uprising of 
1909 - - though this time the workers were not Eastern European, but Chinese.  The 
workers won their strike and forced the shops to sign the standard union agreement.
157
  
Many Chinese restaurant workers also organized, often affiliating with Local 69 of the 
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Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE). Some even founded their own 
community-based labor organization, the Chinese Staff and Workers’ Association 
(CSWA).  When fifteen waiters at the upscale Silver Palace struck rather than share more 
tips with management, they forced the company to meet their demands and recognize this 
union in 1981. Another effort at Hunan Garden failed in the face of employer 
resistance.
158
   
Much of the new immigration was among Hispanic workers - - since the early 
1970s, the proportion of the workforce that was Hispanic more than tripled from five to 
nearly 15 percent in 2009. Yet pro-union sentiments were strong among native-born 
Hispanic workers as well. Through the early 1980s, unions organized one in five 
Hispanic workers, a higher rate than among the general population.
159
  Polling showed 
that a majority of Latino workers said they would choose to vote for a union.
160
  Cesar 
Chavez’s United Farmworkers’ (UFW) organizing among California’s grape workers 
was the most well-known and celebrated effort among Hispanic workers.  Farmworkers 
were excluded from the NLRA, and so could not vote in union elections (though 
California farmworkers won that right in 1975 under the California Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act).  The UFW turned instead to a successful boycott of table grapes to force 
employers’ hands on workers’ rights; 17 million people, or 10 percent of the nation, 
refused to eat or buy grapes between 1966 and 1972 according to one Department of 
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Agriculture study. By the early 1970s, the UFW had wrung 200 contracts out of growers, 
covering 70,000 grape workers, though they were later undermined by the Teamsters who 
conspired with growers to sign weaker contracts. 
161
    
Three thousand Texas garment workers at the Farah Manufacturing Company, 
mostly Chicanas, used a strike and consumer boycott to force their employer to recognize 
their union in 1974.
162
  Though workers on the cutting floor had voted for a union in 
1970, the company refused to sign a contract.  By 1972 workers were fed up with low 
wages, arbitrary treatment and the firing of union supporters and were no longer content 
to wait for the NLRB process.  One union organizer watched from a nearby café in shock 
as hundreds of workers poured out of the San Antonio plant: “It was a feeling of pure 
panic…The workers took it out of our hands.”
163
  Workers at the El Paso facility walked 
out a week later, joining what would become a nearly two- year strike.  The company 
patrolled the plant gates with dogs and local police arrested 1000 strikers, many in the 
middle of the night, prompting an NLRB judge to call the company “lawless…trampling 
on the rights of  employees as if there were no law, no board and no Ten 
Commandments.”
164
  The union’s consumer boycott crippled Farah’s operations and the 
company admitted that it was largely responsible for a drop in the value of company 
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stock from $49 a share in 1971 to just under $6 in 1974.
165
  The boycott and strike 
brought the company to the bargaining table, and the workers won a contract that 
included wage increases of up to 80 cents an hour over the life of the three-year contract 
– a significant increase over their $1.70 an hour pay – as well as company-paid insurance 
and maternity benefits.
166
  Yet again, workers used unions to find security within 
America’s employer-based social welfare system.   
 Though immigrants nationwide showed interest in joining unions, many unions 
were hostile to them.  The AFL-CIO officially opposed amnesties for undocumented 
immigrants until it reversed its policy in 2000, finally supporting a path to citizenship.
167
  
The federation’s long-standing policy supporting tight immigration controls reflected the 
fact that many of its member unions saw immigrants as competitors for native workers’ 
jobs, and blamed immigrants for the difficulties unions faced in an increasingly hostile 
anti-union environment.  “The biggest issue we have to contend with is the illegal alien,” 
said Gale Van Hoy, Executive Secretary of the Houston Building Trades Council in 
1983, explaining the failure of a much-hailed joint unionization effort in Houston.  “If 
they’re illegal, they shouldn’t be in our union, and we shouldn’t be bothering with 
them.”
168
  Yet many unions did open their doors and actively organized immigrant 
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workers in the 1970s and early 1980s, including the ILGWU in sewing shops in Los 
Angeles and New York, District 1199 and SEIU in hospitals and nursing homes, HERE 
in hotels and restaurants, and AFSCME among head-start and government service 
workers.
169
 “Any worker...regardless of where he’s from, has the same rights as any US 





Promise Denied  
Growth in union membership in the United States has historically come in spurts, 
shooting up quickly in the early 1880s, during WWI and after the passage of the Wagner 
Act, for instance.
171
  America was poised to see another such spurt in union growth in the 
1970s.  After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 opened up the nation’s workplaces, many 
women, people of color, and immigrants had new access to the nation’s best jobs.  The 
young baby boomers were more union-minded than older workers, and many of the 
African-Americans who returned to the South brought with them experience with unions.  
Using NLRB elections, these groups pushed en masse for full economic security through 
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unions, attempting to organize in record numbers in banks and universities, in auto parts 
plants and sewing shops, in urban metropolises and small towns throughout the South.  
They fought for unions even as they endured the structural shift to retail and service jobs 
driven by the global economy.  If jobs for the new working class were going to be nurse’s 
aides, cashiers and data processors, then they would struggle to make these jobs into 
good, union jobs.  In the end, however, this promise of a new spurt in union membership 
growth was denied.  Far too few of the members of this reconfigured working class were 
ever able to form unions because they faced a new and solid wall of resistance from 
employers and because the federal government did not step up to enforce their unionizing 
rights.  
Employers were well aware of the power of America’s new and emerging 
working class.  They mobilized in new ways, first attacking the law undergirding union 
organizing beginning in the late 1960s, then breaking that law at unprecedented levels 
and constructing an entire anti-union industry throughout the 1970s.  “The interventions 
of those consultants into the organizing and collective bargaining fields represents a far 
more comprehensive threat than they have presented to particular organizing campaigns 
or the particular bargaining relationship,” AFL-CIO Director Alan Kistler told a group of 
labor leaders in 1983.
172
  Employers both weakened the legal regime refereeing union 
organizing and made a science out of fighting workplace organizing.  In doing so, 
employers won the class battle of the 1970s and essentially stripped these private-sector 
workers of the legal right to form a union, helping to set the stage for increased economic 
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inequality in the twenty-first century.  We turn now to a study of this U.S. employer 
assault on union organizing in the 1970s - - the battle plan, the armaments, and the 






Employers Close the Door on Union Organizing 
 
In the summer of 1967 Douglas Soutar warned the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) that the Wagner Act had created “union monopoly power…The 
excessive…and constantly growing …power of the trade union movement has acquired a 
position of dominance over American industry and the American economy.”
 1
  Soutar, a 
vice president of the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO), went on to 
co-found the Business Roundtable in 1972, an organization central to a new political 
coalition that conservative business leaders formed in the 1970s.   Much recent 
scholarship has unearthed the new organized movement among businessmen like Soutar 
to curb the regulatory state, roll back workers’ rights, and counter modern liberalism.  
Often the historical narrative includes the 1971 memorandum by soon-to-be Supreme 
Court justice Lewis Powell in which he called on business to unite in defense of the free 
enterprise system and marshal its influence in the media, courts, and universities.  We 
now have much evidence about the explosion of corporate lobbying offices, political 
action committees (PACs), think tanks and public relations firms in the 1970s which 
served as the movement’s architectural framework.
2
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Yet business leaders did not have a free hand with which to shape the nation’s 
emerging political economy.  They faced potent resistance, reminds historian Benjamin 
Waterhouse: “Progressive liberals, despite suffering fracture and loss of cohesion in the 
1970s and 1980s, remained a significant political foil.”
 3
  Though scholars of the new 
business conservatism have identified union power as a site of such resistance, they have 
thus far only focused on the already-existing unions, and have overlooked the impact of 
workers who were outside unions and who sought to enter them.  In fact, union 
organizing - - especially that led by a changing American workforce - - was an early and 
heretofore overlooked inspiration for the new business conservatism.
 
 Employers’ attacks 
on these workers’ union organizing efforts were key components of the nation’s turn to 
the right in the 1970s and 1980s. 
4
    
America’s employers were well aware that millions of workers were trying to 
form unions by the late 1960s and 1970s and they worked to combat new union 
organizing at two levels.  First, between 1965 and 1972, a number of the leaders of the 
nation’s largest corporations - - such as those at GE, Ford and US Steel - - reacted to 
union power by building the Labor Law Reform Group (LLRG) through which they tried 
to roll back the NLRB rules protecting workers’ rights in organizing and at the 
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workplace.  Though their effort to change labor law failed, this new alliance served as an 
early building block for the Business Roundtable, what one historian correctly argues 
“became and remains… the peak organization” of big business’ political power after 
1975.
5
  Second, employers also deepened their workplace resistance to union organizing 
in the 1970s, increasingly breaking the law and spawning a vastly-expanded “union 
avoidance” industry.  While there had long been anti-union employers and firms, 
employers now developed and honed a new set of techniques to fight union organizing, 
promulgated through business schools and management seminars.  These two threads of 
employer resistance to union organizing came together in the late 1970s in the battle 
around labor law reform legislation which would have strengthened workers’ rights.  
Employers successfully used their newly-built networks to fight this reform and to defend 
their right to resist workers’ union organizing. At the outset of the 1970s, a re-shaped 
working class had offered new promise to the flagging union movement. By the early 
1980s, however, employers had successfully rolled back workers’ ability to form unions 
through the NLRB. In doing so, employers weakened collective bargaining’s capacity to 
serve as a provider of broad social welfare and to redistribute the nation’s wealth.   
 
Why Employers Rolled Back Union Organizing 
Though the proportion of the American workforce with a union peaked in the 
1950s, the 1960s were in many ways the real apogee of labor’s post-World War II power.  
A full 65 percent of manufacturing was organized and labor represented one of the most 
                                                             




united lobbying forces in Washington.
6
  Newsweek declared that a “riptide of new 
militancy” was pulsing through America’s unions in the fall of 1966, pointing to new 
AFL-CIO organizing efforts and escalated contract demands.
7
  By setting workplace 
standards through collective bargaining agreements, unions forced employers to deepen 
their role as providers of social welfare.  Though union members were most likely to 
have extensive benefits, their contracts set the standards for many.  By 1970, the 
percentage of all employees with health coverage had quadrupled since 1950, for 
instance, and the percentage with a private pension had doubled.
8
   
Labor’s strength in the late 1960s raised alarm bells throughout corporate 
America, especially as businesses’ rates of profit decreased.  Though some industries, 
like textiles and steel, had weakened in the 1950s, most industries rode a growing 
economy until the years between 1965 and 1973 when the rate of profit for private 
business fell by 29.3 percent.
9
  This decline in profitability rates did not bottom out until 
the 1980s and influenced business’ decisions throughout the 1970s.  The business profit 
rate slowed sharply because in the face of new global competitors businesses, especially 
manufacturers, could not easily pass off higher costs to consumers.
10
   Large businesses 
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reacted in a number of ways to the lower rate of return.  Some began to diversify wildly, 
scooping up unrelated businesses.  Many blamed new regulations for their economic 
troubles, like those introduced by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), both started in 1970.  The U.S. 
government tried to do its share by sharply devaluing the dollar in 1971, an effort to 
reduce the costs of US manufacturers relative to global competitors. These years were 
marked by an increase in the power of the financial sector, and the beginnings of the 
technological revolutions in computers and containerized shipping that would 
revolutionize business practices.
11
   
Employers also reacted to the new economic paradigm by trying to reduce labor 
costs.  “There was in the early 60s an era of a cost price squeeze,” remembered Soutar.  
“People began looking for ways to economize and found out that…they had given it 
away in the contract.”
12
 Employers began increasing their resistance to union power and 
to workers’ union organizing efforts.   After all, American corporations not only had to 
compete globally, but they had to compete against those in countries in which many of 
the social welfare costs were covered by the government rather than by employers.   
Manufacturing employers in particular desperately wanted to get free of the wage and 
benefit pressures they perceived as vampires on their profit rates, and so they attacked 
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labor - - the entity responsible for pulling wages and benefits from employers within the 
U.S. social welfare regime.  Many employers placed the blame for their new woes 
squarely on labor, in part because they did not yet fully understand the impact or reach of 
the global economy on their business.
13
   
Employers had been split on whether to oppose labor in earlier decades, with 
many major unionized companies eschewing the anti-labor vehemence of NAM.  Auto 
and steel, for instance, operated within what were essentially oligopolistic markets and 
the large majority of workers were union members.  Such large manufacturing companies 
found that unions tamped down wage competition and so they had a heavy incentive to 
find common ground with labor.
14
  Smaller companies and those in the South were most 
resistant to unions. Solomon Barkin, a labor educator and well-respected intellectual from 
the TWIU, argued in the late 1950s that “Management unwillingness to accept unions 
and collective bargaining as a part of the operating processes is most prevalent among the 
smaller and middle-sized employers.”
15
 Anti-union employer groups like the NAM and 
the Chamber of Commerce were not as influential in the 1950s and early 1960s as the 
more moderate Committee for Economic Development (CED) and the Business Advisory 
Council (BAC).  For instance, George Romney, Michigan’s liberal Republican governor, 
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pulled the American Motors Corporation out of NAM in 1957 because he thought NAM 
was too conservative.
16
   
By the 1970s, however, large employers faced a new global market paradigm and 
increasingly sought to limit their labor costs.  The change was not monolithic and many 
unionized companies continued their pluralistic rhetoric, at least.  The Vice President of 
Goodrich asserted in 1978 that his company was “fully comfortable in maintaining its 
extensive…union relationships.” Yet even the most unionized companies were shifting in 
their attitudes to unions.  Goodrich’s executive, for example, made this olive branch 
statement within a speech entitled “Learning to Live Without the Union” in which he 
lamented that “too many of us in the business community have in the past looked to large 
unions to insulate us from wage competition.”
17
  Executives faced a new wave of union 
organizing just as they hit the new era of global competition.  Even as they maintained 
the bargaining relationship with their workers who were already union members, many 
major manufacturers thus sought to limit the number of workers who could access 
collective bargaining and tried to keep many workers from ever forming unions in the 
first place.   
Take, for example, GE’s shifting tactics on unions.  GE had built a “free 
enterprise” corporate culture through its newsletters and trainings, and had pioneered a 
take-it-or-leave-it style of bargaining in the late-1940s which the unions dubbed 
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“Boulwarism” after its architect Lemuel Boulware.
18
 Starting in the late 1960s, GE 
representatives - - such as vice president Virgil Day and manager of employee relations 
R.T. Borth - - added a new tactic to the company’s long-standing efforts to resist unions.  
They began to organize other business leaders to weaken labor law itself through the 
Labor Law Reform Group (LLRG). The company made this decision to help found the 
LLRG in the face of considerable union strength and organizing efforts at GE.  GE 
executives were incensed in 1964 when the NLRB declared illegal their “Boulwarism,” 
style of bargaining.
19
  Then in 1966 the IUE, GE’s largest union, invited representatives 
of a number of other unions to join it at the bargaining table.  GE officials now faced 400 
negotiators who called themselves a “Unity conference” and who challenged the 
Boulware philosophy.
20
 When the company protested that such coalition bargaining was 
a union “conspiracy,” the NLRB upheld unions’ right to coordinate on bargaining 
efforts.
21
  The 1968 decision struck fear in employers nationwide as unions were 
increasing their coalition bargaining efforts, such as at Union Carbide, in oil and in the 
non-ferrous metals.
22
  The battle over Boulwarism came to a head in 1969 when 150,000 
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GE workers from 13 unions struck for 100 days and launched a nation-wide boycott of 
GE.  When GE signed the final contract in early 1970, the AFL-CIO declared 
Boulwarism dead and the New York Times called the agreement an “unmistakable 
departure from the ‘take it or leave it’ spirit of past GE bargaining.”
23
  
 Yet GE did not only face push back from its unionized workers.  Thousands of its 
workers who did not yet have unions were pushing to unionize.  GE’s unorganized 
workers triggered 437 separate elections at GE facilities from 1961 to 1982 and won over 
half of them in the 1960s, though it often took them two or three tries. (The workers’ win 
rate dropped to 39 percent in the 1970s, mirroring a nationwide drop in union win rates in 
the face of increased employer resistance.) The GE union elections were all over the 
nation, in 35 states, and many were in the South (e.g., there were more elections in North 
Carolina than in Michigan).    Unions ran campaigns at most of GE’s approximately 40 
non-union facilities, often multiple times, and also organized contiguous units within the 
organized plants, like maintenance departments.
24
   By 1967, rival unions called an 
organizing truce and began to divvy up organizing leads.
25
  GE clearly faced a formidable 
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union organizing threat throughout the 1960s and 1970s in the same years that its 
executives helped organize a broad corporate push back to labor.   
 
The First Level: How Employers Organized an Assault on Labor Law Protections 
In 1965, Douglas Soutar teamed up with Virgil Day, vice president of GE and chair of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Labor Relations Committee, to organize a hand-picked 
group of high level executives to change labor law in their favor.  The group first called 
itself the “nothing committee,” a reference to its attempt to remain confidential, and 
would later be known as the Labor Law Reform Group (LLRG), or sometimes the Labor 
Law Study Group.
 26
   Other officers and staff of NAM and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, such as NAM’s president W.P. Gullander, were central to the planning and 
implementation of the LLRG.
27
   
The LLRG’s formation was certainly not the first time U.S. businesses had 
coordinated efforts against labor. For example, businesses pooled resources in the early 
twentieth century’s open shop drive to break workers’ strikes and organizing efforts.
28
  A 
formidable alliance of businesses in the 1930s influenced the impact of the New Deal on 
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  Nevertheless, the LLRG efforts marked the first such corporate 
coordination within the dominant labor-management relations of the post-World War II 
era. It was a startling change at the time, prompting one Los Angeles Times journalist to 
label it “the first time the nation’s major corporations…have joined forces in a single 
operation.”
30
   Douglas Soutar describes how “In the 50s and early 60s, we had no 
mechanism for pulling together on common issues in industry…we couldn’t effectively 
lobby against certain pieces of legislation…And we got sick and tired of this.”
31
  Soutar 
and Day soon recruited the well-connected Fred Atkinson of R.H. Macy & Co. and met 
with a group of three legal experts they dubbed the “the troika.”
32
 The group brought in 
nine other “thought leaders” from major corporations to form a steering committee, many 
of whom had long been at the heart of the nation’s unionized labor-management system, 
including Ford, AT&T, US Steel, and Union Carbide.
33
  The LLRG thus represented a 
move by large unionized corporations to challenge labor - - not just by moving to the 
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South, but by pooling resources and planning a frontal assault on the laws protecting 
workers’ basic rights.    
The high-level executives came up with a multi-layered plan to roll back the 
NLRB’s power: first, they would commission the “troika” to do a study of exactly which 
parts of labor law should be changed to their benefit.  They would then get buy-in for 
these changes from what they called a “blue ribbon committee” representing an even 
wider swath of corporate America with lawyers and leaders from such companies as 
General Motors, Inland Steel, Northwest Airlines, Federated Department Stores, Kraft, 
Pepsi, Boeing, Caterpillar Tractor, J.C. Penney, and Westinghouse, as well as 
representatives from management-side law firms.
34
   Finally, they would commission an 
opinion survey and implement a public relations campaign that would smooth the way to 
legislative acceptance of their proposed reforms.
35
   
After the troika completed its first draft of the study in 1966, a new legislative 
committee of the LLRG began circulating it among members of Congress under the 
direction of GE’s R.T. Borth in 1967.
36
  “By artfully dodging clear Congressional intent, 
(the NLRB) has succeeded in keeping our national labor relations policy far closer to 
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1935 than the language of the law…or the fact of union power, would indicate is wise,” 
the report charged, thus making “unions an even more potent force.”
37
 It outlined a series 
of 23 proposed changes to labor law, each set within a legal discussion of NLRB 
decisions.    
The changes covered a range of issues relating to union power, and concerns 
about increased organizing rights for workers under recent NLRB decisions were central.
 
  
For example, their report’s summary started by decrying “certification of unions without 
secret ballot elections.”  This was a reference to the Kennedy and Johnson NLRBs’ 
renewed willingness to recognize a union without an election if the company violated the 
workers’ rights during the election period.  Though, in fact, there were more cases in 
which the NLRB certified workers’ unions on the basis of authorization cards, the 
increase was slight - - from about one to four percent of cases between 1962 and 1968.  
Nevertheless, the LLRG argued that “more and more, the Board is disposed to accepting 
‘the card check.’”
38
   
Issues concerning union organizing were paramount throughout the study.  For 
example, the study lamented the NLRB’s increased willingness to rule as impermissible 
much of what employers often said during election campaigns, such as threats about plant 
closings if the workers chose a union, as well as threats about losing ground during 
                                                             
37 “Labor Law Reform Study: Amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act,” September, 1969, 
Box 72, Series V, NAM papers, v (hereafter “Labor Law Reform Study”).   
38 Gross, Broken Promise, 167 -171 and 183 to 184, see also fns 145 and 146, p. 359.  For LLRG concern 
on the issue, see “Labor Law Reform Study,” xvi and B2 – B3. The Kennedy NLRB had revived the 
Truman-era NLRB’s Joy Silk doctrine  in 1961, recognizing unions without an election in the cases of 
employer misfeasance, and then in 1964 the Johnson NLRB deepened its commitment by allowing unions 
to simultaneously petition for election and file refusal to bargain charges in the Bernel Foam case. See Joy 




bargaining and permanently replacing strikers.  The NLRB had become more willing to 
claim that even if each individual employer threats passed legal muster, the sum total 
could be construed as illegal behavior. This inspired the LLRG to claim the NLRB was 
“muzzling employers who would tell their employees of disadvantages inherent in 
unionization.”
39
  The executives worried that the NLRB might revive the union’s right to 
reply if the employer forced workers to attend a meeting against the union (often called a 
“captive-audience meeting”).
40
  The group also deplored that the NLRB allowed smaller, 
sub-units of workers to vote on unionization.
41
  This was especially important to unions 
who were trying to enter the retail and service economy and found it difficult to win 
elections among thousands of workers spread over multiple stores or offices.  The LLRG 
leaders objected to the NLRB’s strengthening of workers’ right to picket for recognition 
of a union, and also became deeply troubled by the Excelsior Underwear, Inc decision of 
1966 in which the NLRB ordered that once workers won the right to have a union 
election, the company must furnish a list of all employees to the union.
42
  They were 
appalled when the NLRB ordered the textile giant J.P. Stevens not only to hold a new 
election in its plants after it was found to have massively violated its workers’ rights, but 
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also to read the finding aloud and mail the decision to its employees.” 
43
 Many of the 
report’s proposed changes also dealt with issues outside of organizing, such as those 
concerning management’s rights and bargaining.  One central objection, for instance, 
concerned the NLRB’s Fibreboard (1961) decision in which the NLRB ordered the 
company to negotiate with the union over subcontracting. 
44
  
The LLRG study addressed the corporate leaders’ concerns about union 
organizing through its proposed amendments that would, among other remedies, require 
secret ballot elections for certification, strengthen employer “free speech,” insist on 
“meaningful” bargaining units and “prevent improper remedies” for employer unfair 
labor practices during representation campaigns.  The study went through existing labor 
law, line by line, changing it word by word to meet the employers’ needs.  Its final 
solution was to abolish the NLRB jurisdiction entirely in unfair labor practice cases, and 
instead either turn that function over to the judiciary or create a new “United States Labor 
Court” with judges appointed for 20-year terms.  The executives thus sought not only to 
change the rules of the game, but actually to abolish the labor law referee. 
45
  
The next step was to try to change public opinion and soften the way for 
Congressional acceptance of their labor law reforms.  For this, they hired an executive 
director, formed among themselves a “public information committee,” and depended 
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heavily on the Hill & Knowlton public relations firm.
46
  That firm pushed the group’s 
ideas on labor law reform in memos to newspaper editors, a national circuit of speeches, 
packages for women’s clubs and a special investigative report by Reader’s Digest.  Hill 
& Knowlton helped the Reader’s Digest gather and research their material for the article 
entitled “Let’s Enforce Our Labor Laws Fairly.” 
47
  Hill & Knowlton had a fair amount of 
success getting traction for its campaign, especially with the opinion pages of the smaller 
newspapers.  The Bridgeville, Pennsylvania paper, for instance, featured a cartoon 
version of the NLRB knocking over Justice, depicted as a young woman holding scales.  
A Colorado Springs paper cited a bulletin published by Hill & Knowlton under the 
headline “NLRB Dictatorship.”  Virtually identical editorials critical of the board 
appeared in the Macomb Daily (Michigan), Northern Virginia Sun (Arlington) and the 
Richmond Independent (California) in 1968.
48
   
 The LLRG hoped to win its changes after the 1968 elections.  To that end, its 
charges seemed to gain real traction on the Hill by late 1967 when Senator Sam Ervin 
announced a Congressional investigation of the NLRB under his jurisdiction as chair of 
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the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers.
49
  Though at the time the NAM 
denied that the employers provided the impetus for his investigation, Douglas Soutar later 
clarified, “I’d say we fanned the flames…the witnesses, how they got there, and their 
testimony and so forth, this was all coordinated by our group.”
50
  The Ervin committee 
dealt with union power more generally, and union organizing issues were key.  For 
example, NAM’s brief to the committee laid out point for point every complaint about 
recent NLRB decisions on organizing rights.
51
  Conservative legal scholar Sylvester Petro 
testified that it was a “rigged process” when the NLRB ordered companies to bargain 
when they violated workers’ organizing rights.
52
   
The executives had hoped that the Ervin committee would serve as the base for 
changing labor law through Congress, but the 1968 elections did not serve their needs.  
The Congress remained Democratic, and although Nixon won the presidency, he won by 
a narrow margin and courted unions rather than alienating them.  One LLRG leader 
remembers that the group intended to introduce the reforms through Nixon’s new labor 
secretary George Schultz, but “when we went looking for George Schultz right after the 
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inauguration, he was down at Bal Harbor chatting it up with Meany.”
53
  Though Ervin 
issued his panel’s findings in 1970, they got little attention in the press.  The group did 
find legislators to introduce bills on many of its recommendations, such as requiring 
secret ballot elections, banning workers from picketing for union recognition, and 
prohibiting coalition bargaining.  Senator Barry Goldwater proposed a bill to guarantee 
employers “free speech” in union elections.  The bills, however, got little traction. 
54
  
The group soon began to change tactics and actively shifted its efforts away from 
the legislative side and toward judicial decisions and Executive-level appointments to the 
NLRB.  “Since the Labor Law Reform Group was established, we have not had a 
Congress receptive to labor law changes,” wrote the NAM’s executive committee in 
1971, noting that a Nixon administration representative told them that while “the 
administration is receptive to labor law reform…don’t count on it too much.”
55
    Soon 
after Nixon’s appointment, Soutar worked with Schultz to find a candidate who would 
lead the NLRB in the direction sought by the LLRG, but who would not be anathema to 
labor.
56
  They tapped Edward Miller, a Chicago management-side lawyer and member of 
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the LLRG’s blue ribbon committee.  He was appointed over labor’s objections, who 
dubbed him a “corporation lawyer.”
57
    
The Miller-led NLRB quickly began changing the tenor of decisions in 
management’s direction and according to the Wall Street Journal, “putting more 
obstacles in the path of union negotiators and organizers.”
58
  The Miller board 
systematically reinterpreted national labor policy by limiting protections for workers 
along the lines laid out by the LLRG, including organizing rights.   Consider, for 
instance, what employers could now say to workers who wanted to form a union.  
Employers could tell workers that signing union cards would be “fatal” and cause 
“turmoil,” that if they chose a union they could lose what they had because bargaining 
“starts from scratch” and “everything is up for negotiation,” and could predict that they 
would have to close up shop due to financial difficulties if the workers voted yes.
59
  The 
Miller Board began to require that unions run elections in large bargaining units, at many 
sites, such as in fast food chains and stores.
60
  The Miller board also was far less willing 
to order a company to bargain with a union without an election when the company broke 
the law.  For instance, even after an employer physically assaulted two union organizers 
at the Green Briar Nursing Home, the Miller board felt there was no “lingering impact” 
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that would affect workers’ decision on whether to vote for a union and chose not to order 
to company to bargain.
61
  The LLRG’s wish list was coming true even though it had been 
unsuccessful in its attempts to actually change labor law.  
The LLRG continued to expand its membership and opened an office in 
Washington, DC in 1971.  It now had over 40 corporate members, including Campbell 
Soup, Chase Manhattan Bank, Chrysler, Kaiser Industries and Shell Oil and a budget of 
more than $1.2 million. Though NAM and the Chamber of Commerce provided the 
initial funding for the LLRG, the group later came up with a new sliding scale for 
business contributions.
62
  The LLRG soon expanded its influence by merging with two 
other employer groups to form the Business Roundtable in 1972.  The other groups were 
a small group of politically-active executives known as the “March Group” - - founded 
by ALCOA and GE executives - - and another employer organization, the Construction 
Users’ Anti-Inflation Roundtable (CUAIR).  A broad coalition of large businesses had 
established CUAIR in 1969 to limit unions’ ability to force higher wages and benefits on 
the construction of their facilities and stores. The Business Roundtable was the first 
business lobby to limit membership to top CEOs of Fortune 500 groups, and it soon had 
enormous political clout. “No organization can hire the talent we can put together,” said 
the chair of the Aluminum Co. of America. “It would be impossible.”
63
   Douglas Soutar 
and GE’s Virgil Day were both instrumental in pushing for the merger and shaping the 
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Business Roundtable’s direction.  It included many of the same companies which were 
part of the LLRG, and was chaired by the former chair of US Steel, Roger Blough.
64
 
Through the Business Roundtable, these business leaders pushed their labor reform 
agenda through the courts and increased their lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill.   The 
Business Roundtable was careful not to portray itself as an anti-union organization, 
instead emphasizing its stance on inflation and consumer issues.  It also expanded its 
attacks beyond unions and the NLRB to other government regulations and agencies, 
killing the campaign for a Consumer Protection Agency (CPA), for instance, and 
weighing in on issues as diverse as Social Security, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and the Arab oil boycott.
65
   
Yet labor law remained a key concern for the Business Roundtable. The LLRG 
essentially became its Labor-Management Committee whose stated objectives included 
publicizing the Labor Law Reform Study and implementing as much of it as possible 
through “legislation, changed administration and litigation.  Monitor and improve 
administration of existing law.”
66
  The Roundtable’s Public Information Committee was 
also a holdover from the LLRG’s public relations group. It proposed a massive public 
relations blitz and once again collaborated with Reader’s Digest, this time sinking over a 
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million dollars into three-page advertisements designed to look like magazine copy and to 
run each month.
67
   
By the late 1970s, the Business Roundtable was one player in a conservative 
business movement which developed a broad and influential class resistance to state 
regulation and effectively helped reverse the tide of liberal expansion. The Chamber of 
Commerce increased its membership fourfold in the decade and dramatically increased 
its lobbying efforts.
68
 In the early 1970s, labor political action committees (PACs) 
contributed more to campaigns than did those of business, but by the end of the decade 
business spending far outstripped that of labor. A host of new conservative think tanks 
sprang up, like the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the conservative Heritage 
Foundation. 
69
 The LLRG’s initial purpose was never to roll back the liberal state, per se, 
but to roll back specific legal protections for unions and workers who wanted to join 
them.  Nevertheless, the LLRG served as one of the key initial platforms for new 
politically conservative activity among America’s business elite.   The 1970s 
conservative business movement’s first infant steps were taken in opposition to union 
power and worker organizing, and the struggle to roll back workers’ unionizing efforts 
was built into its DNA.   
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The Second Level: Employers Resisted Workplace Organizing 
Overall, the large corporations’ attempt to re-write labor law in the early 1970s was not 
as effective as they had hoped because unions still had such strong political sway.  
Starting in the 1970s, many employers instead began to focus on breaking and 
circumventing the law rather than trying to change it through Congress.  They increased 
their ground level efforts against workers’ organizing efforts, devising new ways to bend 
and overpower the rules governing NLRB elections.  Their tactics were increasingly 
sophisticated and effective.  By 1977, unionizing workers began to lose more than half of 
their elections for the first time since the Wagner Act’s inception.
70
   Employers learned 
how to effectively shut off workers’ doorway to collective bargaining. 
There had long been union busters in the U.S., and many employers had resisted 
unionization for decades.
71
 However, there were three new developments in the 1970s 
concerning employer resistance to organizing at the workplace. First, employers became 
more willing to break the labor law governing new union formation.   Second, resistance 
to union organizing spread deep within the nation’s core industries as even unionized and 
manufacturing employers increasingly fought workers’ organizing efforts. Third, a large 
anti-union consultant industry grew in the 1970s.  These anti-union consultants, often in 
partnership with the nation’s business schools, promulgated a new pedagogy that linked 
remaining “union-free” to good management.  The consultants both encouraged and 
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profited from employers’ fears about the new wave of women and people of color who 
pushed for unions.
72
   
The impetus for employers’ intensified ground level battle against unionization 
was the same that spawned the LLRG.  Companies sought new ways to increase their 
profits in a new, more competitive global paradigm and so sought to control their labor 
costs and obligations within the U.S. social welfare regime.    As they faced this profit 
squeeze, they saw a new wave of workers push for unionization, and they sought to close 
down these workers’ ability to push for higher wages and benefits through collective 
bargaining.   Employers became so successful in making labor law suit their needs 
through this workplace-level attack that by the time unions tried to strengthen labor law 
late in the decade, employers essentially defended the same law they had tried to change 
at the decade’s onset.    
The first major shift in management’s workplace resistance to unionizing in the 
1970s occurred as more employers became willing to break the law at the workplace, 
resulting in a surge in unfair labor practice charges against companies.   The NLRB did 
not effectively hold back this employer assault because its penalties had become so weak.  
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Employers legally were not allowed to fire or threaten workers for supporting the union, 
for instance, nor were they allowed to spy on workers, threaten to shut down if the 
workers voted in a union, or promise workers more money or perks if they rejected a 
union.  These actions were the sorts considered “unfair labor practices” or “ULPs” by the 
NLRB.
73
 Unfair labor charges against employer soared exponentially during the 1970s.  
Though the number of workers who tried to form unions remained steady at about half a 
million a year, those workers faced far more employer law breaking.   ULP charges 
against employers rose sevenfold between 1950 and 1980, and the number of the most 
severe type of charges - -those dealing with discrimination or unfair dismissal for union 
support - - rose nearly six fold. (See Appendix D)  These were not empty charges.  In 
fact, the number of workers to whom the NLRB awarded employer back pay in 1980 was 
nearly seven times greater than in 1950.
74
  Not all unfair labor practices tracked by the 
NLRB were filed during organizing cases. For instance, unions also filed ULP charges 
when employers violated union members’ rights on the job. Nevertheless, the numbers 
clearly paint a picture of employers’ increased willingness to break the law.  Indeed, by 




Yet the NLRB had very weak penalties for labor law violations. Typically, if an 
employer was found to have illegally fired a union supporter during an organizing 
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campaign, for instance, that company would simply have to rehire the worker, pay the 
worker the wages it would have otherwise owed, and post a blue and white sign in the 
break room explaining that it broke the law.  If the employer violated labor law multiple 
times during a campaign, then the NLRB could order a new election, though this would 
do little to negate the original threats’ effects.  Very occasionally, the NLRB would order 
the company to begin bargaining without a new election. There were no large fines, no 
employer went to jail, and the costs for breaking labor law were negligible.  In fact, the 
efficacy of labor law in the mid-century decades rested less on the NLRB’s punitive 
power than on mainstream employers’ willing compliance.
76
 
The second major development in the 1970s was that many more mainstream, 
industrial companies became willing to resist unionization efforts, including in union-
dense geographic areas.  No longer was union-busting a Southern and small firm 
phenomenon. Just as large, Fortune 500 firms with long-standing bargaining relationships 
had broken new ground in forming the LLRG, they also ramped up their resistance to 
union organizing at the workplace.  By the end of the decade, even large manufacturers 
skirted the law, delayed at every step, and increasingly spoke out against new union 
organizing, even when some of their workers were already covered by collective 
bargaining agreements.  “It requires a certain nerve for those companies whose names 
you see in the batting order of big hitters in the bargaining game to try to keep plants 
unorganized,” a vice president of BF Goodrich told an industrial relations convention in 
1978.  “Management is more sophisticated and bolder…and the times ‘they are a-
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   Companies attending one 1979 seminar by Charles Hughes, a prominent 
anti-union consultant, included such blue chip companies as Rockwell International, 
Honeywell, Goodrich, Bechtel and Celanese.
78
   
Union busting tactics moved deeply into the industrial sector, the sector where 
unions had traditionally been the strongest and which had long formed the core of the 
nation’s economy.  A sectoral analysis of ULPs from 1950 to 1980 reveals that workers 
trying to form unions in the industrial sector in the 1970s actually became more likely to 
face employer law breaking than in those sectors which were historically less unionized, 
such as retail and service.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the ratio of ULPs to the number of 
total elections held in the industrial, service and retail sectors all remained fairly low and 
remained similar across sectors.  In the 1970s, however, when all workers faced far more 
ULPs per election, industrial sector workers bore an even greater share of the employer 
resistance.  By the end of the decade the ratio of ULPs to elections in the industrial sector 
had actually outstripped the ratio in both service and retail, though hospital workers and 
retail clerks certainly saw their share of resistance, too.  (See Appendix E)   
The third development in employers’ resistance to union organizing in the 1970s 
was their increased use of anti-union management consultants and lawyers who, in turn, 
helped shift the paradigm of acceptable employer behavior.  Through an avalanche of 
seminars, trainings, books, and speeches, these new “management consultants” helped 
make mainstream a level of anti-unionism that had once been unseemly in the mid-
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century labor-management arrangement.  “Any management that gets a union deserves it 
– and they get the kind they deserve,” was the mantra of one of the decade’s most sought-
after consultants. These hired guns helped forge the concept that managers could and 




The anti-union labor consultants of the 1970s had their roots in the late 1930s 
through the 1950s.  Firms like Sears and Kodak built on the human resources movement 
of the 1940s and used behavioral and psychological research to undercut unionizing 
efforts.
80
  The architect of Sears’ anti-union fortress, Nathan Shefferman, worked for the 
original NLRB in 1933, and in 1939 formed the nation’s first anti-union firm, Labor 
Research Associates (LRA) in Chicago. His staffers went on to found the leading firms of 
the 1970s union buster movement, including John Sheridan and Associates and Modern 
Management, Inc. the firm that would be known as Modern Management Methods, Inc., 
or “Three M.”
81
  Earle K. Shawe, a lawyer and consultant whom one government official 
in 1981 called “the consummate pro… the consummate gunslinger,” also worked for the 
NLRB in the 1930s where he served as the NLRB lawyer who forced Republic Steel to 
bargain with its workers.  He then founded a management-side law firm in Baltimore 
following the passage of Taft-Hartley. There he filed the nation’s first unfair labor 
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practice against a union in 1948 and began a career helping employers fight unions.
82
  
John Tate, the architect of Wal-Mart’s anti-union policy starting in the 1970s, got his start 
in 1956 organizing 300 firms trying to avoid unionization into the Midwest Employers 
Council.
83
   
Yet management resistance to unions in the earlier decades was neither as 
widespread nor as accepted as it would be by the 1970s and 1980s.  While there were just 
a handful of anti-union firms in the beginning of the 1970s, there were hundreds by the 
decade’s end.  One management firm founder told a Congressional hearing in 1979 that 
his industry grew tenfold over the preceding decade.
84
  The AFL-CIO estimated in 1979 
that 70 percent of all campaigns involved some sort of management consultant or outside 
legal counsel.
85
 “Three M” made a name for itself by taking advantage of the private-
sector wave of union organizing driven by women and people of color in the 1970s, first 
fighting hospital union organizing efforts, and then moving on to help universities, banks, 
and insurance companies fight their workers’ unionization efforts.
86
  It specialized in 
teaching supervisors to attack the union, even as it worked hard to stay out of the 
spotlight.  “No, Mr. Donahue, we don’t bust unions,” insisted founder Herbert Melnick 
during his 1983 appearance on the Phil Donahue show.  “We’re a company that serves as 
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a marriage broker between employees and employers.”  Patty Everett, however, a 
registered nurse, described how when she joined a unionization effort, supervisors trained 
by Three M would repeatedly “take me into a closed report room, intimidate me with 
questions, attack my ego, make me feel that I couldn’t exercise my human and legal 
rights.”
87
   A number of other management-side law firms grew rapidly in the 1970s in 
order to capture the growing demand for legal advice on how to avoid unions.  The firm 
Jackson and Lewis, for instance, was founded in 1958 after Louis Jackson left the employ 
of Nathan Shefferman, but expanded quickly in the 1970s by fighting unions at hospitals 
and nursing homes.
88
  Seyfarth and Shaw, the law firm that fought unionization efforts at 
Newport News and Yale University, quadrupled in size in the last five years of the 
1970s.
89
   
Scholars and journalists have tracked the rise of anti-union consultants and 
considered their impact on union organizing.  Yet working people themselves remain 
largely absent from these analyses.
90
  In fact, one key reason employers turned to anti-
union consultants in the 1970s was because they faced a wave of fresh worker organizing 
efforts throughout the 1970s, especially by women and people of color.  The reshaped 
working class of the 1970s wanted a union, and no one knew that better than the 
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employers themselves.  Management consultants simultaneously stoked employers’ fears 
and instructed them on how to beat back their diversified workforces’ collective efforts.  
For instance, anti-union consultant Woodruff Imberman told a Wake Forest University 
management seminar in 1979 “Blacks tend to be more prone to unionization than 
whites…you have to follow the EEOC laws and …there is no reason for you to be heroes 
about this… and fill up the workforce with Blacks.  If you can keep them at a minimum, 
you are better off.”  An infiltrator in the meeting reported that Imberman went on to urge 
clients to hire Cubans but “stay the hell away from” Puerto Ricans, noting that they all 
counted as Hispanic for EEOC diversity purposes.  When the Wall Street Journal asked 
Imberman to confirm the infiltrator’s report, Imberman conceded that “he advised them 
to hire only as many blacks as legally necessary.”
91
    In Confessions of a Union Buster, 
Marty Levitt laid out how his employer, Three M, capitalized on the wave of organizing 
in the health care industry that was driven by many women and people of color.  
According to Levitt, Three M developed tactics in that industry to “awaken within the 
mostly white supervisor corps a hatred of blacks…contempt for women, mistrust of the 
poor…”  For instance, when training supervisors to fight the health care union Local 
1199, Levitt and his colleagues often showed the union’s own film about a Charleston, 
South Carolina hospital campaign with a majority black workforce. “We particularly like 
a scene in which a very fat, very dark female face fills the screen, and the woman says in 
a thick, southern drawl, ‘Jes’ gimme eleven nahhhnty-nahhn….We didn’t say much when 
we showed the film.  We didn’t have to…we tapped the fear that resided in the hearts of 
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   Consultants profited by feeding employers’ fears about their diverse 
workforces.  For example, Robert Kai Whiting of Dallas-based Whiting & Associates 
offered to teach attendees at his upcoming management seminar how to do a “Union 
Vulnerability Audit” which included determining if they were at risk because of “a 
substantial percentage of blacks, Hispanics or females in your workplace.”
 93
 
Consultants were especially shrill about women’s increased organizing and its 
link to women’s newfound rights consciousness. Martin Payson, a partner at Jackson and 
Lewis, warned that the “most significant trend in labor-management relations today is the 
union drive to organize female office workers…The new organizing effort has coincided 
with awakening recognition by women of their rights, and with the passage of laws 
protecting those rights.”
94
  Many rang alarm bells for the mostly-male management class 
about the implications of the gender shifts within union organizing. “Organizing is up in 
office-clerical, in the professions,” warned Charles Hughes in one seminar.  “The hottest 
area now is health care.  If you stepped off a curb in San Francisco and got hit by a beer 
truck, there’s a good possibility that the nurse at the hospital would be a Teamster.” 
95
 
While employers used to believe that women were less likely to unionize because they 
were not the main breadwinners, consultants taught them that attitudes had shifted.  “All 
indications are that women are now more inclined to vote union than men,” warned one 
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In a related development, anti-union consultants and lawyers profited from the 
increase in federal regulations governing diversity the workplace.    The creation of the 
EEOC in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its expansion to government employees 
through the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Act in 1972 served as the legislative 
base for a number of developments that spurred employers to adopt affirmative action.  
For instance, in 1970 the Department of Labor first required all firms with federal 
contracts worth $500,000 to have affirmative action plans.  The perceived threat to 
employers deepened after 1972 when Congress gave the EEOC the power to sue in 
federal court. 
97
 Employers were now forced to deal with a host of new rules on the job.
 
  
Consultants and management-side lawyers stood ready to assist, offering one-stop-
shopping for managing the newly-diversified workforce.  Earle K. Shawe, for instance, 
had helped employers fight unions since the late 1940s, but by the 1970s he expanded his 
services to include updating clients on the latest EEO trends, such as comparable pay.  
When one major insurance company faced both a union organizing drive and a major 
class action lawsuit, he did a training for the managers on both how to both “take extra 
precaution to assure fairness” and how to be vigilant about spotting union activity.
98
  The 
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Advanced Management Reporter - - a newsletter “helping companies stay union free” - - 
featured a regular “EEO corner.”
99
   
Business schools and professors worked in tandem with anti-union consultants to 
help shift management’s values on unions.  By the 1970s, U.S. business managers were 
far more likely to have gone to business school than in previous decades and were far 
more likely to do so than managers in other industrialized nations.
100
  Business schools in 
1970s began to teach students that unions were an unnecessary expense on the cost and 
balance sheet, and tutor them in how to avoid unionization.  William E. Fulmer spent 
fifteen years at the Harvard Business School and then served in the administration at 
George Mason University and other business schools.
101
  In a series of Harvard Business 
School case studies dating from 1975 to 1981, he purported to explore union organizing 
in “an analytical and unbiased manner.” Yet in a discussion of employers’ “tactical 
decisions” concerning unfair labor practices he taught that since the NLRB response to 
employer unfair labor practices was so lengthy and the penalties “quite mild,” that “it is 
quite possible for management to effectively destroy an organizing effort or, at the very 
least, signal to employees the relative ineffectiveness of the union in dealing with 
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   John G. Kilgour, a management professor who joined the faculty of 
California State University in 1972, asserted that his 1981 Preventative Labor Relations 
was an “objective study.” Yet this step-by-step union avoidance manual offered a blue 
print in how to open up and remain non-union.  It imparted that “it is foolhardy to build a 
new facility where the probability of encountering serious union attention is higher than 
necessary,” and then built a “Union Risk Index” which rated each state by the probability 
that its workers would try and succeed to form a union.  Kilgour even suggested capital 
flight:  “For the sake of completeness, we should note that another way of avoiding 
unions altogether is to leave the country.”
103
    Business schools taught managers that 
they needed outside consultants to deal with unionization.    Fulmer authored one 
Harvard Business School case study that told the story of a new personnel manager 
whose major rookie mistake was not hiring an outside labor attorney to help fight a 
successful unionization effort.
104
  The business school academy thus helped shift what it 
meant to be a “good manager” in relation to unions.  “In all but the most unusual 
circumstances it is almost negligent for a company to allow unionization to happen,” 
asserted Kilgour.  “When one surveys all the things a nonunion employer can do to stay 
that way…the employer would almost have to try to get itself organized to end up with a 
union.”
105
  Universities themselves began to host the myriad of anti-union seminars made 
available by union consultants. The University of Delaware, Denver University, the 
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University of San Francisco, the University of Alabama, Clemson, and Wake Forest 
University were among the schools hosting such seminars in the late 1970s, and 
according to the AFL-CIO one consultant boasted of having taught at 30 universities.
106
   
Anti-union consultants and lawyers did far more than fight union organizing 
efforts already off the ground.  Much of their work involved instructing clients in how to 
avoid unions completely, often by opening non-union facilities,  hiring people who were 
the least likely to unionize, and by being perfectly clear that the company philosophy was 
a non-union one.  They thus both tapped into management’s growing desire to avoid 
unions, and helped normalize anti-union management practices.  By 1983, a full forty-
five percent of firms identified remaining union-free as their major labor relations goal in 
a Bureau of National Affairs survey.
107
  The consultant Charles Hughes, for example, 
trained over 27,000 managers and supervisors how to “remain union-free” between 1974 
and 1984. 
108
 Hughes held a doctorate in management psychology and cut his labor 
relations teeth at Texas Instruments and IBM, two firms notorious as anti-union citadels.  
He taught companies that good management meant staying non-union:  “No labor union 
has ever captured a group of employees without the full cooperation and encouragement 
of managers who create the need for unionization.”  He encouraged management to 
commit to being non-union in the employee handbook, to make clear during the initial 
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employee interview “its position regarding operating without a union,” and to use his 
extensive employee attitude surveys to cut off any problems before they developed.
109
  
Other consultants and lawyers taught employers how to locate to non-union areas, 
or run away from unions and not get caught.  After Packless Industries, Inc. moved from 
Pennsylvania to Waco, Texas, but found that its new, Southern workers voted for the 
USWA, the company risked triggering an NLRB unfair labor charge if it moved again. 
Yet a memo shows that Shawe & Rosenthal, Earle K. Shawe’s firm, advised the company 
to set up a non-union Brownsville facility “as a separate corporate entity with separate 
officers, banking and checking accounts, and a separate payroll.”  In order to reduce the 
chance that the NLRB would “pierce the corporate veil for purposes of applying federal 
labor law,” the firm suggested that the company emphasize the shutdown of the 
production line “and avoid referring to a ‘move’ of operations.”
110
  Stephen Cabot, a 
Philadelphia management lawyer, also helped firms decide where to locate in order to 
remain non-union, sometimes even identifying specific areas of cities where workers 
were the least likely to unionize.
111
    
 Much of the anti-union consultants’ work, however, came after workers already 
showed interest in a union.  Once employers realized that their workforces were signing 
union cards, they often called in consultants to usher them through the union campaigns, 
step-by-step, in order to defeat the workers’ organizing efforts. Such resistance was 
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facilitated by the predictable patterns in an NLRB election process.  First, workers must 
sign union cards showing an interest in a union.  Once at least 30 percent of the workers 
had signed cards, they might petition the NLRB to hold an election.  The union and 
company work out the “bargaining unit,” or the specifics of who would vote in the 
election, and an average of ten to twelve weeks later the NLRB agents came to the 
workplace to hold a union election.  Meanwhile, the company was free to talk with 
workers as much as they wanted during the work day, on work time, and the union 
representatives were prohibited from entering the property. 
112
  
 Consultants first advised employers how to discourage card signing.  “The name 
of the game is to prevent the election and chill the union off,” Alfred DeMaria, a popular 
consultant in the mid to late 1970s, told the Wall Street Journal.  “Those cards are vile 
and they’re dangerous.”  DeMaria advised employers how to legally dissuade workers 
from signing a union card.  “The Board has approved some surprisingly strong employer 
statements,” he assured.  “One employer was lawful when it told its workers, ‘Don’t sign 
any cards; they can be fatal to business.”
113
  Once the workers successfully signed 
enough cards to file a petition with the NLRB for an election, consultants taught 
employers to delay each step of the NLRB process as long as possible.   For instance, 
consultants urged employers to demand a protracted NLRB hearing to determine which 
workers got to vote.  “Always go to hearing…. I have yet to see a situation where time 
worked against the employers in an election,” urged Fred Long in an executive meeting 
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captured on tape by a union infiltrator in 1975, a transcript of which surfaced in a 1979 
Congressional hearing.  “Suffice it to say, you have at least 500 issues.  So you litigate 
those issues…  You could come up with them for almost a year, as we did in one 
case.”
114
  Such delays cost organizing workers dearly.  One AFL-CIO study from the 
early 1980s found that each month of delay between the filing of the petition and the 
election decreased the workers’ chance of winning their union election by 2.5 percent.
115
  
“It is recognized by virtually all lawyers in the field, and by the unions themselves, that 
the longer the time between the filing of the petition and the election, the more difficult it 
is for the union to maintain its suasion among the bargaining unit,” tutored DeMaria.
116
  
Consultants advised employers to drag out the election process by never agreeing to what 
the NLRB called a “consent” election, in which both parties agree that the NLRB 
regional director could arbitrate disputes, but instead to insist on a “stipulation” for 
certification, which allowed the parties to take any disputes all the way to the national 
NLRB in Washington, DC.
117
    In 1962, the more cumbersome stipulated certifications 
made up only 27 percent of cases but by 1977 they made up a full 70 percent.
118
  
Consultants also instructed employers how to manipulate the loopholes in the NLRB 
process in order to seed the voting group with as many “no” votes as possible.  “Hire five 
of your relatives on a regularly scheduled part-time basis…You have 60 days to hire even 
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a hell of a lot of people if you need to,” urged Fred Long in the closed door executive 
session.
119
  DeMaria’s public advice was more measured in his book entitled How 
Management Wins Union Organizing Campaigns:  “Employers should note that under 
existing NLRB rules a limited amount of ‘stacking’ a payroll is permitted.”
120
 
Consultants developed elaborate systems for training front-line supervisors how 
to track and sway union sentiments among workers.   They knew that supervisors often 
came from among the rank-and-file workers and their loyalties could lie with the union.  
Therefore, consultants advised employers to make clear that supervisors’ jobs were on 
the line.  “Discharge of a supervisor for not campaigning on the employer’s behalf is 
permissible,” advised DeMaria.  “Employers are entitled to the undivided loyalty of their 
supervisors and have the full right under the law to discharge supervisors who are not 
loyal.”
121
  Shawe & Rosenthal met with supervisors at Hecht’s at least once a week 
during a 1981 union campaign and advised supervisors how to pressure workers within 
the law:  “Be sure that your Associates understand that…the union can’t make good on 
its promises… Ask Associates to think about the hard feelings which are always created 
when a strike occurs…bad feelings and sometimes violence.”
122
  Consultants often relied 
on supervisors to track the sentiments of employees during the campaign.  One “highly 
confidential management document” taught supervisors at Cannon Mills in 1982 how to 
use a “block 30” sheet to rate each worker in their department from strongest for the 
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company to the weakest.  Supervisors were urged to profile employees by race, sex, and 
age, and were taught to identify clusters of union-support.  An “R” for “respected” was 
used to identify “employees with influence in the workgroup” and at “T” for talker 
identified those who would talk actively for or against the union.
123
    “The front line 
supervisor is the best possible communicator in a campaign,” said Herbert Melnick of 
Modern Management, Inc. (Three M.) Companies like Melnick’s often spent weeks at the 
worksite, training supervisors and offering advice, though rarely appearing before the 
workforce.
124
  Staying behind the scenes helped them sidestep the requirement to file a 
report under the Labor and Management Disclosure Act of 1959, a law which only 
required reports on direct dealings with workers.   Seventy-one thousand union reports 




  Consultants and lawyers taught companies how to threaten unionizing workers 
with loss of benefits and strikes without actually violating the prohibitions on such threats 
under the law.  They provided employers with letters, speeches and backgrounders that 
made clear to workers that the company would not really have to offer anything new if 
the workers won the right to collective bargaining.  “The Hotel does not have to agree to 
a single thing the union proposes so long as we bargain in good faith,” asserted one 
Shawe & Rosenthal fact sheet created for the Boardwalk Regency hotel in Atlantic City.  
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“All the union can do, if the Company does not agree to its demands, is call the 
employees out on strike.”
126
  In fact, most consultants and employers were quick to alarm 
workers about potential strikes.  “Tell employees that the law permits the hiring of a 
permanent replacement for anyone who engages in an economic strike,” urged Brandeis 
University to its supervisors in 1976 when librarians tried to unionize.
127
  DeMaria 
offered employers specific, threatening language with which to dampen union support:  
“Good faith bargaining does not include signing a contract.  Good faith bargaining 
(includes rejecting) a demand we feel in any way would jeopardize this factory or in any 
way put this company in a noncompetitive position.”
128
 
 Employers learned how to legally threaten workers with plant closure if they 
voted in a union, a threat which held enormous sway within the paradigm of capital 
flight by the late 1970s and early 1980s. DeMaria suggested a sample letter carefully 
calibrated to legally threaten workers with job loss:  “It’s no secret that the company 
has been losing money during the last year…If excessive wage demands add a lot to 
our already existing losses it could force us to close… We won’t close just because a 
union is voted in…Only if union demands…cause substantial additional losses would 
we be forced to consider the business as unprofitable.  You’re free to vote as you 
please. But vote smart.”
129
    It was the sort of skirting of the law exemplified by one 
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plant manager at one GE facility in Goldsboro, NC facing a union drive in 1978.  
“Cleveland Welds…was represented by the IUE, as were a number of other plants that 
have closed, including Cleveland Lamp plant, Oakland Lamp plant…Don’t mistake 
me.  I’m not saying we will automatically lose our business if the Union wins the 
election.  But it’s clear that unions…can, and they do, hurt people’s job security.”
130
 
If the workers did manage to win a campaign, employers routinely delayed or 
avoided actually signing a collective bargaining agreement - - the very relationship that 
the entire election process was designed to facilitate.    One AFL-CIO survey found that 
among workers who won elections,  only 63 percent ever actually got a union contract.
131
  
If all else failed, consultants taught employers the ins and outs of decertifying a union 
already in place.    “If a company loses a representation election…a decertification 
election may be viewed as the next step in the long-run program of remaining nonunion,” 
instructed California State University professor John Kilgour.
132
  Consultants helped 
increase decertification of existing units, a practice that was once more rare.  In fact, the 
numbers of decertification elections doubled between 1972 and 1982.
133
    Earle K. 
Shawe lauded the turn toward “de-unionization,” and laid out specifics for employers 
about the special petitions the employees or management must file to trigger a 
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  For instance, after the spice giant McCormick & Company 
acquired an Indianapolis firm where the workers had recently unionized, Shawe’s firm 
issued a memo walking the company through the options for decertifying the union 
before an anticipated move to South Bend, where it would try to operate non-union.
135
  
 The employer campaigns against unionization in the 1970s were remarkably 
potent, and served to effectively unravel the same federal rules governing organizing that 
the LLRG had once sought to re-write.  U.S. workers still had the right to organize on 
paper, but by the end of the decade they were losing it in practice as they faced defeat in 
more than half of the elections that they themselves had triggered. The AFL-CIO’s 
assistant organizing director told Congress in 1984, “I’ve been involved in organizing off 
and on … since 1967 and can assert categorically that the state of the art in employer 
resistance to employees’ organizing efforts has achieved a level of sophistication and 
effectiveness far exceeding that of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s.”
136
  Doreen Lavasseur, a 
union organizer who helped university and clerical workers organize throughout the 
decade, remembers the ground level impact of the employer campaign on workers:  “I 
would just watch these people go from feeling strong and like we need to do something to 
feeling like totally terrified to do anything, and paralyzed.”
137
  The rise in employer law 
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breaking, the spread of employer anti-union campaigns deep into the nation’s core 
industries, and the tutorials of union consultants coalesced to undermine the potency of 
U.S. labor law by the decade’s end. 
 
The Labor Law Reform Act  
The labor movement sought to revive workers’ rights to form unions through the Labor 
Law Reform Act, a major push to revamp the nation’s labor laws.  Labor managed to get 
a bill passed by the House in 1977, only to watch employers and their conservative allies 
block it with a filibuster in the Senate in 1978. It turned out that employers were now 
more pleased with the labor law than they had been at the decade’s outset.  They had 
learned how to use the law to keep a new wave of workers from entering collective 
bargaining, and so were more effectively controlling their wage and social welfare costs.  
Having shut the door on workers’ workplace organizing efforts, they fought to keep it 
closed. They leveraged the employer activism forged during the LLRG effort to defend 
the same law they had once sought to change, and to defeat labor’s legislative solution.  
In doing so, they blocked workers’ access to the nation’s most secure tier of its social 
welfare regime.     
 Labor’s wish list was long for the new Carter Administration.  In addition to labor 
law reform, the AFL-CIO’s 1977 legislative priorities included a three dollar per hour 




under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
 138
  On labor law reform, labor originally set its 
sights much higher than the rather modest labor law changes that ended up going before 
the House and Senate as the Labor Law Reform Act.  Labor originally called for the 
repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act - - the “right to work” provision allowing 
states to prohibit mandatory dues or fee collections from all union members.  Labor also 
wanted to change the cumbersome, two-step certification process required by U.S. labor 
law under which first workers must sign cards to trigger a union election and then wait 
months to vote.   Unions proposed a “card check” provision under which unions would be 
automatically certified as the bargaining representative after the first step, once a majority 
of workers signed up to be members, as was the case in many parts of Canada.  Finally, 
unions wanted to check employers’ ability to avoid unions through acquisitions and 
mergers.  They wanted a provision that would require a business that bought a unionized 
facility to honor the union contract.
139
   
 The Carter Administration refused to include all three of these more major 
changes to labor law, instead meeting with labor leaders and working out a compromise 
that Stuart Eizenstat, Carter’s  domestic policy chief, labelled a “much more modest set 
of reforms… because they (unions) very much want Administration backing for their 
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   Carter offered the reforms as his own labor law reform bill to Congress on July 
18, 1977, rejecting a suggestion by some staff members to simply issue a message of 
support.
141
  The bill’s major provisions included holding elections more quickly (within 
15 – 25 days) after workers petitioned for an election, allowing union representatives 
equal access inside the workplace to meet with workers when employers held meetings 
against the union, paying workers double back pay if the NLRB found that their 
employer illegally fired them for forming a union, prohibiting repeat labor law violators 
from getting federal contracts, and increasing the number of NLRB members to seven in 
order to expedite board processes. 
142
  
In addition to meeting with labor leaders, the Carter Administration met 
repeatedly with the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce and NAM in the 
process of writing the bill. The Administration thought that while the fight would be a 
tough one, they had extinguished much of the business opposition’s fire.  “Because we 
involved the business community and because they achieved a number of compromises, 
their reaction has been vastly muted…and will be less vociferous…,” Eizenstat assured 
President Carter just after Carter sent the bill to Congress.
143
   Labor, too, believed that it 
could convince many employers with major collective bargaining relationships to eschew 
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 In fact, the Business Roundtable was at first split on whether to oppose the bill.  
A number of leaders of major, unionized firms - - like Thomas A. Murphy of GM and 
Reginald Jones of GE - - had at first argued that the bill was not worth jeopardizing 
peaceful labor relations.
145
  After all, the Roundtable had successfully lobbied to exclude 
from the House bill the provisions dealing with card check, repeal of Taft-Hartley’s 14(b) 
and contract continuity.  The final bill was thus already more palatable to many of 
them.
146
  Yet many members of the Business Roundtable viciously opposed the reform 
legislation and instead argued for maintaining the status quo on labor law.  A large block 
of the Roundtable’s policy committee pushed to join NAM and the Chamber in opposing 
the bill.  Non-union, retail firms like Sears Roebuck opposed the bill, and so did some 
unionized firms like Bethlehem Steel, Firestone and Goodyear.  Fresh union organizing 
was central to their concerns.  They worried the law would make it “most difficult to 
maintain as nonunion such groups as engineers, technicians, branch banks, or retail units, 
etc.,” according to one Firestone executive.
147
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The suppositions of labor leaders and the Carter Administration that they could 
win the support of major corporations for the bill turned out to be glaringly false.  In the 
end, the Business Roundtable policy committee voted 19 to 11 to oppose the House bill. 
They joined a broad coalition of American business - - including NAM, the Chamber, the 
National Federation of Independent Business and other small business groups - - which 
defended the broken status quo of labor law.
 148
   “Speaking for American industry, the 
NAM strongly supports the existing law,” asserted NAM Chair R. Heath Larry and Vice 
Chair of US Steel in 1977.
149
  Such a statement was quite a reversal from a man who had 
once sought to change that same law by serving as one of the original eleven steering 
committee members for the LLRG in 1966.
150
  Heath now defended the current law 
which “guarantees to workers the opportunity to determine whether or not they want 
union representation,” and labelled the reform bill as “largely a bag of free organizing 
tools for unions.”  The employers did back Republican John Erlenborn of Illinois’s 
“Employee Bill of Rights Act of 1977” which would have made it easier for employers to 
trigger elections and prohibited employers from bargaining before an election, but it was 
a weak effort compared to the LLRG’s attempt to re-write the law at the decade’s 
opening.   The Erlenborn bill was mostly defensive and went nowhere.
151
  Instead, the 
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employers put the bulk of their energy into defending a labor law that now served their 
purposes.  
Employer groups mobilized as a united front, putting into action much of the 
lobbying power, relationships and structures they had forged over the last decade.    
NAM and the Associated Builders and Contractors helped found a coalition of employer 
groups called the National Action Committee in June of 1977 to oppose labor law 
reform.
152
  The Chamber of Commerce whipped up fear against the bill among those 
members: “If we lose the ‘big one,’ we accept all the demands made by the unions over 
the last 25 years.  And that is a horrendous prospect.”
153
  NAM armed its members with 
kits containing sample letters to Senators, model letters to stockholders and suppliers, and 
a tutorial on communicating with the media.  Firestone’s chairman, for example, sent a 
letter to shareholders warning that the bill “grants inordinate organizational and 
protective power to unions” and asked them to contact their Members of Congress.
154
  
Much as they had done through the LLRG, the employer groups commissioned studies to 
bolster their case and then veiled their sponsorship.  For instance, NAM commissioned a 
study by Pierre Rinfret Associates which found the bill would increase inflation, and both 
Rinfret and NAM marketed the study as “independent.”
155
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The bill passed the House on October 6, 1977 after a two-day debate with strong 
support, 257 to 163, with 36 Republicans supporting the bill. 
156
 When it passed through 
the Senate Human Relations Subcommittee in January, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch 
immediately vowed a filibuster.
157
 The AFL-CIO wanted the President to prioritize the 
Senate bill for the 1978 Congressional session, but Carter chose to lead with the Panama 
Canal treaty, giving business even more time to mobilize.
158
  Small business opposition 
to the bill turned out to be crucial for swinging Senators’ support, and the NAM and 
Chamber worked alongside the Small Business Legislative Council, which had been 
recently founded in 1976, to put a small business face on the entire business movement’s 
campaign.  The Chamber worked to mobilize its own small businesses members, who 
made up 80 percent of its 66,000 individual firm memberships by 1978.
159
 “The biggest 
threat is not to large companies,” it argued in its member newsletter.  “The real danger 
here is to small business.”
160
  Senator Hatch warned a meeting of 65 McDonald’s 
franchise restaurant owners of the bill’s impending peril of “a new wave of 
organizing.”
161
 The Small Business Legislative Council circulated a petition claiming the 
listed associations employed 13.7 million workers and helped mobilize 5000 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
147C, Series VII, NAM papers;  Press Release by Rinfret Associates, April 11, 1978, Box 147C, Series 
VII, NAM papers.  
156 Townley, Labor Law Reform in US Industrial Relations, 169.   
157 “Labor Law Bill Advances, Faces Filibuster in Senate,” AFL-CIO News, January 28, 1978.   
158 Stein, Pivotal Decade, 187.  
159 Townley, Labor Law Reform in US Industrial Relations, 142-145 and 174.   
160 Congressional Action, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, August 19, 1977, Vol. 21, no 32,  
Box 177, Series 9, Acc 1411, NAM records.   




representatives of small business for a rally, twice the number of those who attended a 
similar labor rally a few weeks earlier.
162
  
Labor also put up a strong fight, mounting what Meany called “one of the most 
massive campaigns we’ve ever waged in our history.”
163
  The unions brought in scores of 
victims of labor law abuse to lobby Congress, for instance, and mobilized support from a 
wide coalition including the NAACP, NOW, the National Urban League and the United 
States Catholic Conference.
164
   The AFL-CIO established a special Task Force on Labor 
Law Reform and publicized horror stories from across the nation of workers who had 
been discharged, threatened and bribed and then were forced to wait years for the NLRB 
process.
165
  Nearly 150 Newport News Shipbuilding workers were among those cheered 
at a massive USWA rally for labor law reform in Washington, D.C.
166
   
When the bill came to the Senate floor in mid-May it faced a 19-day filibuster. 
The bill’s supporters tried five times to get the 60 votes needed to shut down debate, but 
faced a formidable floor manager in Hatch who kept support tight. The Democratic 
supporters scrambled to find support among Southern Democrats such as Lawton Chiles 
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(Florida), Russell Long (Louisiana) and Dale Bumpers (Arkansas).
167
   Labor Secretary 
Ray Marshall remembered that Vice President Walter Mondale managed to hold 
Democrat John Sparkman of Alabama incommunicado and brought him to the Senate in 
his car, only to see Sparkman vote against it.
168
   The bill died after the fifth cloture vote 
on June 22, 1978.
169
 
Labor had known that the battle would be a difficult one, but it was shocked by 
the vehemence and coordination of the business attack.  “I am frankly puzzled by the 
campaign against this bill,” wrote AFL-CIO President George Meany during the Senate 
debate.
170
  The AFL-CIO’s first-ever full-page Wall Street Journal ad reflected the 
group’s sentiments in early May, just before debate began on the Senate floor.  In an 
“Open Letter to American Business” George Meany asked business, “Why?  What is 
your motivation? … Where is the moral basis for your attacks?  Is not the real intent of 
this attack the destruction of the uniquely American system of collective bargaining…Do 
you want to destroy trade unionism?”
171
 The AFL-CIO convention had passed a 
resolution in January calling for “the fair employers of America, who respect the rights of 
their employees and who negotiate honorably with their unions…to join in this campaign 
                                                             
167 Bob Thompson and Frank Moore to the President, June 9, 1978, Box 35, Moore – Office of 
Congressional Liaison, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum; Roof, American Labor, Congress, and the 
Welfare State, 1935-2010.  
168 Telephone interview with Ray Marshall by the author, August 4, 2011.  See also Joseph E. Hower and 
Joseph A. McCartin, “Marshall’s Principle: A Former Labor Secretary Looks Back (and Ahead),” LABOR: 
Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas, Vol 11, No. 4, 91-107, esp. 101. 
169 “Backers of Labor Bill Give Up Filibuster Fight,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1978, A5.  
170 George Meany, “For Working Americans, Time for Justice,” The AFL-CIO Federationist, June 1978, 1.   
171 AFL-CIO News Release, May 4, 1978, Box 85, Series 6, RG 1-038, Office of the President, AFL-CIO 




for simple justice” arguing that many employers must now find themselves “uneasy.”
172
 
Many labor leaders thus felt deeply betrayed by the businesses they had considered 
partners in labor-management.  Days before the final cloture vote, the new UAW 
President Douglas Fraser resigned from the President’s Labor-Management Group where 
he had served alongside leaders such as GE’s Reginald Jones, charging that the “ugly 
multimillion dollar campaign against labor law reform” was indicative of a “a one-sided 
class war” that broke “and discarded the fragile, unwritten compact” between labor and 
business.
173
  The AFL-CIO organizing director’s outrage was evident even a year later : 
“Not a corporate voice was raised…not one expression of disassociation ...Large 
segments of the management community…do not accept collective bargaining… at most, 
have endured it, tolerated it, as one tolerates rats until they can be exterminated.”
174
   
 
Closing the Door to Economic Security  
Employers’ reaction to workers’ new union organizing in the 1970s was a key component 
in the decline of union power in the late twentieth century.  While globalization and 
technological change certainly did impact union membership, the decline of union 
density in the U.S. was not a natural process.  Unions did not just fade away. Rather, 
employers closed the door on workers’ ability to enter unions en masse through NLRB 
elections and so greatly limited collective bargaining’s reach. Large corporations first 
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tried to roll back the laws protecting workers’ organizing rights in the late 1960s.  When 
they were unsuccessful at doing so through Congress, they increased their workplace 
level fight in the 1970s, violating the law at record levels and making new use of anti-
union consultants.  When labor and their allies then tried to re-strengthen the rules 
governing organizing in 1977-78, large and small businesses mobilized to block this 
legislative change and so managed to keep the doors to unions closed.   
   Employers did far more than destroy labor unions when they trampled on labor 
law and workers’ right to form unions.   After World War II, unions had been charged 
with pulling from employers a higher level of social welfare security through collective 
bargaining than was otherwise available.  By the end of the 1970s, however, employers 
had so successfully limited workers’ access to form unions that, absent some radical 
change in course, the U.S. was in dire danger of losing a labor movement with the ability 
to play that key redistributive role.  The new level of unchecked “union busting” thus not 
only severely weakened unions and their members, but “busted” U.S. workers’ access to 
the most secure tier of the nation’s social welfare regime, just as women and people of 
color were winning  full access to it.  The business assault on labor law and on workers’ 
organizing efforts was a key factor in the decline of mid-century liberalism and in the 
















Signing Up in the Shipyard: Organizing Newport News 
 
Jan Hooks’ voice brings to mind Dolly Parton more than Loretta Lynn.  It is high, 
a bit girly and thoroughly Southern. Her father worked at the Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in Virginia as she was growing up in the 1950s, 
and it seemed utterly impossible that as a daughter she could follow in his footsteps.  Yet 
by 1973 things had changed.  That year the nation’s largest private ship builder for the 
Navy started recruiting women for production jobs, keeping in step with the federal 
government’s new affirmative action guidelines.   Though Hooks had trained as a 
secretary, she took a blue-collar job in the yard because the pay was so much better and 
she was a single mother.  Her first day on the job, she faced hostile attitudes from men in 
her work group, and found herself assigned to cleaning metal scraps with a three-inch 
brush in the deep recesses of a nuclear tanker, alongside another woman.  “And I was 
shaking, tired, scared to death…we sat there until I smoked my cigarette and drank a 
Pepsi and got myself calmed down.” 
1
  
Within a few years of entering the sort of blue-collar occupation that had long 
been denied to women, Hooks joined her co-workers in agitating for more economic 
security.  Newport News shipyard workers were among the lowest-paid ship builders in 
the nation, their pensions were paltry, and they wanted full access to the most secure tier 
of the nation’s social welfare regime - - that offered by a strong union’s collective 
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bargaining agreement.  They began to organize. One crisp and cold January morning in 
1978, Hooks served as an official observer for an NLRB election at the shipyard 
involving nineteen thousand workers.  Theirs was the largest single workplace union 
election ever held in the South, and it would be the largest NLRB election held at a single 
worksite in the nation in the 1970s.
2
  After the workers had finished voting that evening, 
Hooks joined the crowd waiting for the vote count at the union hall. “We walked the 
floor, we listened to the radio, we prayed, we cried.  When we finally got the notice - - 
yes, we had won it - - it was like ‘Are you telling me the truth?’ We couldn’t believe it.  I 
mean, not only did we win the election, we beat the heck out of them.” 
3
   
Historians like Jefferson Cowie have been quick to conclude that the 1970s was a 
decade of blue-collar defeat, but no one told Hooks and her co-workers that their role in 
the drama of the 1970s American working class was supposed to be a tragic one.
4
  Once 
they won access to better jobs through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, these workers 
turned to the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) to help them make those good 
jobs even better and more secure.
  
  They joined forces with other women, African-
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Americans, and young workers to overthrow a company-controlled union that had been 
in place for nearly forty years.  When Tenneco Inc. - - the conglomerate that had owned 
the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company for ten years - - followed the 
1970s corporate pattern of hiring anti-worker consultants and dragging its feet in court, 
the workers did not wait for the law to slowly churn out justice.  A year after winning 
their union election, they struck for 82 days in order to force the Navy contractor to 
recognize their union, even as the Virginia governor sent guardsmen to meet them with 
dogs on the picket lines and the city police stormed the union hall, beating strikers with 
abandon.  They went on to build a union that remained active on civil rights issues, even 




There is no question that blue-collar workers in the United States lost power in the 
1970s.   The rules that had governed post-war labor relations were turned on their head, 
in large part by a globalizing economy sharply tilted against workers.  Examination of 
real wages, union density, and unemployment shows that workers suffered by the close of 
the decade.
5
   Yet the Newport News story offers a different narrative for working-class 
history than that offered by many scholars.  Here, we see that workers and their 
organizations were potent and capable - - not weak and inept - - in the face of rising 
corporate power.  Shifting cultural class mores did not defeat them and these workers did 
not participate in a right-wing, grassroots conservatism.   Instead, they joined a wave of 
millions of workers who made increased demands on the state by using its mechanisms to 
organize private-sector unions. The civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s did 
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not derail these workers’ unions, as postulated by many scholars of the period, but instead 
greased the wheels of their labor victory.  Like many U.S. workers, they learned to use 
civil rights tools and the union in tandem.
6
  Newport News workers did have one 
advantage not available to most other industrial workers in the 1970s - - by law their 
product had to be built in the U.S. 
7
 Their story thus allows us to see working class 
agency in action in the 1970s in a context not so determined by unfettered globalization 
and its resulting structural barriers.   Can a labor triumph help us better understand a 
period known for working-class defeat?  As scholars examine the push and pull that 
characterized the tumultuous 1970s, what happens if we shine the historical spotlight on 
working people who actually won?   
 
Newport News Shipbuilding and the “Union Stopper” 
There was no missing the shipyard if you visited Newport News in 1978.  The dry docks 
sprawled for two miles along the James River, and twenty-story cranes towered over the 
town, emblazoned with the Tenneco name.
8
  The company was founded in 1886 as the 
Chesapeake Dry Dock & Construction Company and got its first Navy contract in 1893.
9
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Tenneco, one of the world’s largest diversified companies, bought the struggling shipyard 
in 1968, and sunk $100 million into the operation.  Five years later, the shipyard had an 
order backlog of a billion dollars, including for the kinds of large ships needed to meet 
the nation’s new demands for imported oil.
10
  In 1978, the shipyard was the largest 
employer in the state, with over nineteen thousand workers. More than a third of the 
money circulating in the entire Tidewater local economy came from the company.  It was 
a major Navy contractor that built and refurbished Navy aircraft carriers and nuclear 
submarines, and it also did private work.  This shipyard was one of the world’s largest.
11
 
Nevertheless, the company experienced the same kind of profit squeeze that faced so 
many employers by the end of the decade:  it made just $14 million in earnings in 1978, 
the year of the union election, half its 1975 earnings. The new president, Admiral Ralph 
W. Cousins, knew that he needed to turn around those reduced profits.
12
 
The company had a long and intertwined relationship with the Peninsula 
Shipbuilders Association (PSA), a union at the shipyard.  The company first established 
an Employee Representation Plan (ERP) in 1927 during a time when many companies 
established their own such unions as a welfare capitalism tactic, designed to contain 
workers’ labor activism.
13
   Employer representatives served alongside employee 
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representatives (paid by the company) on the joint committees that governed the ERP.
14
  
The shipyard’s workforce was about a fifth African-American, and the white and black 
workforces each had their own ERP representatives.
15
 One of the purposes of the NLRB, 
established by the Wagner Act in 1935, was to force employers to recognize workers’ 
own democratic organizations over such company unions.
16
  In fact, in one of the first 
NLRB cases to come before the Supreme Court, the Court ruled in 1939 that Newport 
News’ ERP was company-directed and ordered the company to disestablish it.
17
  The 
company union jettisoned its company-paid representatives and, within a month of the 
Court’s decision, regrouped as the PSA and soon bargained with the company for a new 
contract.
18
  Like the ERP, the PSA had a number of black delegates and leaders.
19
 The 
CIO’s Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers (IUMSWA) wanted to 
represent the workers, but chose not to challenge the validity of this new company union, 
instead trying to beat it at the ballot box.  It was a bad choice.  The PSA won a 1944 
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NLRB election over the CIO, and the PSA became one of the nation’s largest 
independent unions.
20
   
Despite the PSA’s claim to independence, the company’s hand remained very 
visible in its affairs.  In fact, Robert Moore - - a former PSA delegate in the 1960s and 
1970s and later a supporter of the USWA - - said that it was not really a union, but a 
“union stopper” which the company encouraged to keep a more effective union out.
21
  
The PSA did have a process for worker grievances, though it almost never took those 
grievances to an outside arbitrator - - a right that is fundamental to most unions’ 
practices.  The PSA constitution had no provisions for general meetings with workers, 
and if workers did attend the meetings, they had no vote.
 
 Instead, they used a delegate 
system of indirect representation.  Workers in various departments could vote on their 
delegates, who in turn would attend the only available union meetings and make all the 
decisions about leadership, finances, and bargaining.
22
   It was a democracy in name only, 
for few workers were even members of the PSA.  At the time of the USWA election, only 
about a third of the workers in the yard were PSA members.
23
  The PSA never even held 
                                                             
20 Certification of Representatives, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company and IUMSWA, 
CIO, Case No. 5-R-1577 and 1579, September 12, 1944, Formal and Informal Unfair Labor Practices and 
Representation Case Files, 1935-1948, Box 3904, NLRB records;  “Va. Shipyard Workers Vote,” The 
Washington Post, May 10, 1972, B1.     
21 Robert W. Moore, telephone interview by the author, October 14, 2010. 
22 Thomas R. Bopeley to John A. Penello, February 17, 1959, Folder: Re: Form 1085 (Financial Data), 
Records Relating to NLRB Involvement in the Industrial Security Program, 1957-1959, N3-25-87-1, RG 
25, NLRB records.   
23 “Why You Should End the Tenneco – PSA “buddy system,” in USWA election leaflet entitled “Vote 
USWA, Shipyard Organizing Committee,” January, 1978, Folder 5, Box 165, USWA Communications 
Department Records, USWA archive, Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Penn State University, 




a convention until the USWA organizing drive began.
24
  Edward Coppedge served as a 
PSA delegate for many years before he helped found the USWA local because he 
believed that some union was better than no union, but he was appalled by the PSA’s 
relationship with the company.  “The independent union was controlled and owned by the 
company…. you basically (got) what they wanted to give you.”
25
   
During its 50 years in the Newport News shipyard, the PSA beat back four 
attempts by outside unions to represent the workers; by the CIO in 1944, the International 
Brotherhood of Boilermakers in the 1950s, and the International Association of 
Machinists (IAM) in the 1960s and early 1970s.
26
  The PSA did not succeed alone.  The 
company had a vested interest in keeping the PSA as the workers’ representative.  For 
instance, the company’s president sent a letter to all workers in 1972 urging them not to 
sign IAM union cards: “If you haven’t signed one of these cards, I hope you won’t…so 
far as I’m concerned, there already is a bargaining agent - the Peninsula Shipbuilding 
Association.”
27
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“Rights Consciousness” Sets the Stage for USWA Union 
The civil rights movement emboldened many black workers, and often they exercised 
that new sense of empowerment by filing charges against their employers under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Yet what scholars call “rights consciousness” also 
resided outside the boundaries of civil rights law and fed many workers’ unionizing 
impulse.  In fact, the Newport News story reveals that the relationship between and labor 
and civil rights was far more interwoven than scholars have understood, and that its cloth 
unfolded in unexpected ways.
 28
 By the time the USWA beat the PSA in the 1978 NLRB 
election, issues of racial equity already had been front-and-center in the shipyard for 
thirteen years.  At every step of the way, the yard’s black workers used whatever tool 
seemed most potent in order to assure economic security and equality.  They filed 
charges that triggered an historic EEOC conciliation agreement, pushed the independent 
union to support the EEOC’s work, sparked a riot and then filed more lawsuits.  
Eventually, when the federal government’s remedy seemed both intermittent and limited, 
a number of them turned to the USWA to help secure long-lasting change.   It was no 
coincidence that after various unions tried four times to overthrow the PSA, the group of 
Newport News workers who finally succeeded included more African-Americans and 
women.   For these workers, the USWA was a tool they could use to both shore up their 
new-found civil rights and win economic security.   
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In the summer of 1965 a group of African-American employees, working with the 
NAACP, filed a suit against the shipyard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  They 
charged that their employer denied promotions on account of race and did not allow black 
workers into the higher-paying jobs.  Many yard facilities, such as water fountains and 
restrooms, were still segregated at this time.
29
  The company had a long history of hiring 
a multi-racial workforce.  African-Americans, however, held the lowest-paying jobs and 
were denied access to such high-skilled jobs as electricians and first-class mechanics.
30
 
The EEOC found “reasonable cause” in its investigation of racial discrimination.  In 1966 
the shipyard signed what turned out to be a landmark conciliation agreement, and it did 
so under government threats to withhold its Navy contracts.  The EEOC signed 
conciliation agreements with 111 employers in 1966, but the Newport News agreement 
was the most far-reaching because it mandated that the company promote more black 
workers and give them first shot at job openings and apprentice school slots.
 
 EEOC chair 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. termed it “a model of comprehensive affirmative action.”
31
  
The agreement was controversial. Far-right Republican Paul Fannin denounced the 
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At first, a clear-cut tension did seem to distinguish civil rights remedies from 
labor rights at Newport News. The PSA promptly protested the EEOC decision, charging 
that the agreement between the company and the government violated its union 
contract.
33
  But then the story muddied.  Thirty-one black members of the PSA disagreed 
with their own organization and filed their own report.  “Any steps that the union takes in 
disagreement of (sic) the agreement between the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and the company would be detrimental to the union,” they insisted, arguing 
for the PSA to help the EEOC implement the agreement.
34
  Newport News workers soon 
learned, however, that government action on civil rights was only sporadic without a 
worker institution pushing for its implementation.  A year after the conciliation 
agreement, the EEOC reduced the scope of its ongoing review of the company’s 
practices, deciding that the agreement “was satisfactorily concluded,” despite the fact that 
there were 76 charges of discrimination pending. The EEOC later admitted that its 
decision was premature: “The much-publicized 1966 conciliation agreement has not 
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made an appreciable dent in the problems,” wrote an EEOC staff attorney to the 
organization’s General Counsel.
35
   
Meanwhile, the transportation department served as a center for black activism in 
the yard.  African-Americans made up the majority of workers in this department, but 
continued to hold the worst, low-paid jobs – like driving trucks and processing scrap – 
despite the conciliation agreement.  They were even paid less than operators of mobile 
equipment in other, mostly-white departments.
36
   One hot July night in 1967 
transportation department workers walked out in support of two co-workers disciplined 
for refusing to work overtime to meet production quotas for the Vietnam War.  The 
transportation workers’ walk-out sparked a broader wildcat strike among white and black 
workers who wanted less overtime and extra pay for working late hours. They rioted for 
two nights when they thought the company tried to bring in strike breakers.  “Turn it 
over, turn it over,” chanted strikers as they tipped and burned a police car.  They smashed 
windows and bottles, and at least twenty people were injured, including police.
37
  The 
PSA did not lead the walkout, but it did later get on board with workers’ complaints, 
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holding a strike vote and negotiating with the company and the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service to reach a settlement.
38
   
Yet the transportation department workers still felt that they did not have full 
access to the best jobs in the yard, and they soon switched tactics from throwing bottles 
to filing lawsuits.  In 1969, thirteen black workers in the transportation department signed 
onto a class action lawsuit against the company charging that the EEOC’s conciliation 
agreement left a majority of black workers still stuck in low-paying jobs and without 
access to apprenticeships.
39
  At first, the PSA was not a party to a suit, and the shipyard 
argued that the union’s contract should be a bar to proceeding.  The PSA agreed to join 
the workers’ suit, however, after a judge required the union’s participation in order to 
proceed.  The PSA was no doubt inspired by its own black leadership who had so vocally 
supported EEOC action in 1966 and by its own members’ militancy in the 1967 riot.
40
  
The suit spurred the federal government to tighten affirmative action standards at the 
yard, holding up $700 million in new contracts until the shipbuilder agreed to sign a new 
conciliation agreement in 1970, which put a heavier emphasis on recruitment, training 
and promotion.
41
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Though the original suits were all focused on racial discrimination, the shipyard 
also began a major push to hire more women in 1973.  The company had not retained the 
women who, for a brief time, built ships at the yard during World War II, and it was not 
until the early 1970s that the company routinely hired women into production jobs and 
the first woman graduated from the company’s Apprentice School (first established in 
1919).
42
  The company’s decision to increase its hiring of women came on the heels of 
the deepening potency of the EEOC’s equity campaign on issues of gender.  Congress 
had given the EEOC the power to sue in federal court in 1972, and it promptly did so on 
behalf of women.
 
 For example, in January of 1973 the EEOC won a $15 million back 
pay suit won for 13,000 women workers at AT&T.  In light of this new emphasis on 
gender discrimination, the shipyard took action, presumably choosing do so rather than 
put its federal contracts at risk by being out of step on affirmative action.
43
   
 
USWA Organizing Drive Kicks Off  
Yet such changes were still not fast enough for four African- American yard workers - - 
Oscar Pretlow, Edward Coppedge, Ellis Cofield and W.T. Hayes.  Though all had been 
PSA members and leaders over the years, by the mid-1970s they were weary of company 
unionism and the PSA’s lack of activism on racial equality.  Despite the government’s 
intervention, they felt that white supervisors freely used their power to promote white 
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workers over blacks and they saw few options for recourse.
44
 “We went out and filed and 
followed up on discrimination in trying to get the shipyard to live by the Civil Rights Act, 
but we didn’t have anybody backing us…To say we are going to go out there and take on 
the company on civil rights, the PSA was not the union.  They wouldn’t do it,” 
remembered Coppedge.
 45
  The group of four men secretly reached out to the USWA in 
October 1976 to explore having the union represent the yard workers.  They chose the 
USWA because that union was already working with the shipyard’s 1200 ship designers 
who had disaffiliated from the PSA a few years earlier.
46
   The four men met secretly 
with Elmer Chatak, USWA director of organizing, who originally thought the campaign 
was “almost an impossible project.”  He insisted that the USWA would not launch a 
campaign until the men had a volunteer organizing committee of 500 shipyard workers.
47
  
The men, meanwhile, balked when the USWA only assigned two white staffers to the 
campaign, Jack Hower and John Kitchens.  “If you want the union in here, black people 
are going to be the people that lead the parade,” Coppedge remembers telling Chatak, 
who then assigned a black organizer, Roosevelt Robinson, to help lead the effort. 
48
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The activists and organizers began to form an organizing committee which began 
slowly expanding over the next months, reaching out to likely supporters and building its 
strength behind the scenes.  The yard was about half black and half white by the late 
1970s, and black workers were far more likely than white workers to support the USWA, 
a pattern that polling showed was typical across the nation.
49
  Organizers were careful to 
build a mixed-race leadership group, which meant spending extra time developing white 
leaders, a task the organizers often accomplished at a Moose lodge and local bars. By the 
end of July, 1977, the USWA had built a committee of 500 yard workers ready to 
spearhead an effort to oust the PSA.  One hot August morning, they began passing out 
USWA authorization cards at the nineteen gates the workers used to enter the yard.  The 
workers’ union campaign was now out in the open and moving quickly.
50
   
Many Newport News workers saw a new union as a doorway to increased 
economic security. “Job security, income security plus health security equals FAMILY 
security,” read one USWA mailer. Key issues included wages that were less than the 
national shipyard average and poor retirement benefits.  The PSA had signed a retirement 
agreement in 1969 that counted people’s service only from that year forward. People who 
had already put in 40 years stood to earn as little as $40 a month on retirement under this 
system.  Many people were particularly upset that Tenneco had cut a paid 20-minute 
lunch break period; they saw this as emblematic of a larger lack of respect from the 
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  Yet not everyone was for the USWA, and the PSA enjoyed significant 
support.  “About two years ago, I deserved a raise and wanted to go back on day shift, but 
I was told I couldn’t have either,” argued Twanna C. Lewis, an African-American 
worker, explaining that the PSA helped her with both issues.  S.F. McMillan supported 
the PSA because they had helped him out with some attendance issues, and helped him 
finance his truck.
52
 Yet for many Newport News workers, a new union essentially would 
mean a chance to force their company to offer them higher wages, better benefits and 
more security - - essentially, the unions would elevate them to a more secure tier of the 
U.S. social welfare regime.
53
 
Organizing Newport News posed an incredible logistical challenge.  To file for a 
union election, the workers would have to file cards with the government signed by more 
than thirty percent of the workforce, or more than six thousand workers; only then would 
the NLRB schedule an election. Shipyard workers lived in communities scattered all over 
the Chesapeake region.  Many commuted from as far as fifty miles away on buses or in 
carpools.  Workers began to gather union cards any way they could - - on the gates at 6 
a.m., in people’s homes, even in the vans that brought workers to the shipyard from as far 
away as North Carolina.  “We would sneak behind the toolbox racks, behind the 
machinery,” to get the cards signed, remembered Hooks.  “Sneaky.  In the bathrooms.  
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Lord, some of the conversations we had in the bathrooms.  That’s where we did a lot of 
our organizing.”
54
  The USWA organizers began to branch out far from the shipyard, and 
held meetings with groups of workers where they lived, in local recreation centers, 
churches and hotel conference rooms.  The campaign was heavily dependent on its large 
volunteer committee -  - a marked difference from other contemporaneous campaigns 
which were union staff-heavy, such as the Woodward & Lothrop campaign.   “Nobody 
knew those guys,” said Coppedge of the USWA organizers, “so every meeting they held 




The USWA organizers found strong support among an interracial group of 
women. By 1977 women made up between 10 and 15 percent of the workforce.  Many 
women took the job because it was the best opportunity around, even though the going 
was rough.  “It wasn’t my intent to go down in the shipyard and get dirty and crawl 
through tanks, but that’s where the money was and I had a child so that’s what I did,” 
remembered Peggy Carpenter, who pointed out that many of the women were single 
mothers, like herself.
 56
  Breaking the gender barrier was not easy.  Hooks remembers 
going to the PSA about a promised pay raise but “I couldn’t get anybody to represent me 
because they still resented the women… ‘You are taking a man’s job,’ that type of 
stuff.”
57
  Even though she was scared, Hooks went to a meeting the USWA organizers 
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called just for the women, and she began to organize others to join, helping to develop a 
core cadre of the organizing committee.  The women found they had tremendous 
momentum after jumping the yard’s gender hurdles, and their courage inspired some men 
to join the effort.  “A lot of them moved because of the women standing up in the 
union…they followed us along,” remembers Carpenter.
58
   
At each shift change, PSA supporters gathered outside the gates to counter the 
USWA committee and organizers as they gathered cards.  Wearing special PSA decals 
emblazoned on their white helmets, they would challenge and taunt the USWA 
supporters who often wore their union ball caps.  The USWA supporters gathered enough 
signatures to file for a NLRB election in December of 1977.   The thousands of union 
cards were so heavy that the string binding them cut and bloodied the union organizer’s 
hands as he carried them to the NLRB office to file for election.  The NLRB set the date 




The Campaign Hits High Gear 
Tenneco relied on the PSA to serve as its front-line defense against the USWA.  “The 
stalking horse for them was the independent (union)…that was the way they chose to do 
it” remembered Carl Frankel, the USWA attorney.
60
  The head of personnel at Newport 
News, D.T. Savas, told workers at the first-ever PSA convention that “the Steelworkers 
are out to ‘raid’ the PSA …Reject the Steelworkers; don’t be coaxed or pressured into 
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signing a Steelworkers card.”
61
  After the company fired one USWA supporter for 
circulating a letter critical of the PSA, a NLRB judge found that the company had broken 
the law and that its attitudes “disclose(d) a desire on its part to shore up the fortunes of a 
labor organization with whom it had achieved a comfortable relationship and whose 
status was being challenged by a potential rival.”
62
  The NLRB also found that PSA 
representatives threatened workers that they would be fired if they continued to support 
the USWA and otherwise coerced USWA supporters. 
63
  The company gave the PSA 
tremendous latitude in its campaign efforts. PSA delegates spoke with Peggy Carpenter’s 
work group, but USWA supporters were not allowed to speak up.  “I recall saying, ‘Well, 
you had a chance to speak, let me speak.’  And that was a no no.”
64
  Robert Moore was 
still a PSA delegate at this point and voted for the PSA in the election.  He remembers 
having free rein to walk the yard with his PSA buttons, armband and decals on his hard 
hat.  After one of the frequent PSA campaign meetings with the company, Moore 
remembers that the PSA “gave us all a little piece of paper…with what you’d lose (with 
the union), that type of stuff.  When you walked around and someone asked you a 
question you just more of less read it off to them.”
65
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Though the shipyard leaned on the PSA to wage much of the front-line fight 
against the union, Tenneco also pulled workers into closed-door meetings to talk against 
the union.  Danny Keefer remembers that supervisors would hold meetings “and they 
would be letting you know that if you go that way instead of keeping the PSA, things are 
going to be different here.  Not to your best interest.”
66
  Tenneco’s campaign was 
orchestrated by Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, one of the largest 
management-side law firms in the nation.  Seyfarth-Shaw joined the surge of growth 
among anti-union consultants and firms in 1970s and represented nearly 1600 clients by 
the end of the decade, including the lettuce growers (in their efforts to fight the United 
Farmworkers) and the Washington Post (in a bitter pressman strike).  The firm was 




The larger African-American community was divided on the unionization issue, 
and local black leaders had a lot of potential sway.  Newport News was a relatively small 
town of about one hundred fifty thousand people in 1978 and was about 30 percent 
African American.
 68
  These leaders’ opinions could make a real difference in how 
workers voted.  After all, while black workers were more supportive of the USWA than 
were the white workers, many remained undecided.  In past campaigns, the black 
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ministers’ associations helped defeat the outside union and supported the PSA. In this 
effort, however, dueling black ministers’ groups came down on either side of the issue.   
Carpenter remembers that much of the support in the black community for the 
corporation came from the middle class.  “You’ve got to take into consideration probably 
they never worked in the plant and a lot of their people could have been management.  
They are not going to buck them.”
69
   
Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr. was scheduled to speak at a massive pro-union 
rally two days before the vote, but he cancelled after being urged to do so by some local 
black leaders who supported the PSA and the company.  The USWA immediately 
dispatched a group of supporters and leaders to Atlanta to meet with King.  He 
nevertheless bowed out, allegedly because of ill health, and sent his aide who urged a 
vote for the USWA. 
70
  More than twenty-five hundred workers came together at that 
rally in the Hampton Coliseum two days before the vote. 
71
  Harold Ford, Sr., a two-term 
African-American congressman from Tennessee referenced the controversy over King’s 
absence in his speech of support, hinting at a generational difference within the civil 
rights movement.  He said he wanted Tenneco “to know Dr. King is 78 and I’m 32 and 
those threats won’t work.”
72
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Election Day was cold and clear.  The voting started at 5:30 a.m. on January 31, 
1978 and ended at 6:00 p.m.  A total of 17, 210 workers voted, first lining up at fifteen 
polling places and then voting in booths before dropping their ballots in boxes.  Sixty-
five NLRB staff people oversaw the massive election, joined by official observers from 
the company, PSA, and USWA, including Jan Hooks.
73
  As voting wrapped up, the PSA 
held an early victory party at its new million-dollar headquarters, complete with a dance 
band and catered food.   The USWA supporters anxiously gathered at the Steamfitters’ 
hall.  At 10 p.m. the television news announced that PSA was ahead 55 to 45 percent in 
the vote count.  Spirits sunk.  At about midnight, a local photographer rushed into the 
Steamfitters’ hall and asked why the mood was so glum.  He announced that the USWA 
workers had just won, 9093 to 7548.  Workers hoisted him to their shoulders and rushed 
him to the microphone where he made the official announcement as the room erupted in 
hugs and tears.  At noon the next day, the USWA supporters hosted a victory march in 
the yard to celebrate their new union.
74
  
Within five days of the January election, the company and PSA filed nearly 
identical objections to the election, arguing that the NLRB officials mishandled the 
elections.  In May, the regional director of the NLRB recommended that the union be 
certified and that the objections be dismissed.  Tenneco and the PSA demanded a review 
by the full NLRB in Washington, DC, which then also recommended certifying the 
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  “It is obvious that the election was not error free,” wrote the three-
member panel.  “However, in our judgment the free choice of these workers was not 
thwarted.”  The panel members pointed out that the magnitude of such a sizeable election 
caused logistical problems but those were not sufficient to jeopardize the election.
76
 
Tenneco followed by appealing the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Newport News Shipbuilding’s president, Admiral Ralph Cousins, put a high-road spin on 
the company’s decision to drag out the process : “…we, unlike the NLRB, cannot accept 
election misconduct and irregularities in free elections…The principle of conducting 
unbiased elections it too precious to our nation and its democratic process to be casually 
put aside....”
77
   
 The USWA supporters, meanwhile, began to build their union even as their case 
wound its way through the courts.  They held their first election of officers in late August, 
and elected an inter-racial group of eleven leaders from a field of sixty candidates.
78
  
“Even though the company didn’t recognize us we elected our officers.  We set up and 
got ready to meet with the company,” remembers Peggy Carpenter, the local’s new 
financial secretary.  In mid-November, they held another massive union meeting at the 
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Hampton Coliseum in which 7500 workers stood together and were officially sworn in as 





Tenneco knew that it could buy time by appealing the NLRB’s decision to the Fourth 
Circuit.  Even NLRB officials admitted their process could take years.
80
 Nearly a year 
had gone by since they had voted for their union in early 1978, and the Steelworkers’ 
supporters grew impatient with the glacial pace of the nation’s labor law.  Newport News 
workers had a decision to make.   Should they let their case lumber through the courts?  
Or did they have the strength to walk out?  They would make their decision at the end of 
a year marked by massive strikes.  During1978, nearly 35,000 coal workers had struck in 
March, more than 300,000 railroad workers had walked out in July and 55,000 grocery 
clerks in Southern California started their strike in August. 
81
   
 “We won count-wise, we had won every court case,” remembers Hooks.  “You 
get to the point where you have had all you are going to take and the hell with them. The 
only thing that a working person has to withhold is their work.”
82
  More than seventy-five 
hundred workers gathered in December 1978 and voted to authorize a strike at any time. 
At that rally, Undersecretary of Labor Robert Brown called the Tenneco situation “a 
classic case for labor law reform” and promised the Labor Department would do what it 
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could to bring labor peace.  Meanwhile, U.S. Labor Secretary Ray Marshall asked the 
union and company to meet in his offices to discuss the issues at hand.  Forty-three 
newly-elected bargaining committee members travelled to Washington, DC for the 
meeting, but the company refused to participate.
83
  “A meeting with the  
Secretary of Labor will not resolve the legal questions surrounding our objections,” 
argued Newport News’ vice president for corporate relations to the USWA. “Since our 
differences are in litigation, we see no purpose in attending your meeting…”
84
 “The 
company “obviously felt they had a strong hand to play in court…they knew the longer 
the strike lasted the weaker the union’s position would become,” remembered Marshall.
85
 
The workers began their strike on January 31, 1979, one year to the day after they 
voted for their union.  They carefully organized the picket lines with twenty-one stations 
within a two and a half mile radius and used CB radios to communicate.  The governor of 
Virginia sent in over a hundred state troopers to monitor the picket lines and bolster the 
city police.  The company, meanwhile, armed security guards with .38 pistols, mounted a 
water cannon on the gates, and gave its guards SWAT team training. 
86
    
The second day of the strike became chaotic.  State and local police moved in on 
the pickets with police dogs, one of which attacked Betty Johnson, a USWA picketer.  At 
one gate there were twenty state and local police in riot gear with four dogs to control 
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seventy-five pickets.  When the police refused to allow the picket line to cross the plant’s 
driveway at the Sixty-Eight Street gate, Wayne Crosby, Local 8888’s president, put on a 
placard and boldly walked across the drive.  He was promptly arrested for violating the 
state’s right to work law.
87
 Meanwhile, one picketer used a knife to threaten workers 
crossing the picket line until another picketer told him to stop.  One man drove through 
the line in his car with a motorcycle helmet on his head. Another calmly strolled through 
with his hands in his pockets.
88
  More arrests followed in the next few weeks.  Strikers 
began scattering jack rocks (or welded-together nails) around the shipyard gates to flatten 
the tires of workers attempting to go to work. They disguised the nails by painting them 
white when it snowed.  Strikers also used six speedboats to set up a floating picket 




Much of the workforce, community, and even families were split over the strike.  
Rickie Pike remembers, “Out of my whole family, I was the only one who didn’t cross 
the picket line…I was very much the outcast of the family.”   His father and uncle both 
crossed the line.  Pike’s daughter was born during the strike and he remembers that 
because of the tension in the family, his relatives did not visit the hospital to welcome the 
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  The local newspapers were dead set against the strike, and opponents of the 
strike emphasized its economic impact.  Tenneco “saved our economy on the Peninsula 
and created over 10,000 new jobs…and now all of a sudden people say they are no 
good,” argued one worker in a letter to the editor.  Yet another striker’s letter protested 
the police’s actions against picketers, and made clear that these were far from the “last 
days” of his working class identification: “The officials responsible for this are poor 
people haters.  They want to see the poor working people walked on by Tenneco or any 
other big company.”
91
  The USWA held a massive march of support on March 2, 
bringing in union members and other supporters from around the country.  More than 
four thousand people marched through the streets of Newport News, chanting “Eighty-
eight! Close the gate!” 
92
   
In the early weeks of the strike Local 8888 had been able to squeeze Tenneco.  
Though the company claimed that sixty percent of the workforce was reporting to work 
by mid-February, a local newspaper reported that the figure was closer to twenty 
percent.
93
 The USWA began sending weekly benefits to the striking workers.  The union 
got the power company to grant extensions on electric bills, and worked out similar 
arrangements with local banks, finance companies and landlords.
94
 The workers set up 
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free child care services so parents of young children could more easily join the picket 
lines.
95
 Nevertheless as the strike wore on into weeks and then months, it became much 
more difficult for the members of Local 8888 to hold the line.  The company began 
advertising for workers to replace strikers.
96
 The union claimed that the company 
illegally interrogated and harassed workers, and offered them financial incentives to cross 
the line. The company settled the case by posting a NLRB notice, though it refused to 
admit fault.
97
 By mid-April, even the union admitted that half the workers were reporting 
to work, while the company put the figure at three-quarters.
98
    
The USWA, meanwhile, was under myriad pressures to end the strike.  U.S. 
Labor Department director Marshall had been against the strike from the start, urging 
USWA president Lloyd McBride to wait to strike until the company’s appeal was heard 
by the Fourth Circuit.
99
  The strike was expensive since the USWA headquarters not only 





  For instance, the legal support was larger than anything the USWA had 
undertaken in twenty years, and at least fourteen lawyers were working nearly full-time 
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on various aspects of the case.
101
  By the end of March, two months into the strike, 
McBride admitted that it had been a “tactical blunder” to paint the strike as a major 
breakthrough.
102
  He began to put pressure on the district director, Bruce Thrasher, and 
the local staff running the effort to end the strike.
103
  On April 13, six thousand workers 
once again packed the Hampton Coliseum and voted to suspend the strike in a week and 
to wait out the board process.  The decision was hotly debated, and many strikers did not 
want to return.  These dissidents won one concession - they demanded that the company 
not call their offer to return to work “unconditional.” The company agreed, and workers 





Though the picket line was officially ended on Sunday night, and workers were 
scheduled to return to work a week later, many strikers turned out on the gates Monday 
morning, April 16.    They were angry they had lost, and they did not want to go back to 
work.  In a kind of wildcat action, workers began marching through the parking lots and 
through the town to the PSA headquarters, throwing rocks and breaking windows.   
“They did some damage.  Rocks, bottles, anything we could get, we busted windows and 
everything.  But we never touched anybody.  We never hurt anybody,” remembers Jan 
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Hooks, who contrasted the strikers’ property damage to the personal violence they 
suffered at the hands of the police.
105
   
A confrontation erupted when crowd of strikers locked arms and sang “We shall 
not be moved” while blocking a number of workers attempting to go to work.
106
 The city 
and state police reacted in a massive show of force to quell the strikers, gathering on 
Washington Avenue in full riot gear.  They looked like a wall of black armor to one 
young striker.
107
  Jan Hooks stood in a local storefront watching the police form a 
phalanx with their batons ahead of them and rush up Washington Avenue through the 
masses of strikers.  “They started running, they started hitting, shoving, pushing… They 
shoved me, started beating me across the back and kidneys with a baton, there was three 
of them.” 
108
 The police beat and arrested strikers and bystanders indiscriminately.  Four 
police, including the deputy chief of police, beat one lone striker with batons as another 
dozen officers and police dogs surrounded them.
109
   Other police knocked one local 
reporter to the ground.  They rushed the union hall, forcing one striker through the front 
plate glass window.  The officers caught Bill Bowser, one of the local union officers, at 
the foot of the stairs where they beat him and then broke his leg as he lay unconscious on 
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   Cynthia Boyd-Williams was inside the union hall working on the financial 
books and watched in astonishment as union members began throwing furniture down the 
stairwell to block the police from coming up. 
111
  The local deputy chief reportedly told 
officers on duty to “make sure you add charges of breach of the peace and resisting arrest 
on everyone who went to the hospital to cover our asses.”
112
 
What later became known as “Bloody Monday” did not turn the tide, however.  A 
week later, the strikers went back to work as planned and suspended their eighty-two-day 




Squeezing through Labor’s Door  
If the workers’ strike had taken place a decade later, the story of their union probably 
would have ended there.  Though the labor movement had lost its 1978 effort to 
strengthen labor law, in 1979 the NLRB still had a Democratic majority appointed under 
Carter and, unlike the Reagan and Bush boards, did give real weight to its mission to 
protect workers’ freedom to form unions.
114
  Even though the wheels of justice were 
frustratingly slow and employers mucked up their gears at every chance, the workers still 
had a chance to win in the courts.  
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During the strike, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals judge had decided that at 
least one of the company's and PSA’s charges had possible merit.  The Fourth Circuit 
sent the case back to the NLRB and ordered it to hold a hearing into whether the election 
could have been fraudulent.
115
  The new NLRB hearing began in mid-March and 
revolved around the allegation that the NLRB officers’ conduct left open the possibility 
that there could have been chain voting, an election fraud scheme in which voters bring 
blank ballots outside the voting area to be marked by a campaigner, and the ballot is 
returned secretly via another voter.  Though no one ever testified that such chain voting 
took place, the shipyard brought in witnesses who testified that they had seen blank and 
torn ballots floating around the polling places.  The hearings spanned three weeks, 
including about 90 witnesses.
116
  On May 2, the NLRB’s administration law judge upheld 
the workers’ victory.  The company appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which heard oral arguments before considering the case yet again.
117
   
Meanwhile, the Newport News workers continued building their union.  They 
were not deterred by the endless court delays, the defeat of labor law reform or the fact 
that the economic crisis was deepening for working people by the late 1970s.  They 
expanded their organizing committee to 900 members and had 530 temporary stewards 
wearing buttons in the yard.  The workers also held new officer elections, and thousands 
voted in the elections using special balloting machines.  They elected Coppedge president 
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 Finally, on October 11, 1979, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
NLRB’s decision that the Newport News workers had fairly chosen the USWA as their 
bargaining representatives.  The company had faced continual pressure behind the scenes 
from the Department of Labor. “They depended on government contracts and the 
government was not favorable to them,” remembered Marshall. “That was what, I think, 
finally caused them to cave in.”
 119
 The company chose not to appeal any further.  It had 
taken twenty-one months and four legal rulings, but Jan Hooks, Edward Coppedge and 
their co-workers had finally squeezed through labor’s door and won their USWA 
collective bargaining rights.  That night three thousand people packed the Hampton 
Coliseum yet again as the organizing team and lawyers received a standing ovation.   
 
The Contract and Beyond  
Negotiations began in early November 1979 at the local Holiday Inn.  Key issues 
included pensions, guaranteed raises, and health and safety.  Twenty-six workers were 
elected to the bargaining committee, and among their ranks were three of the four men 
who had first reached out to the USWA.
120
  The workers’ union and the company finally 
                                                             
118 “News Update for Tenneco Shipyard Workers from the USWA,” No. 10, September 27, 1979, LD-257, 
USWA legal records.    
119 Marshall interview with the author.   
120 “Newport News Negotiators Report Progress in Shipyard Talks,” Steel Labor, January, 1980, 6;  
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company and United Steelworkers of America Local 8888, 




reached agreement in late March, 1980.   “We went from one of the lowest paid 
shipbuilders in the industry to the highest-paid, and better benefits,” remembers 
Coppedge.
121
 Pay rates for a first-class mechanic, for instance, went up from $6.90 to 
$9.15 during the three-year contract, and by 1985 were up to $11.50. 
122
 The workers had 
long been frustrated by the ability of supervisors to determine the rate at which they 
could progress up through the wage scales.  The USWA contract ensured that wage 
progress was based solely on years served, thus finally cementing a level of economic 
security that had eluded workers after the EEOC’s conciliation agreements.  Now 
everyone could get the regular raises as long as they worked there long enough.
123
  The 
workers and company signed their agreement on March 31 with a big yellow pen in front 
of an audience of television cameras and reporters.
124
  A subsequent agreement in 1983 
lifted wages and benefits even higher, substantially strengthening the workers’ pension 
plan and eliminating the hospitalization co-pay, for example.
125
 
The members of Local 8888 used their new union contract as a base to build an 
organization that fought for a progressive agenda and nurtured a culture of activism.  The 
PSA had not involved workers in decisions about politics, and actually endorsed the 
Republican Jon Dalton for governor of Virginia in 1977 despite the fact that he was a 
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strong supporter of the state’s right-to-work laws.
126
  In their new USWA local, workers 
who were part of an active political action committee quizzed dozens of candidates 
before issuing an endorsement.
127
  They lobbied at the state capitol for improved laws on 
unemployment compensation and sat on statewide committees on job training.
128
 
Newport News workers often had not been engaged in wider political dialogue before 
they became active with the USWA.  Hooks remembers that before she joined the 
USWA, she had never even voted.  After joining, she traveled to Washington, DC for 
numerous rallies, helped get her co-workers to vote, and organized workers in 
unorganized workplaces.  She remembers that more men than women marched alongside 
her at an ERA rally in Richmond.
129
  As a white, Southern working-class woman, Hooks 
was a natural candidate for the “Wal-Mart constituency” whom one scholar finds helped 
to usher in an era of Christian free enterprise.  Hooks, however, was involved in a union 
that emphasized member education and political activism and so had a very different 
political outlook.
130
   
The new local beat back a decertification attempt by the PSA in 1983, solidly 
trumping the independent union by a vote of 13,591 to 2,535.
131
 Democracy remained 
alive and well in the new union which itself became the terrain for progressive action.  
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For example, Local 8888 initially had a tradition of having only men in the top positions, 
including as trustee, a top leadership office in the local union.  “That just gave me all the 
drive and determination in the world because we just left a union that wouldn’t let us do 
what we felt like we wanted to do.  I wasn’t going to have that,” recalls Cynthia Boyd-
Williams.
132
 She threw her hat in the ring in 1983 and was elected the first woman 
trustee.  
The new USWA Local 8888 activists continued to weave together civil and labor 
rights, using their collective labor institution as a base from which to monitor and even 
expand the rights of African Americans and women at the shipyard. For instance, the 
union was a plaintiff in a key Supreme Court test case expanding legal coverage for 
pregnancy.  When the shipyard insisted on offering only $500 in maternity benefits to 
workers’ wives, while offering full benefits for other spousal medical issues, a male 
employee filed a complaint with the EEOC under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978.  He argued his wife should get full benefits.  The union soon followed up with its 
own charge on behalf of six other male union members whose spouses wanted full 
maternity coverage.  The combined charges led to an historic 1983 Supreme Court 
decision in which the Court used the new pregnancy discrimination law to overrule its 
earlier decision that pregnancy could be treated as a special case in employment issues.  
The Court now required employers who provided medical expenses for employees’ 
spouses to offer everyone equal coverage, including maternity costs, and the case set an 
                                                             




important precedent for ending discrimination against pregnancy.
133
  In many ways Local 
8888 became an organization of the “long civil rights movement,” one that fought for 
economic gains even as it pursued an agenda of civil equality and justice.
134
   
Local 8888 also became part of a wider organizing tradition.   The workers joined 
in organizing efforts, reaching out to workers throughout the South who did not already 
have a union.  For example, Rickie Pike later volunteered as an organizer on a campaign 
among US Airways workers in Charlotte, as did Jan Hooks who helped Smithfield 
packing workers win a union with the United Food and Commercial Workers.
135
  Most of 
the local’s leaders volunteered in organizing at some point.  Such a commitment to 
organizing allows us to interrogate scholars’ assertions that under the post-WWII social 
compact, workers became satisfied with their share of the pie and did not reach out to 
expand the benefits more broadly.
136
  In fact, after winning their own union, the USWA 
Local 8888 members worked to expand the WWII social compact beyond their base by 
trying to usher more workers through labor’s doors. 
The Challenge 
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The Newport News shipyard workers’ victory reminds us of the breadth of working 
people’s resistance in the 1970s.  Their organizing drive warrants historical attention for 
its sheer size.  It was the largest NLRB election in the 1970s, the largest ever in the 
South, and the largest in the history of the USWA.
 137
   More workers were involved in 
Newport News than in the PATCO strike or in the JP Stevens organizing campaigns, for 
example.
138
  However, Newport News was not some quirky outlier.  Workers were 
challenging employers all across the nation until the end of the 1970s demanding a more 
equitable distribution of wealth and a real shot at long-term security.
139
   
If Newport News workers found success when they went knocking on labor’s 
door, why did so many others fail?   Workers had routinely won more than seventy 
percent of union elections in the 1950s and more than 60 percent in the 1960s.  By the 
end of the 1970s, they were winning only 48 percent, largely because corporations 
pushed back and broke labor law at an entirely new level.
 140
 As discussed in chapter 
three of this dissertation, industrial employers even became more likely than those in 
other sectors to break labor law and to capitalize on workers’ job insecurities, threatening 
to move overseas if workers unionized.  Meanwhile, the federal government did not 
prioritize national or global policy that would support domestic industry and encourage 
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corporations to keep jobs in the U.S.
141
 Yet Jan Hooks and her co-workers had special 
leverage not available to other industrial workers.  Newport News was the only Navy 
yard that could build and refurbish nuclear aircraft carriers and Navy ships, by law, had 
to be built in the United States.  While Newport News workers faced fierce employer 
resistance as they organized and struck, these workers were less subject to competitive 
forces from the changing global economy than other U.S. workers.  They had more room 
in which to fight back.  The events at Newport News allow us to see what might have 
happened if the nation had developed a coherent industrial and trade policy that anchored 
jobs in the US, undercutting employers’ threats to move shop.   
We turn now to a group of Southern industrial workers whose story is similar to 
that of the Newport News workers, but who received no such protection from the storms 
of globalization.  The Cannon Mills textile mill workers in Kannapolis, North Carolina 
also built on momentum from the Civil Rights movement to build a new union, finding 
new energy among the young, African-American workers who won access to textile jobs 
through the Civil Rights Act.  Unlike Newport News shipyard workers who made a 
product protected from foreign trade, Cannon Mills workers saw their employer use their 
new insecurities within globalization as an anti-union device.  By the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the Cannon Mills workers’ defeat became far more typical than Jan Hooks’ and 
the Newport News workers’ union organizing success.   
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The Cannon Mills Case: 
Out of the Southern Frying Pan, Into the Global Fire 
 
No one was more surprised than the union when Cannon Mills textile workers 
very nearly voted for it in a 1974 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election.  One 
sole union organizer, Robert Freeman, launched the campaign to organize the company’s 
16,000 workers with the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA).  It was the first 
such union election ever held at the anti-union behemoth in Kannapolis, North Carolina 
and the largest election ever held in the U.S. textile industry.
1
    African-American 
workers were at the forefront of this surprising labor groundswell.  Textile employers had 
long refused to hire black men for any but the most dusty and dirty textile jobs, and they 
had declined to hire black women altogether.
2
  When African-American workers at 
Cannon Mills finally gained full access to textile jobs and unions under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, they went on to support a union in order to shore up their 
newfound economic security with a collective bargaining agreement.
 
 Many analysts 
predicted that as more African-Americans and young workers entered the South’s textile 
mills they would bring unions in with them.
3
   Many were thus shocked in 1985 - -  after 
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an even more diversified Cannon workforce again asked the government to hold a union 
election - -  when the company soundly defeated the union by a clear margin of two to 
one.
4
   
What accounted for the downturn in Cannon Mills workers’ support for the union 
between 1974 and 1985, especially after so many had predicted the union’s eventual 
success?  Grappling with this question, I argue, allows us to test and complicate scholarly 
narratives about U.S. labor’s steep decline in the late twentieth century and highlights 
increased employer resistance to union organizing as one of the most enervating factors.  
Standard historical explanations for unions’ decline hold that unions stopped reaching out 
to workers, and workers turned away from unions.  This happened in the 1970s just as 
globalization and technology ushered in a service and retail-focused economy.  Scholars 
assert that the “rights consciousness” of the civil and women’s rights movements 
conflicted with collective solutions, like those of labor unions.
5
    
Yet we will see in the Cannon Mills case that unions were still actively 
organizing, many Southern textile workers did want unions, and the Civil Rights 
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movement boosted - - not weakened - - their collective organizing momentum.  At 
Cannon Mills, in fact, a newly-diversified workforce had nearly organized itself out of 
the Southern frying pan of paternalism and racism in 1974, buoyed by gains from the 
Civil Rights movement. Then, in the 1985 NLRB election, they found themselves hurled 
into the global fire by Cannon’s threats that a union would make their jobs even more 
vulnerable to imports.  The Cannon Mills case complicates scholarship which paints 
globalization as a neutral, inevitable force undermining workers’ unions, and instead 
illustrates how U.S. manufacturing employers used globalization as a weapon against a 
reshaped working class as it tried to organize unions.
6
  The Cannon Mills case also 
reveals a previously unseen path by which the retail sector overcame manufacturing in a 
globalizing economy.  Cannon Mills made these threats to its workers even as the 
company successfully lobbied alongside the textile union for import limits as a part of a 
long-standing joint labor-management alliance. When such U.S. textile companies 
resisted the efforts of textile workers to form unions, they weakened their own partner in 
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Cannon Mills, Unions, and Civil Rights  
Textile manufacturing was by far the South’s largest industry and was also a key national 
industry in 1974, the year of the first union election at Cannon Mills.  Though textile mill 
employment in the U.S. began to weaken in the 1950s, the industry enjoyed a revival by 
the late 1960s, in part because of Vietnam-war era government contracts.  In the decade 
before 1974, the number of textile mill employees in the U.S. rose fourteen percent to 
over a million workers.
7
  One in eight manufacturing workers was either a textile or 
apparel worker, an employment level on par with auto or steel.
8
  The industry would soon 
face tremendous global pressures.  U.S. textile industry’s workforce shrunk by 27 percent 
between 1974 and 1985, the years of the Cannon elections, hemorrhaging nearly 300,000 
jobs as textile imports soared.  Over the ensuing decades, globalization and technological 
change roiled the industry not only in the U.S., but around the world.
9
 
Yet in the early 1970s, Cannon Mills was still going strong, producing half the 
nation’s towels and a fifth of its sheets.
10
  The Cannon family founded the textile mill 
town, Kannapolis - - which was just north of Charlotte, North Carolina - - in 1907. It 
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remained a true company town for 77 years, incorporating only in 1984.   Cannon Mills 
literally owned the land that sat under the churches, schools, post office, and courts, and 
owned many of the workers’ homes, lined up in rows and nearly all painted white. The 
plant complex was the center of town and at 5.9 million square feet it was larger than the 
Pentagon.
11
  The Kannapolis facility was the largest of the company’s seventeen 
manufacturing plants in North and South Carolina.
12
  Though Charles Cannon died in 
1971, workers still felt his paternalistic influence by the time of the union drive in 1974.   
Cannon Mills still paid to have the Kannapolis workers’ garbage picked up, paid their 




Workers tried to form a union at Cannon Mills multiple times, their periodic 
efforts spanning nearly the entire twentieth century.  In 1921, 6000 Cannon workers 
struck and Charles Cannon broke their union, firing and evicting union supporters.
14
   In 
the 1934 general textile strike, Cannon used local police to close all the roads and turned 
back 500 “flying squadron” picketers who toured from mill town to mill town. 
15
   
Workers formed a union in one small Cannon mill in Thomasville, North Carolina during 
World War II – Amazon Mills – but Cannon Mills officials forced a seventeen-month 
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strike in 1947 and then, according to the union, refused to hire anyone with “one drop of 
union blood.”
16
   The ten union organizers sent to Kannapolis as part of Operation Dixie, 
the 1946 CIO effort to organize the South, never got any traction.
17
  An even larger and 
more promising joint TWUA / AFL-CIO effort from 1956 to 1958 included fifteen 
staffers, a weekly radio program, and a union publication called the “Cannon Uniter.” 
Though at least 5000 workers out of 18,500 signed union cards, Cannon knocked the 
wind out of the effort with a hefty pay raise.
18
  Time and time again, workers tried to 
form unions, but they found out exactly where Cannon stood.  “Mr. Charlie was not 
subtle about it,” remembered a Charlotte businessman.  “He’d walk up to a man and call 
him by his first name and he’d say, ‘I knew ya daddy boy, I’d sho hate to see you go.’”
19
 
Yet Cannon Mills was changing by the 1970s and one of the biggest 
transformations was around race.  For decades, white workers had staffed most of the 
South’s textile mills.  However Cannon Mills, like many textile companies, began to hire 
more black workers following President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order No. 
10925, which mandated “affirmative action” to ensure equal racial opportunity within 
federal contractors.  Cannon Mills first began hiring black women in production jobs in 
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1962 and escalated its hiring after the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
20
  “It was a big deal for 
Kannapolis women to start working in the mills, because the only jobs black women had 
then was working in white women’s homes, babysitting or house cleaning,” remembers 
Janet Patterson, who started at Cannon in 1965 as one of the company’s first African-
Americans to hem fitted sheets. 
21
 In 1967 the EEOC held a series of high-profile, public 
meetings designed to force textile executives to change their ways and to signal to black 
workers that they had an ally in the federal government.
22
   
Civil Rights legislation also prompted changes within the TWUA, whose record 
on race was mixed.  When black workers were part of the TWUA in the South before the 
mid-1960s, they often were part of segregated locals, and even into the early 1970s 
African-American union members found that many of the union’s white-led locals were 
reluctant to use their grievance procedures to take on issues of racial discrimination on 
the job.
23
  When the TWUA tried to organize Cannon in the 1950s, it held meetings for 
white workers at the Concord Hotel and meetings for black workers at the Masonic 
Lodge rather than choosing a location where everyone would be welcome.
24
   At a 
national level, the TWUA was more progressive on racial issues than its Southern locals, 
passing a resolution denouncing the White Citizens Councils, for instance. Yet it found 
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that Southern white textile workers’ opposition to integration spilled over into organizing 
campaigns. One young white Cannon worker threw a leaflet in a union organizer’s face 
in 1957, saying, “I have no use for unions.  A lot of us can’t see any sense in giving them 
money when they stand for mixing the races and we don’t.”
25
   Civil Rights legislation, 
however, changed the terms on which Southern textile organizing campaigns would be 
waged.  By the 1970s, black workers held many more textile jobs and the TWUA 
organizers reached out to them as strong union supporters.    
Daisy Crawford - - a young black woman in her 20s - - was watching these 
changes carefully.  Over her years working at Cannon Mills, Daisy Crawford used every 
tool in her toolbox to push for change, blending civil rights and labor tactics in order to 
win greater economic security.  After entering a low-level job at Cannon in 1966, she 
agitated for and eventually won the right to train as a weaver.  She soon discovered that 
Cannon Mills would not rent its company-owned mill houses to black single mothers like 
herself, only to those who were white.  Crawford went straight to the top.  Her letter to 
President Lyndon B. Johnson informed him of the housing discrimination at Cannon. 
That letter went first to the Housing and Urban Development department, then to the 
Department of Justice, and finally triggered an FBI investigation.  The U.S. government 
filed suit against Cannon Mills in 1969, alleging discrimination in both employment and 
hiring under the Civil Rights Act.  In the resulting 1971 consent decree, Cannon agreed to 
hire and promote more black workers and take “affirmative steps” in housing.
26
  Yet 
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Cannon Mills was slow to change its ways, and although by 1971 more than 3000 of the 
mills’ 16,000 workers were black - - a higher percentage of African-Americans than in 
the local population - - they remained stuck in the poorest jobs.   A quarter of Cannon’s 
black workers were in the lowest-paying blue collar jobs, compared to only five percent 
of whites.  In 1974 the company still had 94 job classifications that were all-white, and 
only about three percent of its clerical staff were African-American.
27
     “My job consists 
of sweeping and opening waste machines,” said one black woman, pointing out that her 
job used to be done by black men.  “I have been working on this job for three years and 
have never seen a white woman doing this work.”
28
 
Crawford testified in the federal government’s suit against Cannon Mills, and 
joined fifteen other black co-workers in filing their own class action suit against Cannon 
Mills in 1970 with help from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.  The resulting Hicks v. 
Cannon Mills suit was one of the largest of its type in the South and was not settled until 
1982.  Crawford endured much harassment at work for her activism. In 1975, a white, 
vehemently anti-union loom fixer groped Crawford’s breasts at work and called her a 
racial epithet, whereupon she slapped him.  The company suspended him for five days 
and fired Crawford. Crawford then filed an EEOC charge of racial discrimination. The 
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government found Cannon in contempt of its 1971 conciliation agreement and allowed 
her to sue. 
29
   
Before her dismissal, Crawford also joined the TWUA effort to organize a union 
in 1974, stepping up as one of its most outspoken supporters and serving as one of the 
union’s observers in the NLRB election.
30
  Crawford was not alone in her support for the 
union.  African-American workers at Cannon Mills were twice as likely as white workers 
to back the union.
 31
  Their union support often grew out of a new sense of rights and 
possibilities that was rooted in the civil rights movement.  Cannon “had to put us in,” one 
African-American woman told a reporter, explaining why Cannon’s long reluctance to 
hire people like herself helped sway her decision to vote yes in the upcoming election. 
“I’m not going to forget that,” she concluded.
32
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The 1974 Union Election 
Textile mills were still booming in early 1974 and the industry needed workers. TWUA 
union organizer Robert Freeman could feel that tight labor market in his bones the way 
some people feel the weather in an arthritic knee, for it meant workers would be more 
willing to challenge the company. At fifty-one, Freeman was the son of a Cannon worker 
and grew up in the mill’s shadow.  He had worked briefly at Cannon in high school 
before becoming a union organizer. His life-long mission was to organize the mill.
33
  
Described by TWUA staffers as both a “rugged individualist” and a personable optimist, 
Freeman was continually at odds with TWUA leadership.  A large man with a big voice, 
he roamed the South finding interest among workers, and then ran union organizing 
campaigns single-handedly, often without even getting permission from his supervisors 
to file for election.  “He was recognized as a lone wolf among his colleagues,” 
remembers TWUA researcher Kier Jorgensen.  “But they couldn’t argue with his success 
in … generating a campaign.”
34
  Freeman’s organizing efforts were driven by a heavily 
class-based philosophy rooted in his Kannapolis experience.  “We have been degraded all 
our lives by the cotton mill owners…if we complained…we were referred to as ‘trouble 
makers’… who wanted to be uppity people” read one of his letters to Cannon workers.
35
   
He believed the entire Southern power structure was tilted against textile workers, and 
that in order to effectively challenge this structure, workers must organize their own 
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union without a lot of hand holding from union headquarters.   “We will never organize 
the South with organizers,” he told one AFL-CIO official.  “As a matter of fact, we are 
destroying ourselves with organizers.  We overstaff our campaigns.”
36
  Freeman begged 
for the right to organize Cannon Mills, arguing that the time was ripe, and he insisted that 
he could run the campaign among 16,000 workers on his own.   Though his superiors 
were skeptical, they decided there was little harm in letting him have a go of it since it 
often took two or three tries to organize massive industrial mills.   Freeman launched the 
campaign in October of 1973 and began holding periodic meetings and passing out 
lengthy, newspaper style leaflets at the mill gate.  While a core group of about 200 
workers solicited union cards within the facility, most workers who signed the cards sent 
them back in the attached self-mailer.
37
   
Raises, benefits, and promotions topped the list of issues most important to 
Cannon Mills workers, according to a survey commissioned by the union.
38
 Some 
workers were incensed when Cannon claimed its benefits and wages – averaging just 
over three dollars an hour - were the top of the industry standard, arguing in anonymous 
letters to management that they were middling at best.
39
 For instance, Cannon 
implemented a retirement system in 1964, but a thirty-five-year employee would only 
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take home 35 dollars a month, in part because there was no credit for service prior to 
1964.
40
  Workers fully understood that Cannon had a lock on their social welfare, and 
some turned to unions to force the company to turn the key.   Many felt overworked and 
wanted to control the pace of their job.  “You can’t take time to get a deep breath,” 
complained one weaver.  “You have to keep at the job continuously or else the looms will 
be stopped and that knocks your production down.”
41
 Polling showed that black and 
young workers were especially keen on a union.  African-American union support was 
double that of whites, and a full 44 percent of white workers under the age of 30 
supported the union, citing as their reason promotions and pay.
42
  “The young people 
wasn’t hard, I could sign the young people, but the older people, they were just, ‘oh no!’” 
remembers Delores Gambrell, a white union supporter who was in her 20s at the time.
43
 
African-American workers were especially interested in winning a right to job 
promotions and were concerned about layoff policy, since they remained the most likely 
workers to be unskilled and thus to be the first laid off.
44
  Despite the conciliation 
agreement, there was no one policing the day-to-day reality of race discrimination in the 
plant and white supervisors routinely played favorites.  Leonard Chapman was an 
African-American union supporter who remembers “the supervisors were terrible on a 
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black man. He could hardly breathe without them getting all over him for any little 
thing….They wanted to show their dominancy over you.”
45
   Young women, too, brought 
a new sense of rights consciousness to their experience at Cannon Mills.  “A woman 
don’t have a chance. Women don’t get to be supervisors, or even any promotions,” 
complained one worker.
46
    
Anti-unionism was strongest among the white workers over the age of 50, 
especially white women.
47
  Historian Nancy MacLean describes how many white women 
in the nation’s Southern textile mills took a resigned approach to black women’s 
employment in the years after the Civil Rights Act, eschewing public protest for 
tightening social boundaries elsewhere.
48
  Many older white Cannon workers’ opposition 
to the union likely represented this sort of quiet discomfort with progress toward racial 
equality.  They viewed the union as an organization for black workers, not for them. 
Long-time Cannon worker Estelle Spry showed such uneasiness, for instance, in her letter 
to Cannon supervisors explaining why she planned to vote no for the union even though 
she was unhappy with the company’s pension: “They sure do the older people dirty that 
is in retiring age.  That is discrimination.  I think that is what they call it. The Blacks is 
the one that will get Cannon Mills in Union.”
49
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By August of 1974, 6510 of the 16,000 workers had signed union cards, and 
Freeman was able to petition the NLRB to hold its first-ever union election at Cannon 
Mills.   The NLRB held the pre-election conference at the one neutral site it could find, 
the Gem movie theater, and set the date of the election for November 20, 1974.
50
  
Freeman agreed with the TWUA leadership that Cannon workers were likely to lose - - 
he predicted at the time of filing that they would get 40 percent of the vote.  Yet he 
argued that the union must first educate the workers in order to lay the groundwork for a 
future victory. In order to equip Cannon workers with the tools needed to really wrest 
back power, he believed, they needed a larger world view which put their company-
owned town in perspective.
51
  For instance, Freeman sued the Kannapolis police 
department for unjustly arresting and harassing his wife and accused it of being 
company-owned.  Reporters found that Cannon had indeed reimbursed the county 
sheriff’s office for 22 or the town’s 42 police staff and that a Cannon vice president 
received a carbon copy of the daily arrest sheet from the police station.
52
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 Freeman needed every arrow in his quiver because though Charles Cannon had 
recently died, anti-unionism at Cannon Mills headquarters was still very much alive.  Top 
management laid out the company philosophy for front-line supervisors: “It is our 
intention to oppose the Union without swerving or change… For all of you in supervision 
there can be no middle ground…no neutral position.”
53
   The president of the company 
video-taped a message against the union which all workers were forced to watch.  It 
placed huge 4 x 8 plywood boards throughout the plants and covered them with literature 
against the union, including photos of machine guns on the roof in the textile uprisings in 
1934, and newspaper articles from the 1921 strike.
54
   “They had enough of (sic) plywood 
for bulletin board to build another plant up there,” marveled union supporter L.C. 
Wright.
55
 Management also worked hard to paint the union as an outsider, despite the fact 
that Freeman was from Kannapolis.  One cartoon featured a fat union boss in an elaborate 
New York City office surrounded by money bags saying, “Sho’ is Green in the South.”
56
  
In one training manual, supervisors were told what they could and could not say.  “I don’t 
trust those fellows at all.  They are a bunch of thugs, gangsters, Socialists and 
Communists and the truth is not in any of them,” was on the permissible list. 
57
  The 
larger Kannapolis community lent a hand in supporting the company’s efforts to defeat 
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the union.   The sheriff, mayor, local doctors, postmaster and heads of the Kannapolis 
merchants association all participated in a company-sponsored meeting leading up to the 
election. 
58
  The President of the local bank assured Cannon’s president that many 
business leaders had taken Cannon employees aside to talk to them “on a one-to-one 
basis in support of management in the upcoming election.”
59
  
Notably absent from both the company and the union’s rhetoric, however, was 
any discussion of global competition or imports.  Leaflets and company literature in 1974 
urged workers to consider dues, fines, strikes, assessments, and the union’s stance as 
outsiders. Cannon and its supporters did assert that the union would hurt its competitive 
stance, but the context was a domestic one.    Workers were more fearful that they would 
lose their individual job if they supported a union in 1974 than that the plant would close. 
Job insecurity because of imports only grew in the late 1970s and early 1980s at Cannon 
Mills. 
 Voting began at 7 a.m. as the third shift got off work.  Workers voted in 31 
polling places, overseen by a phalanx of two dozen NLRB staffers, 136 union observers 
and a nearly equal number of company observers.  A full ninety-seven percent of the 
workers cast a ballot that day before polls closed at 9 pm.  It took the NLRB staffers over 
two hours to hand count the ballots at the district court house.  Glenna Chambers, Cannon 
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worker and company supporter, rang a victory bell when at 11:27 at night the NLRB 
officials announced that Cannon had defeated the TWUA, 8473 to 6801.
60
 
 Cannon officials and industrialists across the South breathed a collective sigh of 
relief.  In fact, in the aftermath of the union’s defeat, business leaders from around the 
South proved that class consciousness was still alive and well.   “We are well aware of 
the fact you carried the ball for all of us,” wrote one CEO of a Southern yarn company.  
J.P. Stevens officials commiserated.  “As you know, we have been through a lot of this 
sort of thing and it is not pleasant.”  Telegrams and letters poured in from RJ Reynolds 
Tobacco, Belk’s, Coca-Cola, Elon College, Fieldcrest Mills, Rich’s Department store and 
many more. 
61
  What elites found most notable about the election was just how close the 
workers came to overcoming the historic obstacles to unionization in Southern textiles.   
“Cannon Won, but TWUA Displayed Strength,” read the Charlotte Observer headline, 
and that paper editorialized that the close vote was “a signal to the industry.”
62
  Many 
credited the diversifying workforce with turning the union tide. “As you get more 
younger workers, more women and more blacks into textiles, there will be more union 
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victories,” asserted one textile analyst after the vote.  “I think there will be a union at 
Cannon...”
63
   
 
Lobbying on Trade: An Uneasy Partnership 
Even as workers at Cannon Mills came close to winning a union election in one of the 
most traditionally anti-union corners of the nation in 1974, the textile industry began to 
feel the impact of global competition at a deeper level.  Though the industry had enjoyed 
a recent surge in employment, 1973 marked a peak in textile jobs that would never again 
be matched as the nation shed jobs in the face of increased imports.  U.S. textile and 
apparel workers became among the first workers to feel the full brunt of late twentieth 
century globalization and by 2014, forty years later, there would be little more than 
100,000 U.S. textile jobs.
64
  Yet in the early 1970s, the industry still had about a million 
workers and the story of U.S. globalization was still unfolding.   
Historian Nitsan Chorev reminds us that the trajectory of globalization in the U.S. 
was not pre-determined, but was instead the result of a political struggle between 
protectionists and supporters of free trade:  “Capital could not become mobile and 
financial markets could not internationalize without corresponding legal and political 
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   In the 1970s, U.S. textile workers and their companies were 
powerful protectionists and still possessed remarkable sway in their joint lobbying 
efforts.  Even as Cannon Mills and the union battled at the workplace level, they joined 
hands in potent joint labor-management lobbying efforts that helped shape the nation’s 
policy decisions on trade. Together, they helped pass the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
(MFA) in 1974 which governed import levels for thirty years, and nearly passed further 
restrictive import legislation in the mid-1980s.  Such joint lobbying efforts were an 
important lever of power for the textile union which had never represented a large portion 
of its industry, unlike unions in auto or steel.    
The textile labor-management partnership on trade had deep roots.  Charles 
Cannon was a leader in the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute (ACMI) when the 
Administration of John F. Kennedy asked representatives of industry and labor to join in 
a tri-partite Management-Labor Textile Advisory Committee in 1961.
66
  Industry and 
union representatives sat side-by-side as the committee sought to shape the 
administration’s textile policy on imports and quotas.  They successfully fought together 
for passage of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) of 1974, an agreement by 50 textile 
and apparel producing nations to build a complex system of quotas that governed the 
industry, under four variations, until it was phased out by 2005. Under the MFA, nations 
negotiated with one another just how many wool coats, polyester blouses and yards of 
cotton fabric, for example, could come out of any one nation into another.  No other 
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industry had such a tightly-controlled and complicated quota system.
 67
   The MFA did 
slow down imports to the U.S. for many years, and offered an interesting model for 
regulating global capital.  Unlike purely protectionist measures, in theory it offered a 
framework by which representatives of government, industry, and workers from various 
nations could sit down together and rationally make decisions about a globalizing 
economy.  In reality, power under the MFA remained tilted heavily in the direction of the 
developed nations.
68
    
By 1978, the new textile parent union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU), and textile employers deepened their alliance in the face of 
the Carter administration’s pressures to weaken the MFA regulations. Clothing and 
apparel unions joined a number of industry groups, including the American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute (ATMI), to form the “Textile / Apparel Import Steering Group.”  
Cannon Mills remained involved in the ATMI, and its president Harold Hornaday served 
on the ATMI’s new political action committee.
69
  In June, AFL-CIO President George 
Meany joined ATMI President Robert Small and other industry leaders at a Steering 
Group press conference on imports where the group called for passage of a bill that 
would completely exclude fiber, textile and apparel imports from any duty reductions in 
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ongoing multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva.  Though the Senate and House passed 
the bill, Carter vetoed it.
70
  Yet textile and apparel unions clearly had sway on the Carter 
administration’s trade policy, and the U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 
was careful to meet with the union’s leaders to inform them of the veto in advance.
71
  The 
labor-management alliance still had enough strength to persuade Carter to cut a separate 
agreement guaranteeing controls on imports in the textile and apparel industries.  Under 
the headline, “U.S. and Great State of Textiles Strike a Bargain,” the National Journal 
noted that it was as though Carter were negotiating with a foreign power.  The textile 
companies were clearly delighted.  “We win one,” declared the Southern Textile News.
72
   
Yet - - as we have seen in the case of Cannon - - the industry was undermining its 
partner in that “great state of textiles” even as it stood next to it on Capitol Hill.  A 
number of other textile employers continued to fight their workers’ organizing efforts in 
the 1970s, such as JP Stevens and Burlington Mills, even as they united with the union on 
trade.
73
  In addition, the ATMI served as one of the key leaders in the fight against the 
1978 labor law reform bill. The juxtaposition was stark.  For example, the ATMI 
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Congressional Report, on the very same pages that it celebrated the joint press 
conference with labor, reported on the weakening prospects of the Labor Law Reform bill 
that was currently before Congress in 1978.  Noting that “as of now, the bill’s prospects 
for revival during this session of Congress seem dim,” it urged its member to contact 
Senators immediately to vote against it.
74
   
By the mid-1980s, this powerful labor-management alliance deepened its effort to 
staunch the growing impact of the nation’s turn toward neoliberal trade policies.  Their 
failure to do so removed a key barrier to the retail industry’s push for free trade policies. 
In 1985, within weeks of the second Cannon vote, President Ronald Reagan vetoed the 
Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act (also known as the Jenkins bill after its 
sponsor Congressman Edward Jenkins of Georgia.) The law would have replaced the 
bilateral MFA system with unilateral quotas that were completely in US control.  The 
Jenkins bill had no real checks on capital’s movement and investment and, unlike the 
MFA, it did not require negotiations with any other countries.  It was a blunt tool with 
which to govern an increasingly complicated global economy.  Nevertheless, the textile 
and apparel industry joined with labor unions to fight for its passage, forming the new 
Fiber, Fabric and Apparel Coalition for Trade (FFACT). 
75
  Members of FFACT and its 
fourteen staff lobbyists met with senators and members of Congress, held letter writing 
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drives among their members, and held joint press briefings.  Cannon’s President Doug 
Kingsmore served as an ATMI director, the source of half of FFACT’s two million dollar 
budget, and textile union staffers were on its executive group.  The industry and unions 
together made up a powerful lobby, and managed to get the bill through both houses 
before Reagan vetoed it.
76
   
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the labor-management alliance continued to put 
up a fight against the U.S.’s turn toward a free trade policy.  The industry came close to 
winning strict import controls three more times between the 1985 Jenkins bill and the 
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, but it 
continually found itself battling the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations’ 
support for retail groups over manufacturers.  The union became less and less able to 
carry its weight in this fight.  Its membership dropped by half between the time of the 
1974 Cannon election and the passage of NAFTA.
77
  Though some of this membership 
loss was the result of layoffs in unionized plants, employers’ refusal to allow a newly-
diversified working class to join textile unions mattered too, for they effectively blocked 
the union’s ability to grow.  In doing so, they enervated their own lobbying partner and 
robbed U.S. textile workers of one important tool with which to mitigate globalization’s 
impact.   
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Globalization and the 1985 Campaign 
Despite its joint lobbying efforts with the union, Cannon Mills remained vigilantly anti-
union as ACTWU kept a toe in the Kannapolis waters throughout the latter half of the 
1970s.  The union ran organizing efforts in 1976 and 1980, though it never gathered quite 
enough support from workers to file for an election with the NLRB.
78
  Even though the 
workers did not have a union, their constant unionizing pressure helped push their 
company to improve their wages and benefits.  For instance, after the workers began 
signing cards in 1980, the company quickly announced an extra $2.2 million in benefits 
including eliminating the requirement for employee contributions to the retirement plan.  
It also offered far greater major medical coverage, such as increasing the plan’s 
maximum coverage cap and upping reimbursement for hospitalization.
79
   Yet supervisors 
also continued to pull workers into one-one-one meetings to probe for their opinion on 
the union, and even sent out an anti-union message by Norman Vincent Peale.
80
   The 
company remained true to form, even as its leadership changed. “I pledge to you that 
(Cannon)… will do all we can to assure that we continue to operate in a union-free 
environment and avoid those obstructions and restrictions that go with unionism,” wrote 
the new Cannon President Otto Stoltz in a 1980 letter to all workers.
81
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The early 1980s were rocky years for Cannon Mills as it struggled to weather the 
double-dip 1980 – 1982 recession that wreaked particular havoc on the manufacturing 
sector.
82
  Whereas the company had seen the highest sales in its history in 1979 and 
earned over forty million dollars, by the third quarter of 1980 the company was showing 
nearly a million dollar loss.
83
 The company began to lose market share, and its sheets and 
towels began to be seen more as discount material than top-notch goods.  Charles 
Cannon’s cautiousness continued to shape the company culture, even years after his death 
in 1971.  The company did little to invest in new machinery or to introduce new product 
lines, even as the textile industry was undergoing a wave of consolidation and 
mechanization.  It continued to run a mill town, owning over 2000 company houses until 
1982, long after most textile companies had gotten out of that business.
84
  Yet that 
conservative culture made the company a juicy target for the leveraged buy-outs of the 
early 1980s.  Cannon products were still a household name, and the company had zero 
long-term debt, more than $180 million in working capital, and had just been re-listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange after Charles Cannon took it off 16 years previously.  The 
stock was deliciously undervalued.
85
 
David H. Murdock knew an opportunity when he saw it.  The Los Angeles-based 
financier bought Cannon Mills for $413 million in 1982, finally taking the company out 
of the Cannon family by vacuuming up their stock along with Cannon charity trust stock.  
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Murdock had made tens of millions through real estate, like Washington, DC’s Hay-
Adams hotel, and by forcing the sale of other companies, like the Hawaii food and land 
company, Castle & Cooke.  He operated in 60 countries, but Cannon was his first foray 
into manufacturing. 
86
  Murdock only owned the company for three years. Before he left, 
he robbed the workers’ pension of $30 million, terminating the retirement plan and 
reinvesting it in an insurer dependent on shady junk bonds.
87
  Yet during his tenure as 
owner, Murdock heavily invested in the struggling Cannon and spent $200 million to 
modernize the mills with imported Italian air-jet looms.   Such shuttleless looms were 
changing the industry as technology replaced workers.  An old shuttle loom, for instance, 
required thirteen minutes to make the material to make a man’s shirt while an air jet loom 
took only three minutes. 
88
 But Murdock’s reign coincided with a heavy slump in the 
textile industry driven by imports and overproduction.   More than 350 textile plants 
closed between 1981 and 1986. 
89
 Murdock slashed workers’ pay, laid off 3200 workers 
over three years - - some with only a few hours’ notice - -and brought in industrial 
engineers to help squeeze more work out of the remaining workers. 
90
  Buddy Cannon, a 
long-time Cannon hourly worker, said Murdock cut his pay from $9.80 an hour to $6.44 
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and that his wife, Pinky, was down to working three days a week.
91
   Murdock sold off 
the company houses, giving workers 90 days in which to decide whether to buy their 
homes.  The town of Kannapolis finally incorporated under Murdock’s watch, its citizens 
suddenly governing themselves in the midst of the chaos.
92
   
A month after Murdock bought Cannon, Robert Freeman began lobbying for 
another campaign.
93
  The union had high hopes that the new ownership and continued 
influx of African-Americans and young workers into the mill would help it build support 
among a workforce that now numbered 10,500 workers, more than a quarter of whom 
were African-American.
94
  “There are a lot more younger people working at Cannon, 
particularly young black, than there were at the time of the election, and these people’s 
aspirations are far greater than the old textile mill hand,” observed one ACTWU staffer in 
Kannapolis.
95
  Union leaders proceeded cautiously and, not fully trusting organizers’ 
positive reports, hired a Washington, DC polling firm to do a survey.
96
  That firm found 
that 42 percent of workers supported the union by August, compared to 36 percent who 
opposed it, with the rest undecided. Workers’ top issues included wages and job 
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 Black workers were far more likely than white workers to support the union - - 
a full 69 percent of black workers were union backers as opposed to only 34 percent of 
white workers.  In 1982 Cannon had finally settled the 1970 racial discrimination suit, 
paying 3700 workers a total of $1.65 million in back pay.
98
  Yet Black workers still felt 
less secure in their jobs than did white workers, and 91 percent of black workers said that 
they wanted more protection from layoffs. Young workers were at the forefront of 
support for the union in 1985, including 45 percent of white workers under the age of 
35.
99
   
The union launched its new and improved effort in August of 1984, passing out 
leaflets that targeted Murdock’s changes. Slowly union activists gathered union cards. 
100
  
The tantalizingly close 1974 election remained on ACTWU’s leaders’ minds, and this 
time around they insisted on a more traditional, professionally-run effort.   Freeman only 
participated in the 1985 campaign from the sidelines as a retiree. 
101
  The union leaders 
hired fifteen full-time staff members, contracted with advertising and polling outfits, 
spent $125,000 on television ads and billboards, hosted a phone bank to reach 6000 
workers, and utilized a state-of-the-art computer system.   All told, they spent somewhere 
just south of a million dollars.  Freeman had run the 1974 campaign for just over 
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  The union petitioned for an election in August, claiming to have a 
substantial majority of workers signed up. “This time the response is better,” concluded 
ACTWU southern regional director Bruce Raynor.
103
  
This time around was different from 1974, but not in the way that the union had 
hoped.  Even as Murdock remade the landscape of Kannapolis, the ground on which the 
workers stood shook with the deeper earthquake of global economic changes.  Cannon 
workers were already worried by Murdock’s purchase of the company and anxious in the 
face of his many job cuts and changes.  Murdock deepened this anxiety by blaming 
imports for the pay cuts and layoffs, and prevailed on the workers not to risk a union at a 
time when global competition was rampant.  Days after union supporters petitioned the 
government to hold an election, David Murdock sent out a letter to all workers that would 
make imports the central issue for the rest of the campaign.  Saying Cannon was “in 
serious trouble” he argued that “our market base has been invaded by imports” and said 
he had been forced to pursue merger talks with other companies.  He said he had put in 
an additional $12 million of his own funds to keep the company afloat and urged the 
workers to “not allow ACTWU to divide us at a time when, more than ever, we need to 
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     If that did not get the message through, the company also required 
all workers to attend meetings in which they were shown a video of the company 
president, Doug Kingsmore, declaring “Cannon is not operating profitably” because of 
imports.  Supervisors then followed up with each worker back in the mill, quizzing them 
with clipboards in hand.  They echoed the import message, and made sure workers 
understood that Murdock would not continue to sink his money into a company that was 
not making a profit in a global economy.
105
  Kingsmore followed up the meetings with 
his own letter in which he argued that if the company could not compete it would have to 
close its doors.  “We are facing the worst obstacle (UNCONTROLLED TEXTILE 
IMPORTS AND GREATLY INCREASED COMPETITION) in our company’s 
history…Cannon’s future is in the hands of the people who work at Cannon.”
106
       
It was certainly true that Cannon Mills scrambled for footing in a globalizing 
economy.  Cannon Mills was suffering in the downturn in the textile industry, and though 
Murdock refused to make his earnings public, he claimed to have lost money as the 
company’s international sales fell by more than half from 1981 to 1984.
107
  Yet when 
U.S. employers like Cannon faced a new global paradigm, they were especially quick to 
try to limit labor costs by viciously fighting workers’ unionizing efforts.  U.S. 
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manufacturing sector employers like Cannon became more likely than those in the 
service or retail to fight their workers’ efforts to unionize starting in the 1970s.  Though 
in 1965 the ratio of unfair labor practices filed to the number of elections held was the 
same in manufacturing, retail and service, by 1980 there were one and half times as many 
charges against manufacturers.
108
   Manufacturers from many industries, not only textiles, 
routinely capitalized on their workers’ insecurities in a global economy and threatened 
that they would close the plant if the workers unionized.  Political scientist Kate 
Bronfenbrenner found that by the early 1990s half of all employers faced with a union 
organizing drive threatened plant closure and twelve percent actually followed through 
with the threat. In manufacturing, a full 62 percent of employers threatened to shut down 
and move compared to 36 percent in less mobile sectors, like health care and retail. U.S. 
labor law deemed such threats illegal, yet the penalties and enforcement were so weak 
that employers continued to make the threats. 
109
  Cannon workers and other U.S. textile 
workers certainly did face an uncertain future in a globalized economy, but their nation’s 
legal structure allowed employers to exacerbate that insecurity.  
 Though the union staffers in 1985 thought that their operation was better than the 
one in 1974, they found themselves tilting at new windmills within the global climate. 
“They outgunned us, outclassed us,” remembered ACTWU lead organizer Mark 
Fleishman. The company’s campaign was orchestrated by the management-side law firm 
Constangy, Brooks and Smith, an Atlanta-based firm well known to the textile union for 
its harsh campaigns. The firm trained supervisors to serve as messengers who to 
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Fleishman seemed “like an army of folks….We were like kids with our faces pressed up 
against the glass.”
110
 ACTWU tried to neutralize the company’s import issue by pointing 
out that Murdock himself was a free trader - - “Murdock – king of the importers.”  One 
leaflet featured the local post office with a headline that read “mortgaged,” pointing out 
that Murdock had put up the town’s land for collateral on loans for foreign machinery.
111
  
They held rallies and marches in Asheville, Raleigh, and Charlotte to position the union 
as an import-fighter, and worked to get the rallies covered in the Kannapolis media 
market. 
112
 They argued that the union could provide job security in the face of global 
competition and featured union members whose contracts included language on 
subcontracting globally.
113
  No one really believed them.  In fact, the union’s own polling 
firm found that while imports were one of the workers’ most serious concerns, the vast 
majority of workers thought that government was the only one who could rectify it.  A 
mere 35 percent thought the union could “help make things better” on the import issue.
114
  
The company kept up the offense. When union supporters presented Austrian-made yarn 
at a press conference, arguing that Cannon imported goods, the company sent a clear 
message by firing one of them, allegedly for revealing company secrets.
115
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Cannon Mills even used its political activism around the Textile and Apparel 
Trade Enforcement Act (the Jenkins bill) as a way to sway votes in the union election, 
despite the fact that the union served as its lobbying partner on the bill.  Under the 
headline, “Which Will You Choose?” it circulated leaflets with photos of David Murdock 
meeting with President Reagan on trade, juxtaposed with photos of sparse union rallies.    
The company solicited letters from employees to Reagan to call for passage of the 
Jenkins bill, and a week before the election sponsored letter-writing tents at the main 
grandstand of the Charlotte Motor Speedway.  An 800-member marching band, 
fireworks, a jet fly over and a pre-race parade featuring David Murdock rounded out the 
weekend’s “Buy American” weekend of textile bill events.  Richard Petty, the celebrity 
racer, toured Cannon’s plants with a message tailored toward the upcoming union 
election:  “Support your Company - - it Supports You.”
116
  
A week before the union election in Kannapolis, David Murdock called the union 
an “insidious cancer” in a video all workers were required to watch, and drove home the 
fear of imports:  “If I determine that Cannon cannot operate competitively, I can and I 
will cease to operate Cannon.  This is my decision and mine alone, and no one can stop 
me, including the union.” 
117
 Cannon workers got the message.  David Murdock was 
jubilant as he greeted company supporters on the mill floor, dressed in a double-breasted 
suit, after the company solidly defeated the union by a two-to-one margin, 63 to 37 
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  Workers cheered with cries of “We’re Number One!” as the mill whistles 
sounded for what turned out to be a short-lived victory for union opponents.  A mere 
seven weeks later, Murdock sold the mills to Fieldcrest for 250 million dollars.
119
   
 
Retail Topples the Smokestacks 
The 1986 ACTWU Executive Board meeting in New York City was a grim one.  The 
union’s budget was off by a million dollars, a deficit the leaders pinned in part on the 
twin losses of Cannon Mills and the failed fight for the Jenkins bill.  The leaders passed a 
resolution to withhold any support from legislators who had voted against the Jenkins 
bill, but by 1986 their power to weigh in as a political force in Washington, DC was 
greatly diminished.  The union had lost over a quarter of its membership in the last five 
years.
120
   Though it needed to organize at least 20,000 workers a year just to stay even, it 
was averaging less than 7000.
121
   
After the 1974 election, leaders at a similar Executive Board meeting had lauded 
the close Cannon election, and thought that it could just be a matter of a few years before 
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Cannon Mills would go union.
122
   Yet they could not see from that vantage point that 
Cannon Mills workers would have to wage their future unionizing fights on shifting 
terrain.  Not only would their employer successfully use a globalizing economy to scuttle 
their unionizing efforts by 1985, but a more retail-driven economy overcame the power 
of the U.S. manufacturing sector. This was especially clear in the apparel and textile 
sectors which had long been interdependent - - apparel companies bought the textiles to 
make their clothes.  Yet starting in the mid-1980s what had been separate operations 
increasingly combined into retail-apparel-textile “channels,” and retailers like Wal-Mart 
began to lead the whole process.
123
   The retail industry had been sufficiently spooked by 
the success of the Jenkins bill that it formed two powerful new lobbying groups: the 
Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition (RITAC) and the American Fair Trade Council 
(AFTC), which included importers and clothing retailers and manufacturers like Levi-
Strauss and Patagonia.
124
   The year after Cannon workers lost the second election, the 
Reagan Administration sent representatives of retail to the MFA negotiations in Geneva 
for the first time.
125
  Retail had effectively gotten its hands on the wheel that steered the 
textile industry’s fate, and would soon move into the driver’s seat of globalization. 
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When textile employers fought their workers’ efforts to form unions and 
prevented the unions from growing, they weakened the textile labor-management alliance 
which had served as a counter weight to these retail interests.  Over the decades, the 
textile and apparel unions depended too heavily on management-labor coalitions as tools 
to mitigate imports’ impacts. In order for U.S. workers to win power within a globalizing 
capitalism, labor would have had to win effective curbs on capital’s ability to move, and 
would have had to forge full partnerships with workers across the globe.
126
  The union 
did begin to build some global alliances, such as holding organizing trainings with 
representatives from sewing shops in the Caribbean in the same months when the union 
was in the throes of the 1985 Cannon Mills election.
127
  Yet the efforts remained small 
and scattered, even after the union expanded such partnerships more broadly in the 
1990s.
128
    The union always put the most emphasis on lobbying jointly with the 
employers as the most viable lever with which to soften the blow of global capital.  Yet 
its ability to come to the table as a full partner in those efforts was quickly fading.   
Cannon Mills changed hands several times over the next decades after the 1985 
election - - textile giant Fieldcrest bought it in 1986 and then Pillowtex in 1997.   The 
                                                             
126 On labor’s attempts to curb capital’s ability to move, see Stein, Running Steel, Running America, 203-
204. Stein covers the Burke-Hartke bill of 1971 (the Foreign Trade and Investment Act) which would have 
launched import quotas in many more industries, eliminated tax incentives for companies expanding abroad 
and, remarkably, given the executive branch powers to stop US-based companies from investing abroad if 
it believed this would cost U.S. jobs.  For examples of union efforts to pass this legislation see “Almost 
1,000,000 lost,” undated IUD brochure, c. 1972, Box 57, M86-019, TWUA papers; Sol Stetin to Howard 
Chester, October 6, 1972 describing the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO’s taskforce to move a 
grassroots program to support Burke-Hartke, M86-019, Box 57, TWUA papers.    
127 Minutes ACTWU General Executive Board, January 13 – 16, 1986, Box 5, 5619-030, ACTWU papers, 
Cornell.  For limitations of such partnerships, see Jorgensen interview with the author. 
128 For a critique of labor’s unwillingness to forge such partnerships more broadly, see Frank, Buy 




company’s workers tried three more times to win a union, in 1991, 1997, and 1999.  Each 
time the company threatened workers’ jobs with imports.  “They would show …videos 
right before it was time to vote of padlocks on gates, and grass all the way to the top of 
the gates,” remembered worker Kem Taylor.
129
 After the 1991 election, the NLRB found 
the company guilty of violating labor law 150 separate times and found its behavior so 
egregious that it called for special remedies.   On Election Day, for instance, the company 
had fired a high-profile union leader, Elboyd Deal, and had security guards escort him out 
through work areas where other employees would be certain to see him.
130
  The NLRB 
ordered the company to allow union organizers in the plants and forced the president to 
read the NLRB remedy to all the workers.
131
 Meanwhile, the union sued Murdock for 
absconding with the workers’ pensions, and Murdock eventually agreed to settle the suit 
and make up the shortfall.
132
   
In 1999, a majority of the workforce finally voted by a narrow majority for the 
union (by then called UNITE) in a last ditch effort to control the companies’ forced 
speed-ups and to avoid layoffs.  The workforce was now down to 5000 employees (less 
than a third of the 1974 workforce) and included many more immigrant workers who, 
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like the African-American workers, tended to be supportive of the union.
133
   The workers 
won their first union contract in 2000, earning a nine percent wage increase over two 
years, and the first sick days in the textile industry. 
134
   They would not have the union 
contract for long, however.  Just three years later, the company shut its doors due to 
global competition in North Carolina’s largest mass layoff ever.  Workers not only lost 
the gains they had made with the union but found many of their employer-provided social 
welfare protections, like health care, pulled out from under them. Those who did get jobs 
often found that the jobs were part-time and poorly paid.   When a Wal-Mart superstore 
opened in Kannapolis in 2003, more than half its new staff was made up of laid-off 
workers from the mill.
135
 Cannon workers’ experience was a typical one in the textile 
industry.  One study of the textile industry found that two-thirds of re-employed textile 
and apparel workers earned less on their new jobs than before.
136
  When the giant 
smokestacks of former Cannon Mills’ Plant 1 tumbled to the ground in 2006, the 
demolition was one of the largest such efforts in the world.
137
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The Cannon Mills case demonstrates the thorny complexities of labor’s decline in the late 
twentieth century.  It suggests that scholars should look for causation beyond complacent 
unions or an individualistic working class.  At Cannon Mills, Southern textile workers 
wanted unions and tried hard to form them, even in the face of globalization.  The Civil 
Rights movement bolstered the textile union’s efforts by creating a diversified workforce 
at Cannon Mills, one which was more union-minded than preceding generations.   
Yet just as Cannon workers found a way out of the Southern frying pan, they 
found themselves tossed into the global fire.  Globalization mattered deeply to these 
workers’ fates, of course, and was bound to impact them, yet the Cannon Mills case 
reminds us that the terms on which U.S. workers would experience globalization were 
not inevitable, but were determined by the larger legal and political context.
138
   A 
globalizing economy did not necessarily have to mean weaker unions. In Germany, for 
instance, though textile and apparel employment dropped 60 percent between 1970 and 
1990, the membership of the union representing these workers only dropped 20 percent. 
There, workers were more easily able to turn to unions to help protect them from job 
losses and to mediate globalization’s effect.  German workers can enter unions without 
having to fight with their employers and go through tumultuous union elections.
 139
   The 
Italian textile industry’s workforce plummeted in the 1970s, but by the late 1980s that 
industry regrouped and workers’ wages were above the European average.  There, local 
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labor movements were involved in the development of a network of smaller, specialized 
textile companies giving workers a safer seat within global forces.
140
  Throughout 
Europe, when textile workers did lose jobs en masse, stronger labor movements were 
able to negotiate more freely than in the U.S. for income adjustment and assistance.
141
   
Within the U.S. political economy, in contrast, globalization severely undercut textile 
workers’ unions.  There, employers resisted workers’ unionizing efforts, often using 
increased global labor competition as a weapon against organizing workers.  At Cannon 
Mills, the workers’ union organizing campaigns thus became not only sites for the 
unfolding of the cloth of globalization, but for its very manufacture.  When such U.S. 
textile workers lost the power to unionize, they also lost their platform from which to 
lobby and negotiate the terms under which their industry globalized and so were less able 
to counter the retail sector’s growing push to deregulate trade policies.   
We turn now to take a closer look at workers inside retail, the industry that was 
the clear winner over textiles in the trade struggles of the late 20
th
 century.  Scholars often 
cite the nation’s turn toward a retail and service based economy as one of the driving 
factors behind labor’s decline, since so few workers were traditionally unionized in this 
sector.  Unions did not try to organize retail workers, the standard narrative goes, and 
retail workers did not turn to traditional unions.
142
  Yet in retail, as in so many other cases 
covered in these pages, the standard narrative of labor’s decline gets far more 
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complicated upon examination of the workplace-level struggle and through discussions 






Retail Workers Organize: The Victory at Woodward & Lothrop 
 
Rosa Halsey rarely ate lunch in the Woodward & Lothrop downtown store’s employee 
break room until she started forming a union.  “Other people I met had the same 
spirit…we had a common goal,” she remembers.  Halsey moved to the Washington, DC 
area in 1977 from Norfolk, Virginia, a town adjacent to Newport News.  A young, 
African-American mother, she quickly found a job in the accounts department of the 
Washington area’s largest department store, widely known as “Woodies.”  In 1979, she 
joined her 5,300 co-workers in winning the largest NLRB union election in Washington, 
DC’s history, and the nation’s last large retail industry union election. As in the 
organizing efforts at Newport News and Cannon Mills, young workers, people of color 
and women propelled the Woodward & Lothrop union drive.   What is different about the 
Woodies story, however, is that unlike shipbuilding and textile, retail was an ascendant 
industry.  Here was the future of the U.S. economy, and Rosa Halsey and her co-workers 
thought that future should include a union.
1
   
Transformations in retailing, driven by a new breed of discount retailers like Wal-
Mart, helped shape the twenty-first century economy.  Giant, multinational retailers 
harnessed new technologies - - like UPC symbols and enormous container ships - - to 
shift the locus of power from manufacturers to retail.  They became the shapers of global 
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markets, determining what was manufactured and by whom, how it was transported, and 
how much it would cost.   Retail conglomerates also re-shaped the working class 
experience in the United State. Their low-road employment policies - - very low wages, 
paltry benefits and mandatory part-time status - - permeated the labor market, shaping the 
work experience for people far beyond those who ran credit cards at a register. 
2
 Retailers 
like Wal-Mart also weakened the nation’s social safety net by essentially refusing to play 
the role of security provider.  The company’s no-holds-barred anti-union approach meant 
that it sidestepped the state-backed mechanism - - collective bargaining - - that forced the 
company to pay its fair share.  The company s effectively shifted those costs to the public 
coffers and helped deepen the nation’s economic divide.
3
  
Scholars have given much attention to Wal-Mart and the rise of retailers, but there 
has been little attention to retail union organizing in the pivotal moment of the 1970s, the 
years when a new breed of retail companies first began to gain momentum.  Many retail 
workers, it turns out, did not back down easily when they faced de-skilling and the 
gutting of wage and benefits standards in the 1970s.  They fought to bring retail jobs into 
the most secure tier of the U.S.’s social welfare state - - a union contract.  While retail 
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workers were less likely than other workers to have a union, they were trying to 
organize.
4
  The number of retail workers voting in elections in the 1970s increased by 28 
percent compared to the previous decade, a rate not far behind the job growth in the 
industry, which increased by 39 percent. Though unions were not organizing at anywhere 
near the scale necessary to increase union density in the retail sector, they were clearly 
stepping up efforts in the 1970s.
 
(See Appendix F)  Retail workers at Caldor Inc., Dillon 
Companies, Davison’s department store in Atlanta, The Hecht’s Company, Gimbles, FW 
Woolworth, Montgomery Ward and Peoples Drug Store were just a few examples of 
those voting in union elections in the 1970s, according to monthly NLRB reports.
5
    
The new workforce was increasingly young, female and African-American.  By 
1970 a full half of sales clerks nationwide were under 25, and so had grown up in the 
wake of the civil rights movement.
6
 Though women had long worked as sales clerks, the 
percentage of retail sales clerks who were female rose from less than half in 1950 to more 
than seventy percent by 1979, the year of the Woodies workers’ union election.
7
 As in 
textiles, black workers had only won the right to many retail sales jobs as a result of civil 
rights activism and legislation in the 1960s.  Employers worried that this new workforce 
would translate into unions.  One anti-union management consultant warned, “Danger: a 
union can muster a most potent campaign when it can take advantage of a “racial” or 
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   They were right to be worried. Rosa Halsey and her co-workers fought 
to make retail jobs secure and rewarding for the people who would swipe scanners, stock 
shelves and serve shoppers. 
For the Woodies workers, the fight succeeded in part because their employer did 
not attack their union with the kind of scorched earth tactics that Wal-Mart and other 
discount retailers adopted.
 
  Wal-Mart, for instance, approached unions as though they 
were a cancer, flying in a specialized team at the first appearance of union cards in the 
1970s and 1980s.
9
 Kmart had a special security department to track union activity and 
report it to the Board of Directors.
10
  Even other Washington, DC department store 
employees faced tough tactics waged by anti-union consultants, such as at The Hecht’s 
Company warehouse.  In the Woodies election, we can see a glimpse of what the retail 
industry might have been like if employers had not had such a free hand to trample 
workers’ freedom to form union. The workers of Woodies won their union, and built a 
strong contract and local that would serve them well in the face of the squeezed retail 
labor standards and department store mergers of the 1990s and 2000s.  Macy’s owns 
some of the stores left when Woodward & Lothrop closed in 1995. Those workers still 
have a union in 2015 that is a legacy of the one formed in 1979, and they are among the 
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nation’s few department store workers who have any say over the terms of their 
employment.   
Retail workers nationally, however, were not able to turn the tide.  The giant 
Woodies election would be the last of its kind in retail.  After 1982, union organizing in 
the industry slowed to a crawl.  In the 1980s, when jobs in retail grew by a third, the 
number of union elections in retail sunk by half.  By 1989, a mere 14,000 retail workers 
voted in NLRB elections annually.  Only five percent of retail workers had a union by 
2012 and this lack of unionization helped make most retail jobs bad ones.
11
  Low wages, 
paltry benefits and scarce full-time schedules marked the industry, yet retail loomed huge 
in the nation’s economy.  Retail sales clerk was the second-fastest growing occupation in 
the United States by 2013.  There were as many people working as salespeople, cashiers 
and stockers as in all production jobs combined.  The poor quality of retail jobs was thus 
a foundation on which the new economic divide rested. 
12
   
Was retail just so big, and the tug of technology so strong, that retail workers’ 
enervation was inevitable?   History is never made by the victors alone.  Wal-Mart and 
K-Mart, for example, were just starting to mold the kinds of low-road labor decisions in 
the 1970s that would later become a template for the larger economy.
  
They made those 
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decisions facing young, female, minority workers - - like those organizing at Woodward 
& Lothrop - - who were vocal about their rights, active and a possible threat.   Perhaps 
corporations only needed a small hammer to tap down retail unionization efforts in the 
1970s and 1980s, but they thought they needed a massive sledgehammer which they 
swung with abandon, pummeling the nation’s system of economic levelers and leaving 
great holes in the social safety system.   Retailers continued to wield this weapon long 
after the union threat weakened.   The early twenty-first century’s unequal economic 
divide was fashioned, in part, by corporate fear of workers’ 1970s activism. Yet scholars 
have taken worker activism far less seriously than did the corporations, and have asked 
few of the kinds of questions that would illuminate the contours of this crucial class battle 
workers waged in the 1970s.   
The Woodward & Lothrop organizing campaign allows us to understand more 
clearly the role of union organizing in shaping today’s economy.  Who formed this union 
and why?  What did the company do?  What role did the state play in this contest?  Did 
workers’ unions continue to organize and, if not, why?  Can we find within this victory 
some clues as to why and how retail workers across the United States lost control of their 
fate within twenty-first century capitalism?   
 
Seeking Refuge Amidst the Retail Storm 
In 1962, the same year Michael Harrington sparked a nation-wide discussion of poverty 
amidst an age of plenty with this book The Other America, he also published a much less 




Harrington profiled a single, growing union - - the Retail Clerks International Association 
(RCIA).
13
  Though the union was still relatively small at 400,000 members, it had 
quadrupled in size over the preceding two decades. Harrington called it “labor’s newest 
giant” for he believed that the RCIA represented labor’s future, “a new type of industrial 
union” which was well on its way to organizing this expanding sector. 
14
   
It was not clear in the early 1960s, even to so prescient a scholar and activist as 
Harrington, that a rocky road lay ahead for workers in retail.   The industry itself had 
grown along with the rise of a post-World War II consumerist economy built around a 
car-centered, suburban culture.
15
   When consumers drove to those new suburban 
department stores, the people who waited on them were not likely to have a union, 
though the union was indeed making some headway at organizing among regional 
discount stores, such as at Marshalls, Gemco, Caldor’s, Two Guys, and Bradlees.  
Unionized department stores were mostly confined to urban areas in cities like New 
York, Seattle and San Francisco.  However, when those consumers cruised down the 
suburban street to their local grocery store, chances were much better that a union clerk 
would ring up their Cheerios, especially if they lived in a Northeastern or Midwestern 
market.  By the late 1970s, the Retail Clerks International Union (RCIU) - - the same 
parent union that the Woodies workers would join - - represented a quarter of the national 
grocery market and virtually all of it in Washington, DC.   Unionized retail workers had 
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good wages and benefits, and guarantees of full-time work.
16
 Though retail weekly wages 
had fallen relative to those of other non-supervisory workers in the 1950s and 1960s, in 
1968 retail workers nationally still made about 70 percent of what the average non-




   
The 1970s, however, brought profound changes to the retail industry which 
Michael Harrington could not have foreseen in 1962, the very same year in which 
Wal-Mart, Target and Kmart were all founded.  The discounters rose to prominence in 
this new economic structure over the next three decades, and used new technology to 
force manufacturers and vendors to drive their prices down.
18
 The discount chains 
were helped along by the elimination of New Deal-era federal fair pricing laws which 
had allowed manufacturers to set base prices.  Opponents to these laws, such as 
discount department stores, successfully argued in the 1970s that they were 
inflationary.  There were 45 such local and state laws in 1941, but by 1975 only 13 
survived.  Now discounters could not only drive down prices, but could also access 
brand-name merchandise that had been the purview of the conventional department 
stores.
19
  New technologies - - such as computerized inventory and containerization - - 
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also helped shift the levers of economic power from manufacturers to retailers. As laid 
bare in the Cannon Mills case, this shift in power was contingent on more than 
technology - - trade policy and manufacturers’ own labor policies also favored retail’s 
rise.  For the department store industry, this shift meant tremendous consolidation as 
firms sought to gain enough leverage to compete.   Prior to the 1970s, department 
stores typically sold a wide range of products and catered to a variety of price ranges.  
The discount retailers, however, stripped off the bottom market starting in the late 
1970s and 1980s, just as consumers had less money to spend.
20
  Meanwhile, upscale 
department stores like Nordstrom’s began to expand, creating more competition for 
the upper echelons of the market.     
As the discounters grew in size and influence in the 1970s and 1980s, hours and 
working conditions plunged for most retail workers, and what had been decent jobs 
quickly became very bad ones.  In order for discounters to make a profit, they had to sell 
more goods and squeeze labor, keeping labor costs to less than half those in department 
stores.
21
 Part-time work grew to be the norm and technological changes, like the rise of 
scanners, allowed for the mass de-skilling of retail jobs.   Whereas retailers used to 
carefully train working class women to serve as salespeople, by the late 1970s most 
workers received little, if any, training for what was considered a low-skill job.
22
 Wages 
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fell much more quickly than before, and jobs became more contingent.
23
   While retail 
workers had started out the decade with weekly wages averaging 70 percent of those of 
all non-supervisory workers, by the time of the Woodies campaign in 1979 they only 
earned 63 percent of the average workers’ weekly wage.  Ten years later, they earned 
only 56 percent of that average wage. (See Appendix G)  
The history of Woodward & Lothrop parallels that of the retail industry.  The 
store was founded in 1880 by Samuel Woodward and Alvin Lothrop who made their 
name through the one price marking system, eliminating sales person haggling.  The 
downtown store on F Street in the nation's capital became famous for its opulence, 
including the introduction of live models, concerts and even a radio broadcasting station.  
It took off in the 1920s and 1930s, serving the growing army of government employees in 
Washington DC and opening its first suburban store in 1950 in Chevy Chase. By the time 
of the union election in 1979, the company owned 14 stores and two warehouses spread 
over the metropolitan area.
24
 
In 1979, Woodward & Lothrop stood just on the cusp of the discount store 
retail revolution.  It was one of the nation’s last independent department stores.  Four 
major firms owned the majority of the nation’s department stores:  May Company, 
Federated, Allied, and Dayton Hudson.
25
  Neither Wal-Mart nor upper-scale stores, 
like Nordstrom’s and Macy’s, had a presence yet in the Washington DC area, and 
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Woodies occupied a kind of middle-ground between upscale Garfinkel’s and the 
lower-end Hecht’s.
26
   It brought in a new President, Edwin K. Hoffman, in 1969, 
replacing family management. 
27
 By 1978, Hoffman had successfully revamped the 
stores, jettisoning departments like hardware in which the discount stores were clearly 
beating Woodies, and getting out of budget fashion entirely.
28
  This publicly-owned 
store was doing well by 1979. The company’s net margin had nearly doubled in the 
previous six years to 4.6 percent, well above the median figure of 2.4 percent for the 
department store industry and making it the most profitable of the leading department 
store companies.
29
  The company boasted in its annual report that 1979 marked “the 
greatest increase in our market share in recent times.”
30
 
Woodies did not pass this profit on to its workers.  When Woodies felt squeezed 
by the industry competition, it followed the discounters’ lead and squeezed workers. Rosa 
Halsey and her co-workers thus began organizing, signing union cards starting in January 
of 1979.  A survey commissioned by the union at the outset of the campaign revealed that 
top issues among workers were, in order, health and pension benefits, job security and 
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increased wages. “To me, it meant better benefits, better pay, better working hours, better 
working conditions.  I didn’t see any reason not to support it,” recalls Adam Mathias, a 
young white clerk at the Montgomery Mall store’s luggage department.
31
 
 Woodies’ workers had little access to the kinds of fringe benefits that filled in the 
gaps left by the patchwork U.S. social welfare state.  Though technically, full-time 
Woodies workers had access to health benefits and pensions, workers remember that 
mostly white-collar managers received these benefits, and part-timers were excluded.
32
 
Only a quarter of Woodies’ employees, including managers, were part of the group 
hospitalization plan; only 1500 out of 8000 total active employees were covered by 
Woodies’ retirement plan.
33
  Top managers had contracts, including stock options and 
severance guarantees, but Woodward and Lothrop’s rank-and-file were far more 
dependent on management’s whims when it came to their economic security.
34
 
Rampant inflation cut deeply into Woodies workers’ earnings, 68 percent of 
whom had family incomes of less than $18,000 a year in 1979, a level below what the 
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federal government considered an “intermediate budget” for the Washington, DC area.
35
 
“Back then, they did not give good raises.  They just did not.  Your raises depended on 




 Job security was a recurrent theme among workers who wanted protection 
against unjust firings and favoritism.  Two-fifths reported that had been hassled by their 
supervisors or department heads.  “If you made a mistake, it was like you killed 
somebody, but the other person, if they made a mistake, it’s all well and good,” 
remembered Barbara Cash, a merchandise receiver in the downtown warehouse. “If you 
didn’t belong to a union the company could say, “you’re fired” if you did something they 
didn’t think you should be doing.”
37
   
Not everyone thought the workers needed a union, however.  Frank Wright, a 
group leader in major appliances at the Lakeforest store, argued that “They treat 
their…employees fair.  The pay is better than other operations and the benefits are much 
better.  There is room for advancement for good people from within.”
38
  Woodies 
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workers, overall, reported that they liked their company and were proud to work for it.  A 




New Workers Knocking On Old Doors  
Like the Newport News and Cannon Mills workers, many of the Woodies workers who 
sought security through a strong union contract were representative of America’s 
diversifying workforce.  Black workers had long been excluded from retail sales jobs, but 
during the 1970s the percentage of black working women in sales increased even as that 
of white women decreased slightly.
40
  By 1979 a quarter of Woodies’ non-supervisory 
workforce was African-American, and three-quarters of the workers were female.  Black 
workers were far more likely than whites to support the union, as were young women, 
especially those supporting a family alone. Almost half of the workers were young, under 
the age of 35, and this group supported the union most strongly.
 41
   These workers fought 
for access to the strongest economic security that was available to them as working-class 
Americans – a union contract.   
Like the Newport News workers, workers at Woodies had to first overcome an 
independent union that had been set up in the 1930s as what one shipyard worker aptly 
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termed a “union stopper.”
42
   As at Newport News, though unions had tried numerous 
times to organize a new local union at the department store, it was a workforce with 
changed demographics that gave the RCIU the grassroots momentum to mount an 
effective challenge.  The independent union had been born in a Woodward & Lothrop 
Board of Directors’ meeting in 1937 soon after the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America (ACWA) union president Sidney Hillman announced that the CIO would launch 
an industry-wide drive in department stores.
43
  Luke Wilson, a member of the Board of 
Directors, suggested a company union when the directors fretted that the CIO was a 
“communistic” threat to the esteemed store.  Management had long opposed unions and 
Woodies had been on the local Coalition of Labor Unions’ unfair list for 20 years by 
then. When a delegation from the Washington League of Women Shoppers asked Donald 
Woodward’s position on the union in 1937, he told them the company would not stand 
for domination by unions and hoped soon to have a company union.
44
  
The first unions to challenge Woodies in the fall of 1937, however, were not those 
of Hillman’s CIO department store group.  Rather, the AFL’s Building Service 
Employees Local #82 sought to represent the majority-black unit of janitors, and the 
Painters union picketed Woodies because it refused to hire union painters.   Soon after, 
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the promised company union emerged.  Charles Davis, a supervisor who one NLRB 
official noted “had never before been interested in any labor organization,” began to 
circulate a petition to start a company union. The petition came as a shock to employees.  
The new union collected initiation fees and dues, and set up a new constitution with 
nineteen long-service employees serving as the Executive Committee.  The constitution 
required everyone to join. The company allowed the group to sign up members while 
they worked and to hold meetings on the property, while refusing the AFL unions similar 
access.  The NLRB found in 1938 that the Association of Woodlothian Employees was 
an illegal union, company-directed, and ordered it disbanded.  As in the Newport News 
case, however, the organization simply ducked and wove.  It changed its name and then 
won official NLRB sanction through an election in 1940 as the Union of Woodward & 
Lothrop Employees.
45
   
The employee organization hung on for another 39 years, beating out a 1947 
challenge by the RCIA-backed Department Store Council by a two-to one margin.  
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Though workers sometimes expressed interest in organizing with a more potent union, 
the independent union continued to officially represent the workers, often signing one-
year contracts with small increases.   The company continued to develop anti-union 
tactics, even while letting the in-house union do its job.  For instance, it enlisted George 
Washington University psychology professors to survey workers as a means of ferreting 
out dissatisfaction, the kind of soft anti-union tactic pioneered by Sears Roebuck and 
described by historian Sanford Jacoby.
46
   
The workforce, however, began to change in the 1960s, and the black and young 
workers were more willing to challenge the company and its union than had been workers 
in previous generations.  In the 1950s, black workers had access to few jobs at Woodies.   
“If you are colored, you start here in uniform as a maid or porter.  After 20 years, you’re 
still in uniform,” summed up one black worker in 1956.
47
   Yet by the late 1950s, the 
company found itself in the crosshairs of savvy civil rights leaders who served as de facto 
labor leaders for the black community, especially since so many unions still excluded 
black workers.  In the fall of 1957, ministers who led the local NAACP were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to persuade Woodies to hire black sales clerks for the 
holiday season.  The following spring, however, the group persuaded the black 
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community to boycott Woodies for a day.  Woodies finally employed 80 black women to 
wrap packages in the 1958 holiday season.  They were the first black people to serve 
customers in any Washington area department store, outside the tea rooms.
48
 “They knew 
the change was coming,” remembers Patricia Gilliam, one of those African-American 
women first hired to wrap, noting they did it “to keep people in the stores…it had a lot to 
do with civil rights.”
49
 However, not until after the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) 
got involved in negotiations with the company in 1961 did the company finally hire four 
sales women for the holiday season.
50
  Woodies then expanded its black hiring in the 
mid-1960s faster than did other local firms.
51
 Leola Dixon was working as a housekeeper 
at the downtown store when Woodward & Lothrop tapped her to be one of the store’s 
first black sales associates.  “I was so nervous and I just stood behind the register” in the 
flowers and gifts department, remembers Dixon, until an older white supervisor kindly 
encouraged her to step forward and help the customers.
52
  
The women workers at Woodies provided impetus for the effort to throw off the 
old, ineffective union, and they made that decision amidst the women’s movement 
sweeping the nation around them.  “Women were waking up in the 70s,” remembers 
Glenda Spencer-Marshall, a unionized discount store worker who served as a rank-and-
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file organizer on the campaign. She remembers that women like those at Woodies 
“decided they wanted more and decided that they would have to be the ones to get 
more.”
53
  Women had long served as sales clerks and starting in the early twentieth 
century, department stores trained and shaped women to become professional 
saleswomen.  After World-War II, many women found jobs in the burgeoning suburban 
shopping malls, often ringing up clothes and perfume on a part-time basis while their 
children were at school during the day.
54
  When women moved en masse into U.S. 
workplaces in the 1970s, a great many followed that well-worn path and took up 
positions behind cash registers.  After all, sales offered a flexible job for working mothers 
and a familiar space to many women.
55
    The year of the Woodies election, 1979, marked 
the first year that more than half of U.S. women worked for wages, and a full quarter of 
the eleven million women who joined the workforce in the preceding ten years took jobs 
in retail trade.
56
 However, four-fifths of these women were stuck in the lower ranks of 
sales clerks and service, and could not easily access the higher sales positions - - like 
sales representatives.  The women were also far more likely than the men to work part-
time.
57
  The women at Woodies wanted a union, in part, so that they could have more 
control over their schedules as working mothers, and so that even as part-timers, they 
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could access full benefits.
58
  If their feet were going to be glued to the lowest rungs of the 
job ladder, they at least wanted to be better paid.    The women at Woodies hoped to use 
the union as a tool to shape their feminized work experience.   
The older department store workforce had not been willing to challenge the status 
quo.  After a 1970 department store organizing effort failed in nearby Baltimore, one 
organizer noted, “The department stores for many years have had many widows and older 
people convinced that they are one big happy family…it’s difficult to convince them that 
they have rights.”
59
 By the end of the 1970s, the scale had tipped in the other direction, 
and a new working class at Woodies viewed its rights with fresh eyes.  
Arthur Banks, an African-American loading dock supervisor, noticed the change 
in the younger generation, and supported it as best he could.  Even though he was a 
supervisor, he surreptitiously backed their union efforts. Banks remembers that the group 
pushing the union was different from his generation because the younger workers had 
grown up in an integrated world and had a different understanding of their rights 
following the Civil and Women’s rights movement.  “They were just more outspoken.  
They didn’t really care about the repercussions of getting fired.”
60
  Like Archie Bunker 
from the All in the Family television series, Banks worked as a loading-dock supervisor.  
Though a number of historians find the fictional Archie Bunker’s conservatism 
representative of the late 1970s working class, Banks’s support for young workers’ 
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organizing efforts serves as a reminder much of the real working class was open to liberal 




How to Win a Union  
Like Edward Coppedge and the other originators of the Newport News steelworkers 
union, Wilbur Reed was an African-American man who had once been active in the 
independent union but who helped launch the drive for a new union.  A company bus 
driver who shuttled workers between warehouses and stores, Reed knew everyone, and 
once served as the independent union’s president.
62
  Reed, however, was dissatisfied with 
the paltry raises the independent union could win, and with the fact that the workers had 
no right to outside arbitration to deal with grievances.   During the 1979 campaign, he fed 
Local 400 (an RCIA affiliate) information about the workforce and worked behind the 
scenes to support it.
63
   
The union first attempted to sign up Woodies workers in 1976. 
64
  Local 400, 
however, could not convince the NLRB to allow it to hold separate elections among 
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warehouse workers, like Reed, and those at the individual stores where it found support.
65
  
This was a typical dilemma for retail workers who wanted a union by the 1970s.   As 
retail chains grew in size and importance, the nation’s legal structure needed to adapt to 
the industry’s changes.  Would workers at one chain store or fast food joint be allowed to 
form their own union, or would they be forced to try to unite with workers at various 
stores who they may have never met before, spread across a vast urban area?  In the early 
1960s, the Kennedy-appointed NLRB leaned toward allowing workers in small units to 
form their own unions, deciding in the Sav-On Drugs case that union elections did not 
have to follow the same jurisdictional lines adopted by the parent company’s mega-
structures.
66
  Employers, however, hated this interpretation.  The Chamber of Commerce, 
for example, in 1966 singled out unit-size as one of the issues that the Labor Law Reform 
Group should address, demanding that the NLRB favor the employer’s administrative 
structure when determining who could vote in a union election.
67
  The Nixon-appointed 
board gave the employers what they asked for.  In a 1971 precedent-setting case, it 
decided that a group of McDonald’s workers could not form a union at their restaurant - - 
they had to be included in a larger group of McDonald’s restaurants also owned by a 
regional conglomerate called Twenty-first Century Restaurant.
68
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Thus, by 1976 Local 400 was forced to try to organize across all stores and 
warehouses at Woodies, and with only a few organizers on staff, it could not get enough 
workers to sign union cards to warrant a vote.  However, the union worked with activists 
to try to take over the independent union’s board and then to force a merger with Local 
400.  It did not work.  Instead, the board elected a strong company supporter as president 
of the independent union, Natalie Koeling.
69
  If Woodies workers were going to have a 
union with Local 400, they were going to have to do it the hard way - - by winning what 
would be the Washington, DC area’s largest union election in history, and by taking on 
the Washington area’s largest private-sector employer. 
70
  
Thomas McNutt, the president of Local 400, was just crazy and ambitious enough 
to help them try.  A young upstart within the RCIU, McNutt came out of the Michigan 
district council and quickly rose through the union’s ranks.  McNutt won the local’s 
presidency in 1975 after having served as its headquarter-appointed trustee, and made 
waves by negotiating top-notch contracts with full health benefits and by prioritizing 
organizing.
71
  “Our philosophy is never to be satisfied with what is,” said McNutt. 
72
  
McNutt knew that the Woodies independent union’s contract would expire again in 1979, 
thus opening a window of time during which workers could legally switch unions.  This 
time, he began amassing an army of organizers well in advance, calling on colleagues and 
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allies throughout the union to send their own staff his way in 1978.
73
  The international 
union sent McNutt one of its top strategists, Jack Adams, to head the campaign.  McNutt 
also recruited and trained union members from within the local to help on the drive.
74
 
January 22, 1979 found 200 staff members and rank-and-file volunteers spread 
out across Woodies’ 14 stores and two warehouses in the Washington, DC area, 
including stores in suburban Maryland and Virginia.  The organizers synchronized their 
watches and at exactly 4:30 p.m., they started working their way from the top floor down 
through the department store levels, handing out handbills and passing out union cards.  
Managers scurried behind them collecting the papers.
75
    
Each of the Woodies stores and warehouses had different kinds of workers with 
their own unique concerns and issues.  Some of the suburban stores employed mostly 
older white workers who were more concerned about retirement issues, for instance, 
whereas the workforce at the Washington, DC warehouse on M Street was nearly all 
African-American and mostly young.  Pay and treatment were the biggest issues there.
76
  
The union approached this puzzle by building a balkanized organizing structure that gave 
each team a fair amount of autonomy.  In effect, it chose to run 16 different campaigns, 
assigning a team of organizers and volunteers to each store and distribution center, trying 
to match the staff demographics to that of each facility.  Each team was free to create and 
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distribute its own literature, drive its own message and call frequent meetings, often in a 
hotel suite or the shopping mall’s bar.
77
   
The loose structure offered room for surprises, such as discovering a union hot 
bed in cosmetics.  Though workers who work for on commission are notorious for being 
the least supportive of a union, the teams at Prince George’s and Montgomery malls 
found that the commissioned women in those cosmetics departments were particularly 
interested in having a union because they wanted more control over rates of pay.  “Pretty 
soon those girls were our shock troops,” reported one organizer.  When it became clear 
that the commissioned men in suits were “totally scared to death,” the cosmetics union 
flotilla would float behind the racks to talk with them, and soon many of the men signed 
up for the union.
78
 
At the M Street warehouse, supervisors faced a tidal wave of union support, and 
attempted to shut down all union activity.  They banned workers from signing union 
cards on the warehouse floor – something that they were within their legal rights to do.  A 
group of women workers, however, outmaneuvered their male bosses by turning the 
ladies’ restroom into a union safe house where they could sign cards. When they ran out 
of union cards, they called out to organizers for more through the chicken-wire-covered 
windows in the bathroom.  The organizers rolled up the cards and shoved them through 
the wire, and the women poked them back out once signed.  “They were giggling and 
                                                             
77 Earman interview; Lowthers interview; “Woodward & Lothrop – Supplemental Notes,” Box 9, Folder 
23, Kistler papers; Mathias interview.   
78 Brown interview; Polak, “Organizing Case Study:  Woodward & Lothrop, Washington DC,” quote from 




laughing, and I know supervisors knew what was happening but there wasn’t anything 




A thousand workers signed union cards in the first four days of the campaign.  
Hundreds more signed cards in the following weeks in meetings, parking lots, garages 
and surreptitiously on the shop floor. “You hide behind the rack of clothes or you go in 
the store room,” when told not to organize on the shop floor, remembered Adam 
Mathias.
80
  Nearly a third of the workers who signed cards sent them through the mail. 
The union petitioned for an election with about 3,400 cards on April 3, 1979, the earliest 
date on which it could make a legal claim to challenge the independent union.
81
 Two days 
later the company and the union filed nearly identical challenges to the union’s pet ition 
alleging that the union had used improper methods to get signatures, and the independent 
union filed a civil suit demanding a quarter of a million dollars in damages to compensate 
for costs incurred by the drive. The union’s lawyer remembers that the charges were 
weak and the union’s legal team easily got them dismissed. 
82
   
The management of Woodies did not run a scorched earth assault on the union in 
the vein of the Cannon Mills campaigns. Rather, it walked a fine line between the union 
busting tactics that were becoming de rigeur for employers at the time, and a more 
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paternalistic tone that matched the dignified public image Woodies carefully cultivated.  
“It’s kind of like they went to a management library and got a notebook that has all the 
typical … boiler-plate stuff,” remembers Michael Earman, an organizer on the campaign. 
A letter from the company’s president to workers was a typical attempt to paint the union 
as an outside third-party:  “I personally feel that the treatment you and this Company are 
receiving from this union (Local 400) is offensive…I encourage you to report to your 
personnel office when…you have been intimidated, harassed or in any way interfered 
with.”
83
 Management ran an inconsistent campaign, pleading that workers trust the 
company to have the workers’ best interest at heart.   The company held captive audience 
meetings - - mandatory anti-union meetings - - but the tone was civil and non-
threatening. “It was politely put, that they wanted to make sure you knew what Woodies 
had to offer,” remembers Rosa Halsey, who attended such meetings in the flagship 
store.
84
   
Front-line supervisors turned out to be key to the company’s campaign.  Woodies 
relied on supervisors to carry a “neither union” message to their employees, urging them 
to let employees know that unions would hurt the company.  Labor law did not permit 
them to support either union publicly.
85
  Both the company and the union, however, knew 
that many supervisors supported Local 400 because if the rank-and-file workers got a 
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raise, so would the supervisors.
86
  Arthur Banks, the loading dock supervisor, made quiet, 
positive comments about the union to some of his staff though he knew his platform 
supervisor “might have balled me out.” 
87
   At many other companies, supervisors would 
be unlikely to have even this sort of soft latitude.  Most employers followed the advice 
laid out by one self-styled management guru in 1981 to fire promptly any supervisor who 
“does not possess or acquire the requisite leadership capacity and is unable to grasp and 
comply with the union-free concepts.”
88
    
Woodies, however, still had one foot in the old way of doing things.  If Woodies 
had run a more vigorous campaign, with the kinds of threats and intimidation that were so 
common by the late 1980s and 1990s, it is much less likely that the workers would have 
won their union.  Instead, Woodies did not even hire the Shawe & Rosenthal anti-union 
firm until six weeks before the election, and chose not to run as vigorous a campaign as 
that same law firm ran at the Hecht’s warehouse in the early 1980s, for instance.  
Woodward & Lothrop company archives shed no light on the company’s motivations for 
running a less threatening anti-union campaign.   One union staffer’s speculations, 
however, offer one explanation.  The company’s president, Hoffman, had served as 
president of the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, a kind of mini-chamber of 
commerce for retail employers, which included unionized employers like grocery stores, 
and they may advised him against a fierce campaign.
89
  “Ultimately, there were enough 
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people … that were friends of Hoffman and they convinced him that Local 400 was not 
bad… at that time it had a very good relationship with the owners of Giant Food,” 
remembers union organizer Earman. 
90
  Whatever the immediate motivation, Woodies’ 
decision to run a lighter anti-union campaign serves as reminder that even by the late 
1970s, corporations’ anti-union stances were not yet so absolute as they would be a 
decade later.  Unions still held great sway and union-busting was still considered 
unseemly for so prestigious an institution as Woodward & Lothrop’s.  After all, the 
company carefully had cultivated that rarified reputation over many decades among its 
clientele.  Woodies thus proved itself to be on the more cautious end of the spectrum of 
corporate anti-union development in the late 1970s.   
Woodies’ relatively weak campaign meant that when young Woodies workers 
brought new consciousness about their rights - - as blacks, as women, as workers - - into 
the workplace, they had a more open playing field than would workers who faced the full 
brunt of 1980s anti-union tactics.  Having finally gotten the kinds of jobs from which 
they had long been excluded, they felt fairly free to organize.  They would never have felt 
this freedom at other retailers in the 1980s and 1990s, such as at Wal-Mart. The absence 
of a full anti-union campaign at Woodies gives us a glimpse of the kind of future that 
might have met the new working class forged in the 1970s if it had not faced the sort of 
increased employer resistance described in chapter three.  
  Local 400 organizers were able to run a high-road campaign that capitalized on 
the momentum generated by this young and energetic workforce. The union 
commissioned an opinion polling firm to survey the workers in March, and they were 
                                                             




surprised to learn that a majority of workers generally liked working for Woodies, though 
they were dissatisfied with the pay and benefits. Organizers decided to run a campaign 
that stuck to a positive message.
91
 It was a strategy that resonated with Rosa Halsey, who 
looked forward to going across the street after work to the union’s store-front union 
office where she met with the organizers who she found to be “truthful and upfront.”
92
  
Even Woodies’ soft anti-union tactics, however, were enough to scare a number of the 
workers, and the union struggled with how to show that it was building support.  One day 
organizers passed out glow-in-the-dark key chains, shaped as “#1”, emblazoned with the 
local’s slogan.  The key chains were a hit, and the “#1” theme began to permeate the 
campaign. It became a mechanism for workers to embrace the union without aggressive 
sloganeering. When organizers at the Springfield mall were banned from leafleting, they 
had shopping bags printed up with a “#1” on the side and handed them to shoppers so 
employees would see them throughout the store.  The union ordered several thousand 
“#1” golden pins - - a trendy designer trinket at the time - - and workers wore them on 
their lapels as they served customers. 
93
   
The union even rode the momentum generated by the 1979 smash box office hit, 
Norma Rae.  The union secured a Dupont Circle movie theater, and hired shuttle buses to 
ferry workers to two private showings.  Four buses went from the downtown store and 
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  Norma Rae portrayed a strong female protagonist leading a Southern 
textile labor struggle, and her story resonated strongly with the heavily-female Woodies 
crowd.  Like Norma Rae, they were yoking their challenges as a new breed of working 
women to those of union activists.   
The women and men who worked at Woodies wanted a union so that they could 
win more economic security from their employer in the insecure times of the late 1970s.  
Health and retirement benefits were of utmost importance to them, as were raises.  The 
union thus led its message with its greatest strength, featuring its strong local contracts at 
other retailers like the men’s clothing store, Raleigh’s, the discount store, Memco, and 
the unionized grocery chains.  There, the local had won fully-employer paid health 
benefits, often including dental and eye care, and robust retirement plans and wage 
increases.
95
  Through leaflets, meetings and conversations, they showed the Woodies 
workers what could be possible with a union.  They even invited workers from Woodies 




Health insurance played a pivotal role on the campaign.  Workers were already 
angry with the company for requiring high employee co-pays, and many part-timers 
resented not having access to the benefits.  A few weeks before the date of the election, 
the union unearthed the forms that employers were required to file with the government 
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about their employee benefits.  They revealed that the company had not been rebating to 
the workers the money it received when there were extra funds in the company insurance 
account at the end of the fiscal year.  The union publicized the missing funds, and though 
the company called the union’s claims “hogwash,” it chose to rebate the money, cutting 
individual workers checks for as much as 75 dollars.
97
  The union claimed victory under 
the headline, “Look What Local 400 Just Won for You!”
98
  “The best thing they could 
have said was nothing,” remembered Brown.  “That was admitting… you got caught with 
your finger in the cookie jar.”
99
 
As the date of the union election approached in June, the vote took on a special 
meaning for Local 400’s parent union.  The RCIU spent an unprecedented two million 
dollars on the campaign.  “This meant unlimited personnel, payroll…  We were able to 
max big money,” remembers Samuel Meyers a long-time vice president of the union.
100
  
The election would take place just a couple weeks after the RCIU’s merger with the 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters to form the new United Food and Commercial Workers 
union (UFCW).  The new union would have 1.3 million members, ranking this retail and 
food union as one of the nation’s largest, comparable to those in auto and steel.  The new 
president had high hopes of making the newly-minted UFCW the face of the union 
movement’s future.  He envisioned organizing the new kinds of workers who were the 
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future of the economy: retail, banking, insurance, and finance.
101
  The Woodies election 
would be the first test.   
The day of the election dawned bright and hot, and found Rosa Halsey brimming 
with hope.  “I felt good, I felt like this was going to happen.”
102
  Employees walked into 
the M Street warehouse, pointing number one with their fingers, and sales clerks wore 
their gold pins as a display of solidarity.  Workers went into the election knowing that 
another large, local group of workers had recently ousted their own long-standing 
independent union at the Potomac Electric Power Company (Pepco).
103
  Woodward & 
Lothrop sales clerks, order fillers and others filed into employee break rooms to vote all 
day long.   
That afternoon, the NLRB agents sealed all the ballot boxes and then took them to 
the NLRB headquarters on L Street where they co-mingled all the ballots, and started to 
count the ballots, one-by-one.  By evening, nearly a hundred workers and organizers 
gathered anxiously outside that office.   A couple hundred workers, meanwhile, came 
together at a rented hall at the Ramada Inn in Alexandria, Virginia in order. Many sported 
their “#1” union t-shirts while they anxiously waited.  As a waiter made the rounds with 
relishes and fried chicken, the long-anticipated phone call came through.   Union 
supporters danced for joy when they got word of their win, hugging one another in a huge 
mass and shouting “We’re Number One!”  The workers had voted for Local 400 by a 
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huge margin: 2407 votes for Local 400, 600 votes for the independent union and 973 
votes for no union.
104
 “I just can’t wait for tomorrow,” said one sales woman from 





The First Contract: Securing Full Prosperity 
Winning the election was the first step for the workers at Woodward & Lothrop who 
sought to secure full prosperity within the U.S.’s employer-based social welfare system.   
However, the election victory merely put a state-backed mandate behind the employer’s 
obligation to bargain with its workers.  Workers still had to get a first contract.  By the 
late 1980s, a full third of workers who won a union election never got a first contract, in 
large part because employers increasingly gamed the system.  Consultants counseled 
employers to drag their feet, pointing out that the law was so weak that the threat of 
penalties was negligible, so employers should do all they could to stop the union from 
ever getting an agreement.
106
  Newport News had taken such advice, and dragged out its 
first negotiations through a number of courts.    What path would Woodward & Lothrop 
follow in negotiations?  
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In the end, Woodies chose a middle path and exploited a key Achilles heel in the 
late 20
th
 century union movement: the “right to work” Sunbelt.  Woodies was in a rather 
unique position of having workers spread out over Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, 
DC.  Virginia was what was commonly known as a “right to work” state, which meant 
that employers and unions could not negotiate a union security clause requiring all 
workers to either join the union or pay union dues.  Maryland and Washington, DC, 
however, allowed such clauses, which were standard fare in the state’s union contracts.   
Woodies chose a strategy reflecting that of the National Right to Work Committee 
and painted itself as the protector of individual workers’ rights.  The National Right to 
Work committee had seized on the legalistic strain of individual rights consciousness in 
the 1970s that grew out of the Civil Rights movement and adapted it to its fight against 
collective bargaining.
107
 Hoffman refused to sign a union security clause for any of the 
workers, saying “my concern is the employee.” He effectively used language privileging 
individual rights in his efforts to defeat the workers’ collective class power.
108
  “It was 
this plantation mentality,” remembered the union’s lawyer.  “The great protector of 
employees is not the union but the employer who is there to look out for his charges.”
109
 
The National Right to Work Committee sought to bolster Woodies efforts, sending out a 
letter to all area newspapers asserting that, “We hope that braced by Virginia’s Right to 
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Work law, the company managers will not continue to surrender the rights of 
employees.”
110
   
Local 400 faced a real dilemma.  The loss of a union security clause would 
weaken the union for years to come as it would be forced to constantly shepherd 
workers into the union, one by one.  In many ways, this was the same dilemma that 
the union movement faced writ large as employers fled the more unionized Northern 
states after Taft-Hartley allowed so-called “right to work” states.  Local 400 could not 
afford to have the entire newly-organized unit follow the way of the Sunbelt.
111
   
The union held fast in negotiations and used the contract fight as a way to 
further mobilize the workers.  Whereas workers had not even been allowed to vote on 
the contract with the old independent union, they were very involved in the new 
negotiations.    Employees from each store met separately to discuss the issues that 
mattered most, and elected a group to join the 150-person advisory board that 
supported the negotiating team.  One worker from each store went into negotiations 
with the staff.
112
   By the time negotiations broke down over the union security issue 
on Halloween, the union had done enough rank-and-file education that hundreds 
gathered at the downtown Constitution Hall and voted to strike unanimously if they 
could not get an agreement.  The following week, a federal mediator stepped in.   
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The result was a compromise, a “modified” union security clause, 
grandfathering workers in Maryland and Washington, DC to a “right to work” status.  
Current workers in those states would not have to join the union, but new employees 
would.  Virginia workers would not be required to join the union.
113
   The agreement 
meant that while the workers got their contract, the local would always have a non-
union cadre in its midst, and would never grow strong in Virginia.  In fact, it would 
lose representation rights there when the company passed to new ownership in the 
1990s.
114
  Local 400 had one foot squarely in the Sunbelt and, despite its best efforts, 
it could not avoid the weak footing forced by the “right to work” status which plagued 
the entire union movement.   
Twelve hundred Woodies workers packed into an auditorium of the Shoreham 
Americana hotel for the contract ratification meeting.  They lined up at microphones 
to discuss the provisions, which included at least eight percent wage increases a year 
for three years, with most workers receiving at least a dollar or more an hour over the 
life of the contract. It broadened health care coverage and lowered co-pays, increased 
vacation days, and provided for free eye and dental care by the third year of the 
contract.
115
 (Part-time workers gained access to health benefits more incrementally in 
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 For a workforce concerned about security, the contract was a 
boon.  It included a full grievance procedure and mandatory third-party arbitration, 
which meant that if the union and company could not agree, they could rely on a 
third-party.  The workers ratified their new contract with a nearly unanimous vote.
117
   
If Woodies workers had worked in England, France or Germany, they already 
would have had greater job security and state-provided health care.  Woodies' workers 
had to win that kind of basic social provision through their union contract.  Fifty 
Woodies workers stepped into leadership roles as stewards, a group fully 
representative of the racial and gender mix of the workforce. They went to workshops 
to learn how to enforce their new contract.
118
   Job security was key.  For instance, 
they used their contract to help a silver polisher, Clarence Mills, who lost his job 
when Woodies closed its metal engraving department. The union pushed to get him a 
job in suits, and it also successfully helped John Thomas win his job back at the 
distribution center when he was fired for being 15 minutes late.
119
  Local 400 had a 
health and welfare fund for unionized grocery store workers that provided actual 
health services, like dental and optical, at the union’s building, and built its own 
network of doctors.  Although Woodies' workers were not part of that fund, union 
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members and their families could now access its networks and go to the union 
building to get discounted health services. The union was effectively playing the role 
of a social welfare provider. 
120
 
Workers also used their contract to shore up their power on the shop floor. The 
company began to educate its managers on how to honor workers’ rights under a 
union contract.  It was a big change for a management team that was used to having 
free rein on the shop floor. On one “complaint and grievance” checklist, top 
management instructed supervisors to “listen patiently. Don’t interrupt.  Consider the 
effect of your decision on the individual, your total group…don’t pass the buck.”
121
 
Rosa Halsey remembers having to step in as a steward to help a young clerk when a 
supervisor vociferously yelled at her about not paying bills on time: “The young lady 
was crying, trying to explain to her that she’d just gotten the mail.”  Halsey got upper 
management involved to help straighten the disagreement out. “You don’t get to do 





The Woodies workers won their union on the cusp of major changes in the retail 
industry and the U.S. economy.  Over the next two decades, multinational 
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corporations would harness the power of technology and globalization to drive 
working standards down to a new low. Though Woodies workers would not be 
directly pitted against overseas workers, as were the Cannon workers, they all served 
as labor links in the new retail-manufacturing structure that would define the late 
20th-century economy.  Globalization did more than just offer new international 
competition that shifted jobs overseas.  It fundamentally reorganized the roles that 
firms played, and created what scholars have called “commodity chains” or 
“channels” in which retail-based transnational corporations drove the design, 
manufacture and sale of goods which were geographically dispersed across the 
globe.
123
  Those global changes were coming, but the terms on which they would 
come were determined by the decisions made by employers, unions and the state.  
When employers faced a newly-energized workforce, most fought workers’ 
unionizing efforts with tremendous vigor, and they did so with a freer hand as the 
state weakened support for organizing.  Workers thus entered a retail-based global 
economy on much weaker ground than they might have if the new, union-minded 
workforce had been able to organize.   
Though retail workers in the 1970s and early 1980s were trying to organize 
unions  - - such as at Montgomery Ward, Dillon Company, and Caldor’s - -  most met 
with increased employer resistance.  The fate of workers at another Washington, DC 
area department store, Hecht’s, is instructive.  After the Woodward & Lothrop 
workers won their union, workers at the Hecht’s distribution center on New York 
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Avenue filed for, but then lost, several NLRB elections.
124
  Hecht’s hired the same 
Baltimore-based “anti-union” consultant as had Woodward & Lothrop.  Shawe & 
Rosenthal ran a no-holds barred campaign at Hecht’s, a campaign that illustrates the 
way that lawyers learned to bend an increasingly malleable labor law.  For instance, a 
1981 memo reveals that Shawe worked the NLRB process to ensure that “as a matter 
of campaign strategy” the union election was scheduled one week before the annual 
pay raise.  Shawe explained to company management that they could not blatantly 
threaten to take away the annual raise if the workers voted for a union, citing a 1976 
precedent in which the board sanctioned Montgomery Ward for doing just that.  
Instead, Shawe told the company exactly what words they could use to convey the 
threat in a legal way: “If the Company wins the election, we will be able to continue 
our past practice.  If the Union wins the election, the Company could not lawfully 
implement a wage increase here unilaterally but would have to negotiate that matter 
with the Union.  We want to insure you of the Company’s firm intention to comply 
with its legal responsibilities in this matter, as we do in all others.”
125
   In case the 
intent was not clear, Shawe & Rosenthal drove home the idea that workers could 
count on nothing.  One Q&A style leaflet asked, “If the union wins the election, will 
the law compel the Company to reach an agreement with the union?”  Answer: 
“Absolutely not!  The Company does not have to agree to a single thing the union 
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proposes so long as we bargain in good faith.”
126
   The law firm built a two-month 
campaign for Hecht’s that ran from the time the workers won the right to an election 
until the date of the election.   The campaign schedule reveals that each week workers 
were forced to endure several “events” such as one of thirteen leaflets, twelve 
different posters, home mailings, paycheck stuffers, mandatory meetings and constant 
supervisor one-on-one discussions. 
127
 Typical “legal” threats included a leaflet that 
asked, "If the union calls a strike and I go out on strike, can I lose my job?” Answer: 
“YES!  Under the law, if the union calls a strike to try to force the Company to agree 
to the union’s economic demands the Company is free to permanently replace the 
strikers.  This means that if you are replaced in such a strike you cannot reclaim your 
job, after the strike is over.”
128
   The firm got particular traction among Hecht’s 
workers by driving home a threat of layoffs, a top concern of retail workers as the 
industry moved to more contingent employment models. A letter from the General 
Manager of the warehouse read:  “All of you know that Hecht’s has a policy of 
providing steady employment for Regular Associates…I have read Retail Clerks’ 
contracts and I haven’t seen one contract  - - not one - - that doesn’t provide for 
employee layoffs.  Every single contract spells out the way to lay off employees.  That 
is what can happen in a union company.”
129
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Finally, Hecht’s feared that the Woodies workers’ union victory could spread 
to their own company, like a virus.  The company made sure to match the wages and 
benefits won by Local 400, thus building a bulwark against the union while helping to 
lift the area’s wages.  The law firm prepared a letter that Hecht’s President and board 
Chairman sent out to workers three days before the election saying as much:  “We 
have committed to you in writing that Hecht’s will provide you with wages and 
benefits equal to or better than competitive department stores - - like Woodies.  We 
have fulfilled our commitment and will continue to do so… With the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union, Woodward & Lothrop employees have BOTH – the risk 
of a strike and the payment of union dues.” 
130
  The Woodward & Lothrop workers 
did not have to face these sorts of aggressive threats and harassments.  Thus, they 
were able to find refuge in their union when upheaval and mergers hit the industry in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
The storm of changes in the retail industry hit Woodward & Lothrop with 
great force. By the mid-1980s, the company found it increasingly difficult to maintain 
its market share in the face of increased competition.  When management faced the 
possibility of a hostile takeover from a corporate raider, Edwin Hoffman pushed 
through a leveraged buyout by Al Taubman, a shopping center magnate from Detroit.  
He did so over the objections of the family shareholders who fought back in a highly-
public shareholder vote battle.
131
  Taubman then used Woodies to buy out 
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Philadelphia’s Wannamaker stores, which left Woodward & Lothrop too strapped for 
cash to be able to continually update merchandise.  Meanwhile, Nordstrom’s and 
Macy’s entered the Washington, DC area, joining K-Mart and, eventually, Target and 
Wal-Mart in the outer suburbs.
132
  By 1995, Woodward & Lothrop could no longer 
compete and began looking for a buyer among the retail giants.
133
     
Woodies workers thus joined the thousands of retail workers who faced 
department store consolidations and pressure from discounters in the 1990s. Woodies 
workers, however, successfully used their union to secure their future.  When 
Federated and May Company began a bidding war over Woodward & Lothrop in mid-
1995, the union could have just scrambled for access to diminishing funds in 
bankruptcy court, doing battle with suppliers and buyers.  Instead, the union declared 
that the workers wanted to be considered as a buyer.  The union’s lawyer remembers 
that the union never really had the funds to build a worker-owned corporation.  
Nevertheless, by putting itself into the competitive bidding process, it forced the other 
buyers to take it seriously, and won negotiating power.  “The buyout made us a 
player,” said McNutt.  “It put us in the arena with the bidders and gave us access to all 
the financial information.”
134
 Though the union ultimately did not make an official bid 
to buy the company, it retained leverage within the negotiations because it had 
insisted on including in the last round of negotiations a clause in the contract that 
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required any buyer to honor existing labor contracts. 
135
 At first, the union struck an 
agreement with Federated under which all union workers would be retained, but then 
May Company asked for a meeting.
136
  By this time, May Company’s holdings 
included the Hecht’s Co.  McNutt sat down with May Company executives and came 
to an even better agreement two weeks later.  May would also hire all workers 
covered by the Woodies’ contract, those workers would retain their union, and it 
would even remain neutral in a card check process for the 1700 workers in its ten 
Hecht’s facilities in Maryland and DC where workers did not yet have a union.
137
  
Ironically, the Woodward & Lothrop workers preserved not only their own 
unionized jobs, but they opened the door to the union for those Hecht’s workers who 
had long tried and failed to form a union.  Hecht’s put out a notice in 1995 to 
employees telling them that it still did not think they needed a union, but that it would 
honor the terms of the neutrality agreement.
138
  Once the employer backed off, the 
Hecht’s workers felt free to join the union.  By September of 1995, over 1000 Hecht’s 
workers signed union cards, thus winning to right to form a union.
139
  The Hecht’s 
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workers without a union fared much worse during the merger than those with a union 
contract.  About 700 people in management and other sorts of jobs excluded from 
union coverage felt the full brunt of the retail revolution, and were laid off after the 
merger.
140
   
The workers’ union helped ease their transition.  Sue Bean was working in 
commissioned cosmetics sales at the time of the Hecht’s buy-out in 1995, and she 
remembers feeling very insecure about the sale.  She turned to the union who “made 
sure I was getting the same salary, the hourly wage and they were able to make sure I 
kept my years of service, which is very important…I even got to work on the same 
cosmetics line.”
141
  Mary Laflin was working at Hecht’s in 1995 when the workers 
won the union.  “The first thing that happened to us, we all got raises…and they 
treated the people with a little more respect.”
142
  The workers retained their union in 
another major consolidation in 2005 when Federated bought out Hecht’s parent 
company, May Company.  By 2006, all the DC-area Hecht’s stores were called 
Macy’s.  Workers at Macy’s in the Washington, DC area still have a union in 2015 
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Woodward & Lothrop was the union exception within a growing non-union 
pool of retailers.  Most retail workers in the U.S. did not have a union, and they fared 
much worse in the 1980s and 1990s than did the Woodward & Lothrop workers.   For 
instance, Woodies’ median wage for sales clerks right before it sold to Hecht’s was 
about $238 for a 35-hour week. That was higher than the average retail wage, and 
even more than that earned by department managers at Wal-Mart.
144
 Woodies workers 
also had full health and retirement benefits, and could use seniority in such issues as 
choosing the best shifts.  None of this would be available to most non-union retail 
workers.  In 2015, Macy’s workers still face downward pressure on their wages and 
working conditions, and find it increasingly difficult to get a schedule that allows a 
full week’s paycheck. “If Macy’s had their way, the union would not exist,” says 
Mary Laflin, a Macy’s worker and union officer.
145
  Nevertheless, members of Local 
400 who work at Macy’s have a real, state-backed tool to assist them in that fight. 
The Downturn in Organizing  
The UFCW never ran another large department store campaign like the one at 
Woodies, and the union saw the same downturn in organizing that marked the rest of 
the union movement by the mid-1980s.  By 2000, unions held a mere 183 NLRB 
elections in retail in the US, bringing about 7,800 workers to election. That is not even 
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a fifth of the number of the retail workers that the unions brought to election in 1979, 
even as the industry itself meanwhile grew by leaps and bounds.
146
   
The impending downturn was not clear to the union leaders in the late 1970s.  
On Bill Wynn’s first day as president of the RCIU in 1978, he met with President 
Jimmy Carter and told reporters that he anticipated a labor law reform victory that he 
would use to launch a new wave of organizing campaigns.
147
   Likewise, McNutt was 
determined to make his local a growing, vibrant one.  In his 1979 end-of-the-year 
newsletter, he pledged to expand into other area retail stores, and asked members, 
“Will we view the present moment as Local 400’s finest hour, or simply the beginning 
of an era of great service?”
148
  Even employers thought unions were potent threats.  
The head of the retail bureau of the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade 
conceded that employers were worried about union strength after the Woodies 
election which “caused a bit of shock in the business community.”
149
 
   So what happened?  Partly the downturn in organizing was the union’s fault.  The 
UFCW was slow to organize among the newer generation of discount stores – like Wal-
Mart – in part because it did not fully understand that these stores were a threat to its 
powerful position within the grocery store market.
150
  Instead, it concentrated on fighting 
for unionization within grocery, but mostly won agreements to expand unionization 
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within employers that were already under union contract.
151
  There was also a cultural 
resistance within the union to the sort of no-holds-barred organizing techniques that the 
Woodies union staffers had used.  Woodies organizers remember working ten to twelve 
hour days, and though many were from out of town, they rarely went home.
152
  Such 
commitment was not widespread in the UFCW, and much power in the union remained at 
the local level where the “executive’s primary concern is reelection, so he has to attend to 
members over organizing programs,” remembered one organizing supervisor.
153
  
Organizing staffers would not put in the hours, and local leaders would not put in the 
resources. And while the UFCW did have some organizers who were women and people 
of color, the organizing staff was not fully representative of the workforce it was trying to 
organize, a key determinant for union success.
154
 Nevertheless, the union’s campaign at 
Woodies was a tremendous organizing feat, and serves as evidence that this young union 
was organizing in a savvy and forward-looking manner.  
     Changes in federal labor law also mattered.  For instance, in the 1970s, 
shopping malls were quickly becoming America’s de facto town squares, and the 
rules were still in flux as to who would have access and free speech there.  Retail 
organizers waged a fight for the right to speak to workers in the privately-owned 
malls, as members of the general public.  In 2015, that die has been cast.  The law is 
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so limiting that union organizers are lucky to get to stand on the sidewalk by the main 
thoroughfare.
155
  But in 1979, the rules were not so clear.  For example, the NLRB 
ruled in favor of retail organizers who challenged the fact that Hutzler’s Brothers 
threw them off its parking lot Towson, Maryland in 1976.
156
   Local 400 tested the 
bounds during the early weeks of the Woodies campaign.  The local routinely sent 
organizers into the stores, even when they knew that doing so meant risking arrest, in 
part to expose the company’s true colors to its workforce. Twenty-two union 
organizers were arrested in the first two months of the campaign.
157
 They included 
Russell Wise who was arrested for trespassing while passing out union cards in a 
parking lot, and Tony Gasson who was jerked off the stairs by the downtown store 
security guards.
158
 While the union got many of the charges dismissed in the short 
term at Woodies, it would ultimately lose the battle for access to the workers by the 
1980s. “The law got built up at that time that was not good for us,” remembers Carey 
Butsavage whose first assignment as a young lawyer for the local was negotiating 
with police in shopping malls on the Woodies campaign.  “Private property always 
trumps the rights of employees.  At the time, that was not a given.”
159
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In addition, union leaders found that their time was increasingly focused on 
providing to members the kind of social provisions that workers in other countries got 
through the welfare state.  James Lowthers, for instance, who was elected Local 400 
president in 1997 remembers spending the majority of his time on servicing the health 
and welfare trust, meeting with “eye people, dental people, panels of people,” and 
even served on the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission which 
regulates state hospital rates. 
160
  Unions were saddled with this social provision role, 
and so often could devote less time and fewer staff resources to organizing.   
    In the end, the fact that employers’ assaults on workers’ organizing efforts 
were increasingly unchecked by federal labor law was the most determinative factor 
for the downturn in organizing.  The Reagan NLRB dragged its feet so slowly on 
enforcing the law that it effectively negated much of its potency.  The number of 
backlogged unfair labor practice cases, for instance, nearly doubled in 1983 to the 
largest number in the agency’s history.
161
 Local 400’s organizing effort at the Bi-Lo 
grocery chain in Norfolk, Virginia in the late 1980s was typical.  The local sank in 
resources and staff, but lost two elections in the face of a brutal anti-union campaign, 
which included many of the threatening tactics that were quickly becoming 
employers’ standard anti-union fare.  Lowthers remembers that McNutt was 
disillusioned by the time Lowthers took over the presidency in the late 1990s, and had 
stopped organizing.  Lowthers was determined to recharge it.  “When I first became 
president, I hired ten organizers. Then I beat my head against a wall for four or five 
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years. I don’t believe you can really organize in the United States anymore.”  
Lowthers shut down the local’s organizing department in the early 2000s and instead 
put two million dollars into a community affairs department where he was able to 
shore up workers’ waning power in contract negotiations. But he was never able to 
facilitate the planned jump into fresh organizing.  “We could never get from there to 
there,” mused Lowthers.
162
    
 
Conclusion 
The Woodward & Lothrop case reminds us that there is no natural law that says that 
retail work has to be bad work.  Rather, the way that globalization and technology 
affected workers was determined by employer and state policy.  After all, if 
technology and globalization had meant an inevitable decline in the quality of retail 
jobs, that would have held true around the world. In fact, the quality of jobs in retail is 
a function of the employment legal paradigm in which the workers must operate.  In 
Sweden and Denmark most retail workers have unions because the state strongly 
backs collective bargaining, and workers have not seen the levels of wage degradation 
seen elsewhere.  Though retail is still less unionized in the United Kingdom and 
Australia than in other sectors, workers there have not seen the sweeping sort of job 
degradation that U.S. workers have experienced.  In the Netherlands and Germany, 
however, even though unions are strong, retailers have been able to circumvent 
                                                             




minimum wage laws by using legal exceptions for young workers, thereby worsening 
job conditions in retail. 
163
   
Through the Woodward & Lothrop workers’ successful unionizing effort, we 
can see that at least some U.S. workers rode the wave of energy from the civil and 
women’s rights movement to successfully win full economic prosperity through a 
union contract.  Rosa Halsey, Adam Mathias, Barbara Cash and their co-workers 
demanded and won a more secure future in their retail jobs.   Yet they entered a door 
to economic security that was only open for so long.  Though these workers won their 
union, most retailers would shut that door by the mid-1980s, and labor law would 
prove too weak to keep it open for most workers.   
     We turn now to a look at labor organizing among another primarily female, 
service industry workforce: clericals.  Like the Woodward & Lothrop workforce, 
Boston’s clerical workforce made new demands on the city’s employers as they 
entered the workforce, seeking security and respect on the job.   Unlike the working 
people of Woodward & Lothrop, Newport News and Cannon, however, the women 
clericals in Boston experimented with an alternative avenue for worker power that 
circumvented the increasingly-broken NLRB system: a worker association.   
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9to5: The Women Who Built a New Door 
 
“I want to be treated as an equal, in pay as well as common courtesy,” was one 
woman’s response to a 1976 questionnaire circulated by 9to5, a Boston organization for 
women office workers.  “A male art director (who managed to support a family of four 
very comfortably on his salary) was replaced by a woman upon his resignation.  She 
received a small raise, but… she is being paid less than half what the male was paid, for 
the same job!” she continued.
1
   Women like this irate publishing assistant carried new 
ideas about women’s rights along with them as they entered America’s workplaces in 
record numbers during the 1970s.  Her words neatly capture how respect and pay were 
inextricably linked in a market-based society, and how mounting a challenge to gender 
norms on the job was both a social and economic task for the nation’s low-paid, coffee-
fetching “office wives.” Many such women in the 1970s turned to a host of new 
workplaces caucuses, associations and unions in order to effect such multivalent change.  
9to5, founded in 1973, is one of the most well-known of the employment-based women’s 
organizations that burst on the scene in the 1970s.  The women office workers who 
created 9to5 first built what they called an “organization for women office workers” - - 
which was explicitly an association, not a union. Through a combination of public 
pressure, savvy media outreach and strategic affirmative action suits, 9to5 helped upend 
workplace gender norms and challenge the terms under which millions of women entered 
the workplace in the 1970s.  The women clericals, however, also wanted to harness the 
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power of collective bargaining, and so built a bifurcated structure, maintaining 9to5 the 
association while also launching their own union - - Local 925 of the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU).  They later replicated this dual structure at the national level, 
with a separate association and union.
2
   
Like the retail clerks, ship builders, and textile workers covered in this 
dissertation’s chapters, the women who founded 9to5 found themselves at the confluence 
of a host of shifting dynamics that shaped their workplace experience.  Young women 
and people of color poured into a broad range of the nation’s workforces, making new 
demands about their rights.  Hundreds of thousands attempted to use NLRB elections as a 
tool to win the fair pay, robust benefits and the respect to which they felt they were 
entitled.  Employers, however, rolled back workers’ ability to win NLRB elections, and 
so mitigated the efficacy of these workers’ organizing movements.  What is different 
about the women of 9to5, however, is that they expanded the range of possibilities open 
to workers by using in tandem strategies based both on and beyond NLRB elections.   
The group’s founders thus essentially pioneered a new form of labor organizing, one built 
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on New Deal traditions and legal structures as well as the tactics and legal strategies of 
the contemporaneous women’s movement.  Boston’s clericals managed to force some of 
the city’s largest banks and insurance companies to post jobs, offer training and even give 
raises - - all without holding NLRB elections or signing union contracts.  Instead, they 
used affirmative action suits to expand workers’ rights, and learned to make creative use 
of public opinion.  SEIU Local 925, meanwhile, won a few NLRB elections, such as 
among clericals at Allyn and Bacon publishing, but it found that most of the private-
sector employers it challenged in NLRB elections were able to block workers’ organizing 
efforts by manipulating and breaking labor law.  The union had greater success among 
public sector workers, such as on state university campuses, where employers were far 
less likely to oppose the workers’ unionizing efforts.    
Though the first generation of women’s movement histories tended to ignore 
women’s working-class organizations, recent histories of the women’s movement often 
portray organizations like 9to5, Chicago’s Women Employed, San Francisco’s Union 
WAGE, or Dayton’s Working Women as integral components of the “second wave” of 
feminism in the late 1960s and 1970s.
3
  Yet these histories place these women’s 
employment-based organizations within the context of the women’s movement, and have 
overlooked the extent to which the groups were part of another “wave” in the 1970s - - 
                                                             
3 Examples of scholarship with little emphasis on class include Sara M. Evans, Personal Politics: The 
Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: Knopf: 
Distributed by Random House, 1979). Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 
1967-1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) has more of a class focus, but does not 
include organizations like 9to5.  A more recent genre of broad histories of the women’s movement often do 
position 9to5 and other working women’s class-based organizations as part of the second wave of 
feminism. See Sara M. Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century's End (New York: 
Free Press, 2003) 86-88; Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement 




that surge of private-sector labor organizing attempts considered throughout this 
dissertation.  9to5 certainly was representative of the working-class side of feminism, yet 
it also represented the feminist side of 1970s working-class activism.  This chapter builds 
on Dorothy Sue Cobble’s scholarship about workplace feminism by placing the 9to5 
clericals not only alongside other female workers who organized in the 1970s, like flight 
attendants, but also next to the millions of other male and female private-sector workers 
who pushed to form unions through the NLRB in the 1970s.
 
 It allows us to see how the 
path-breaking women activists Cobble studies were part of a broader, unseen labor 
organizing movement in the 1970s.  Like the work of Nancy MacLean, the chapter 
emphasizes the conjunctures rather than the fissures between labor and the new “rights 
consciousness” forged by the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and it broadens 




Unfortunately, 9to5 was never able fully to realize the potential of its model. The 
association lost momentum in the 1980s when middle-class women gained new access to 
professional jobs, and so became less likely to agitate for the rights of clericals.  
Computers did away with many secretarial jobs and the industry shrunk.  9to5 also had a 
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harder time raising money in the 1980s as foundations lost interest. Union organizing by 
District 925 (the national version of Local 925) floundered in the face of tremendous 
employer resistance. In the end, District 925 never fulfilled SEIU’s hopes that it would 
open the flood gates and bring in millions of women as new union members.  In 2015, 
few office workers in the private-sector have unions.  
Though 9to5 never boosted unions’ membership rolls, it did find a different kind 
of success; the experience of being a female office worker by the late 1980s was far less 
demeaning and disempowering than in the early 1970s.  9to5 helped fundamentally alter 
working women’s experiences in the U.S.  In addition, 9to5 was the first organization to 
experiment with the sort of non-NLRB, community-based path for labor organizing that 
has become increasingly important for workers by the turn of the 21
st
 century.  It 
preceded such groups as Jobs with Justice and Justice for Janitors, both founded in the 
late 1980s, that used non-NLRB tactics to gain new leverage over employers.  The 
women of 9to5 were the first to use corporate campaign tactics in the service sector, like 
shareholder campaigns. In fact, they were the foremothers of what became known as “alt-
labor,” the new wave of workers’ centers, associations and campaigns that in 2015 seek 
to build power for workers outside the collective bargaining paradigm. 
5
  9to5 was thus 
an early starter in ongoing, creative organizing efforts to transcend a key weakness of the 
                                                             
5 The term “alt-labor” refers to a range of new worker organizations which seek to boost workers’ power 
outside the traditional collective bargaining process.  These include workers’ centers, industry-based 
workers’ associations (like the Restaurant Opportunity Centers or the Taxi Workers’ Alliance) and the 
movement for justice for global garment workers.  See Josh Eidelson, “Alt-Labor,” The American 
Prospect, January 28, 2013 found at http://prospect.org/article/alt-labor (accessed August 11, 2014).  On 
Justice for Janitors see Preston Rudy, “‘Justice for Janitors’ Not ‘Compensation for Custodians,’: The 
Political Context and Organizing in San Jose and Sacramento, in Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss, Rebuilding 
Labor : Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2004) 133-149. For more on the history of Jobs with Justice, see http://www.jwj.org/about-us/our-history 




U.S. employer-based social welfare system: the fact that it gives employers such a heavy 
incentive to resist workers’ unions.  For a time, these women labor activists were able to 
use the new organizing forms of the women’s movement, in combination with 
community organizing tactics, to build an entirely new doorway into economic security 
and equality for America’s workers.   
 
Women’s Rights Comes to the Office 
It was no coincidence that some of the most forward-thinking labor organizing in the 
1970s grew up among clericals, those women who found themselves at the epicenter of 
two major shifts in this decade: the mass entry of women into America’s workforce and 
the cultural transformations rooted in the women’s movement. Twelve million women 
entered the workforce in the 1970s, and half of those new workers were aged 25 to 34.  
Whereas in 1960, women had made up less than 30 percent of the U.S. workforce, by 
1979 women were a full 42 percent of all workers.  Women were more likely to earn their 
paycheck as a clerical than in any other job. More than a third of U.S. working women 
worked as clericals by the end of the decade, a greater number than in teaching or food 
services, the next two most common jobs.
6
 The occupation was undergoing a major shift 
as technologies like photocopiers, memory typewriters and, increasingly, computers 
furthered a century-long process of mechanizing office work.  Women ran the new office 
machines, and they did it cheaply.  Early 20
th
 century employers had learned that they 
could keep costs down by employing women as typists and stenographers, so displacing 
                                                             




the young aspiring businessmen who had once served as clerks.
7
  By the 1970s, a full 97 
percent of typists were women.
8
  Yet female clericals earned less than men who worked 
as operatives, salesmen or service workers - - in fact, they earned less than all men except 
farm workers.
9
  “The companies do not see us in the mainstream of the workforce,” 
complained Fran Cicchetti at one of 9to5’s first public meetings in 1974.  “We are 
working for pin money, they think.”
10
  Yet working women in the 1970s were actually 
providing much-needed family income.  By 1978, 84 percent of women in the labor force 
either supported themselves or were married to men whose income was under $15,000, 
well under what the federal government deemed an “intermediate” standard of living for 
a family of four.
11
   
Yet the clericals who organized wanted to upend unfair, gender-typed treatment in 
the office as much as they sought to address low pay, and they found momentum from 
the new equality ideologies of the women’s movement.  The expectations that women 
clericals would get the coffee, buy the presents, and pamper their bosses collided with 
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their growing sense of professionalism and entitlement.  “My greatest gripe, besides the 
obvious problems of low pay and lack of respect, is that the men with whom we work 
refuse to recognize us as mature, adult women… I am not a ‘puss,’ or a ‘chick’, a ‘broad’ 
or a ‘dear.’ I am a WOMAN and I have a name, a full name of my own,” insisted one 
Boston office worker, writing in response to an early 9to5 newsletter in 1973.
12
   Other 
women who propelled 9to5 embraced the new ideas of women’s equality, even if they 
chose not to embrace its language.  “Many of the women who come to us say that, ‘I’m 
not women’s libber” or “I’m no joiner, but…’ said 9to5 co-founder Karen Nussbaum in 
1979. 
13
   Judith McCollough was typical of such working-class women attracted to the 
group.  An office worker at Travelers insurance in Boston, she joined 9to5 in 1974.  “I’d 
been interested in the women’s movement,” but was “slightly intimidated by it,” 
remembers McCollough.  Though she “identified with the idea that women should…do 
all the things that they wanted to do…The National Organization for Women… just 
didn’t seem to connect to me.” McCollough went on to join 9to5’s staff and later became 
a national union organizer.
 14
   
 
Experimenting with New Forms of Worker Power (1972 – 1975)  
The founders of 9to5 did not set out to launch a new form of labor organizing.  Karen 
Nussbaum and Ellen Cassedy were young, middle-class white women who met at the 
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University of Chicago in 1969 when they were 19 years old.   “Revolution was in the air” 
remembers Nussbaum, who found political action within this zeitgeist far more 
interesting than college. She fled to Boston where she organized with other women to end 
the Vietnam War.  The rent soon came due and groceries were not free, so she got a job 
at Harvard as a clerical. Cassedy, meanwhile, finished her college degree at the 
University of California at Berkeley.   
 Two events nudged Nussbaum in the direction of labor work.  First, during a 
massive anti-war mobilization in 1971 a dozen activists chanted, “What are the unions 
for?  General strike to end the war!”  Labor leaders’ support for the war made unions 
anathema to peace activists like Nussbaum, yet something clicked as she watched the 
protestors: “Oh, that’s an interesting notion: unions as a tool for social change.”  Second, 
when she joined a picket line of working-class waitresses near Boston that same year, she 
discovered the women’s movement bubbling through:  “I realized that there was this 
power in the ideas of women’s liberation which could be exercised against the authority 
of the boss.” 
15
   
Nussbaum brought these new ideas about labor organizing to her clerical job at 
Harvard and organized a group of women in 1972 to “support each other and to act as a 
group to improve our situations as Services and Wages employees.”
16
  The Women 
Office Workers at Harvard was an organization made up of mostly young women who 
despised the “wifely” duties, like getting professors tea, and who also agitated for clearly-
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defined job classifications and demanded that Harvard disclose salary information.   
Though there was not a union drive, they discussed unionization as one of the options for 
change.
17
   Nussbaum soon expanded her labor activism among women in other 
workplaces.  She helped organize a workshop for office workers at an anti-war Boston 
Women’s Assembly in April of 1972, out of which developed a discussion group of ten 
clericals from a hodge podge of local workplaces; they worked at a shoe factory, a 
hospital, universities and insurance companies.   The group put an ad in the newspaper 
inviting others who wanted to talk about building an organization for office workers.
18
  
That ad attracted Janet Selcer, a white, middle-class clerical at Harvard University, who 
was more interested in issues of wealth inequality than “the cultural aspects of the 
women’s movement.”
19
   The group grew to about 25 people and would soon form the 
core of 9to5.
20
   
Ellen Cassedy joined this group in the summer of 1972 when she moved to 
Boston and also got a job as an office worker at Harvard.  “I am writing as a newly-
recruited member of the labor movement,” penned Cassedy in September to a favorite 
high school teacher who was active in his teachers union. She understood her Harvard 
clerical organizing as part of a larger wave of union organizing, explaining to her mentor 
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that waitresses and hospital workers were organizing unions in Boston.  Yet she also 
admitted to being wary of unions and the “corrupt and ambitious and reactionary labor 
leaders...” 
21
   
The discussion group started handing out a “9to5: Newsletter for Boston Area 
Office Workers” at subway stations and on the sidewalks outside major financial 
institutions in late 1972. Under such headlines as “We DO Have Rights” and “‘girls’ till 
we retire,” they aimed to change the lens through which female clericals saw their own 
jobs.  Meanwhile, they insisted that “we must get together as office workers, not only as 
women” and so kept readers updated on local union organizing at hospitals and insurance 
companies. 
22
  They saw themselves as part of a larger movement of organizing by 
women workers.  For example, one newsletter featured a map of the United States under 
the headline “What’s Happening…”  It highlighted the Farah slacks strike in El Paso and 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company unionizing effort in San Francisco alongside 
new groups like Chicago’s Women Employed and Los Angeles’ Working Women.
23
 The 
young women pooled their pennies to send Cassedy to the first training held by the 
Midwest Academy in Chicago in the summer of 1973.  Founded by activist Heather 
Booth from the proceeds of a back-pay award in an unfair labor practice suit, the 
Midwest Academy taught activists from a broad array of organizations the nuts and bolts 
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of community organizing strategy and tactics.
24
  Cassedy returned with ideas of how to 
build an organization of women office workers that would apply these tactics to build 
change among Boston’s office workers. 
25
   
It was in turning their ad hoc newsletter group into a membership organization in 
1973 that the women began to wrestle with the questions and issues that would propel 
them to build a new labor organizing path.    Nussbaum and Cassedy especially were 
interested in unions, but were wary of unions’ conservatism and their male leadership.  In 
a foundational planning document from September of 1973, they made clear that long-
term goals included “a labor movement comprised of democratic unions” yet they also 
valued an “independent women’s movement,” and bristled at a “labor bureaucracy” 
consisting of “a few men negotiating with corporations and government.”
26
  In a response 
document, Nussbaum clarified that the goals should be transformational - - they sought to 
“improve working conditions,” and also to win more “control of the workplace (the 
community and environment as well) by the people who work and live there…”
27
  They 
decided to build something in-between the labor and women’s movements, an association 
that would function as an “independent women office workers’ organization.”
28
   Cassedy 
remembers that she was influenced in her thinking about 9to5 by the Women’s Trade 
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Union League (WTUL), a coalition of working-class and middle-class women that was 
founded in 1903 to push for better working conditions in the Progressive Era.  The 
WTUL also built an alternative workers’ organization that was outside the purview of the 
traditional unions of its day.  In fact, the women of WTUL were the subject of Cassedy’s 
senior honors thesis in college and she considered them the “grandmothers” of 9to5.
29
  
9to5’s creators envisioned changing an undemocratic labor movement by seeding 
it with a fresh wave of the women workers who were pouring into the nation’s 
workforces with new ideas about their rights.  Cassedy thought the whole process should 
take about three to five years.
30
  In fact, the young women were pushed by both the 
limitations of the collective bargaining model and the rich possibilities of the women’s 
movement to build something over the next decade that was much more significant and 
far more complex than their original concept.  
That organization took the newsletter’s name, 9to5, and its first public event was 
a forum for office workers in November, 1973, billed as “the beginning of an action-
oriented organization, fighting for fair employment for the women in Boston’s offices.”
31
   
A hundred and fifty women attended. They were mostly young, white office workers, 
with a sprinkling of middle-aged and older women, a couple of African-American 
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women, and few whom Cassedy termed “Cambridge-area radicals.”
32
   “I am not the girl, 
the kid, dear or honeychile,” testified Lillian Christmas, a legal secretary, during the 
meeting.  “After nearly a quarter century of experience…why is my salary so low that I 
have to take in freelance typing to support my family?”
33
   Yet if the group was not 
focused on organizing employees at one workplace, like in a union, who should they 
target for change?  The group’s first official membership meeting answered that question 
by planning a meeting with the Chamber of Commerce.
34
  They took twenty people and 
half a dozen reporters along to the December meeting with the Chamber’s Executive 
Vice President, and asked the Chamber to host a meeting for women office workers with 
local personnel managers.
35
   The Chamber refused, arguing that “salaries and conditions 
of work are the responsibility of individual firms.”
36
  That refusal “threw us for a loop” 
wrote 9to5 co-chair Joan Tighe in early 1974 because it forced the group to figure out its 
own alternative steps.
37
   
9to5 began to develop an organizational model based on caucuses of workers 
within specific industries: insurance and finance, legal, universities, publishing, small 
businesses and temporary agencies and health care. Members of each caucus would 
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testify at their own hearings to which they would invite representatives of government 
and business.  In a sense, 9to5 recreated a miniature version of the industrial model that 
the unions of the CIO had forged when they abandoned craft unions in the 1930s, though 
the historical record does not indicate that 9to5 did so consciously.  These industry-based 
committees - - especially the publishing and insurance committees - - would be the 
engines for the group’s later development.  They also began to define more clearly their 
public goals through an “office workers’ bill of rights.”  They banged out the bill of 
rights in “two stormy meetings” in which the group lost a few African-American 
members who were unsuccessful in getting child care included as part of the new treatise.  
The founders did not think they could win childcare and resisted including it among the 
demands. 9to5 would struggle throughout its years with issues of diversity, and this early 
defection by women of color turned out to be an important one.
 38
    
Women from each industry testified at the April, 1974 “Hearing on the Working 
Conditions of Women Office Workers.” The three hundred office workers in attendance 
signed the Office Workers’ Bill of Rights, which included the rights to “respect as 
women and office workers” as well as “comprehensive written job descriptions, and 
“regular salary reviews and cost-of-living increases” among its thirteen demands.  
Interestingly, the group did not include higher pay or benefits among its original 
demands, only “benefits and pay equal to those of men in similar job categories,” despite 
the women’s constant frustration with their low salaries.  Their higher-pay campaigns 
                                                             




would only develop later, toward the end of the decade, as the group matured as an 
organization pushing for working-class economic power. 
39
  
9to5 chose a clear women’s issue as the focus for their first action in May of 
1974: supporting maternity leave legislation.  The groups’ leaders experimented with 
three different varieties of power levers to advance their goals.  Members picketed the 
state house twice, held a meeting with the chief lobbyist of the Associated Industries of 
Massachusetts (AIM), a trade group for industry which opposed the bill, and picketed the 
New England Merchants Bank for its opposition to the bill.  From these activities, 
Nussbaum and the other leaders learned that their attempts to lobby government through 
the state house picket were far more popular among members, who found the “attacks on 
agencies and private companies an alien idea.”
40
   
Nussbaum and Cassedy thus followed their members’ lead and steered away from 
confronting corporations directly, choosing instead to exercise power by pressuring and 
influencing government throughout 1974 and 1975.  In this way, they searched for new 
ways for the state to support workers’ organizing efforts outside collective bargaining.  
For instance, while the insurance committee did pass out leaflets and surveys in front of 
Travelers Insurance, New England Mutual, and other major Boston-based insurers, they 
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did not yet confront these companies directly about their employment practices and pay.
41
 
Rather, they used their surveys to build a report on the insurance industry which then 
formed the basis for two public forums on the insurance industry.  Women in the 
insurance industry were part of “an explosive situation” advertised a flyer for the forum, 
featuring an image of dynamite stuck in a high heel shoe.
42
  The report found that though 
60 percent of the city’s insurance workforce were female, a full 86 percent of those 
18,000 women were in clerical positions.  Though over half of the industry’s men earned 
more than $10,000 a year, only two percent of women did so.
43
  In July of 1975, the new 
Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner accepted 9to5’s proposal to issue new state 
regulations against sex discrimination in hiring, pay and benefits and promotions within 
the insurance industry.  The commissioner agreed to use his power to revoke individual 
companies’ licenses if they discriminated against women and to refuse the entire industry 
a rate increase if too many companies did not change employment practices.  The 
insurance regulations were the first of their kind in the nation. 
44
 Although the young 
activists of 9to5 had not challenged individual corporations directly, they nonetheless 
found themselves thwarted by corporate power.  A group of twenty-five Massachusetts 
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insurers challenged the new regulations in court and the commissioner suspended the 
regulations ‘voluntarily’ until the case could be resolved.
45
 
The temporary agencies committee of 9to5 also tried to use state regulation as a 
lever for worker power, and ran into a similar road block when they championed a State 
Senate bill governing temporary agencies.   These agencies began to exercise enormous 
political power in the U.S. as the number of temporary workers doubled during the 
1970s, and companies increasingly turned toward these agents of precarious work to help 
them sidestep their social welfare obligations.
46
  The women of 9to5 tried to fight back. 
Their rather innocuous legislation would have required agencies to provide job 
descriptions, cease their prohibitions on temps taking permanent job offers from their 
assignments, and allow employees to see and respond to job evaluations.
47
  After the 
industry’s lobbyists successfully scuttled the bill, 9to5 met with the Secretary of State to 
demand that he look into the fact that a number of the lobbyists were not officially 
registered, but they never successfully made in-roads on behalf of workers’ rights in this 
growing industry.
48
   
So if corporations could block legislation and effectively thwart government 
agencies from changing the rules that governed them, then what other levers of state 
                                                             
45 Glick, “Bridging Feminism and Trade Unionism: A Study of Working Women’s Organizing,” 70; 
“Insurance Firms Ordered to End Job Discrimination,” Boston Globe, June 6, 1975, 3.   
46 Erin Hatton, The Temp Economy: From Kelly Girls to Permatemps in Postwar America (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2011) 22-23 and 57.   
47 “Fact Sheet: State Senate Bill 303,” folder 111, carton 3, 9to5 Records (1972-1980); “Temporaries – 
Low Women on the Totem Pole,” The Boston Phoenix, March 11, 1975, 12 found in Box 19, 9to5 records 
(Additional records, 1972-1985).    
48 9to5, March / April, 1975; May, 1975 and August, 1975, carton 4, 9to5 records, (Additional records, 




power could a non-union group of employees effectively pull?  “If you look at the power 
structure of the office world in Boston, where do you go? How do you get near them?” 
remembers Cassedy of the group’s dilemma. 
49
 Here, the Women in Publishing sub-
committee began to break the most fertile ground.  Women in Publishing was 9to5’s most 
active committee following the April, 1974 forum, and it soon began distributing its own 
newsletter at publishing houses.  The women of the publishing committee were the most 
middle-class group of all the 9to5 committees because nearly all publishing jobs required 
a college degree. This committee included Nancy Farrell, a production assistant at Allyn 
& Bacon who first got involved in the Women in Publishing in 1974 because she was 
concerned that her employer did not post sales and management jobs.  Farrell would later 
serve as 9to5’s chairwoman and would help unionize Allyn & Bacon.
50
 Like Farrell, 
many of these women came into publishing expecting to rise quickly into editorial jobs, 
but instead found themselves ghettoized in dead-end clerical positions.  Though women 
in the insurance and banking industries tended to be more working-class, it was the 
middle-class activists at 9to5 who paved a path on affirmative action that would set the 
tone for the entire organization.  They were the first group at 9to5 to adopt an action plan 
centered around affirmative action requirements laid out in President Johnson’s 1965 
Executive Order 11246, which was expanded to include sex in 1967.  This Executive 
Order required all federal contractors not only to refrain from discrimination but also take 
“affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated 
                                                             
49 Cassedy interview with author, 2014.   
50 “Interview with Nancy Farrell,” September 19, 1980 (unknown interviewer), Folder 915, carton 14, 9to5 
records (Additional records,1972-1985); Nancy Farrell, “My Entry into 925 History,” February 6, 2004, 
folder 26, box 5, SEIU District 925 records; “9to5 Election Results,” 9to5 News, December / January 1976-




during their employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.”
51
    
To build a strategy around this Executive Order, Nancy Farrell and the other 
activists in the Women in Publishing subgroup began by claiming the high ground.  They 
conducted a broad survey of the Boston publishing industry, and released the report at a 
public forum detailing the rampant discrimination in the nation’s second-largest 
publishing city.  The report showed that though 66 percent of the Boston industry’s 
workers were female, women only made up six percent of the management level 
employees. They called for equal hiring and promotion across gender, equal pay and 
benefits, and for companies to publicize affirmative action plans.  They insisted that 
“stereotypical attitudes” about women “must be discredited.”  (Interestingly, as with 
9to5’s Bill of Rights, this committee did not yet call for across-the-board higher pay.)
52
  
They then worked with the new Massachusetts Attorney General, Francis X. Bellotti, to 
file a joint suit against three of the city’s largest publishers with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the federal agency enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, as well as with its state-level equivalent, the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination (MCAD.)  The suits targeted Addison-Wesley Publishing, Co, Allyn & 
Bacon Inc. and Houghton Mifflin Co. and alleged discrimination on the basis of sex and 
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  Five women editors in the Houghton Mifflin educational division meanwhile filed 
their own class action suit in federal court after discovering through the 9to5 survey that 
women were paid an average of $3400 less a year than men doing the same jobs.
54
   
The women had found their answer as to how best to get corporate Boston’s 
attention.  The companies were shocked by the suits, which seemed to come out of the 
blue in an industry that was not unionized and was not used to any sort of worker 
collective action.  “We think a lot of women… we think they’re very nice,” asserted 
Addison-Wesley’s apparently tone-deaf president Donald Jones in denying the charges.
55
    
Addison-Wesley later counter-sued 9to5, unsuccessfully trying to force them to turn over 
all the group’s records.
56
  Houghton Mifflin, meanwhile, hired a consulting firm to 
evaluate salaries and do interviews with employees, and ended up giving workers a 
sizeable raise, some as much as $2500.  All the suits ended up being settled over the 
course of the next six years. First Houghton Mifflin settled the class action suit for 
$750,000.  Then each of the three publishers agreed to settlements that amounted to $1.5 
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million in back pay, and also agreed to create job ladders, post salaries and offer new 
kinds of job training.
57
 
9to5 was not alone among female workplace activists in using affirmative action 
in the 1970s to pry open doors that had long been closed to women. Women at the New 
York Times and Newsweek, New York City firefighters, steelworkers and telephone 
operators were just some of the groups who successfully used affirmative action 
provisions to force equal access to a full range of jobs.
58
  What made 9to5’s efforts 
different, however, was the extent to which the class action suits were embedded within 
the organization’s large range of collective tactics for workplace change. 9to5 saw the 
suits not as just individual suits filed by individual women, but as part of a strategy that 
involved personal empowerment, workplace coalition building, group confrontations with 
management, corporate public shaming and alliances with women across industries. For 
example, though the early Women in Publishing were originally loath to take on higher 
pay as an issue, they gained momentum and confidence through the suits, and soon 
launched a city-wide wage survey in 1976.  “The management here is scared to death of 
this survey, and of WIP in general, and has made loud flapping noises at us,” wrote one 
incensed production editor at the publisher Heath.  “What has been going on here is 
medieval!”
59
  The 9to5 report of the survey of 18 local publishing houses called 
publishing “a women’s job ghetto” and found that the Boston area employees made less 
than those in the national industry. They demanded higher wages - - for all office workers 
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in the industry - - as well as equal pay and benefits for women.
 60
  They amplified their 
influence through savvy use of public opinion, awarding a “wasted womanpower award” 
to publishers with the worst maternity leave policies, salary reviews and job posting 
plans. They not only leafleted workers, but also shareholders at the Houghton Mifflin 
annual meeting.
61
  Like Rosa Halsey at Woodward & Lothrop, they gathered with like-
minded co-workers over lunch and after work to form new alliances.  Within a year after 
making the demand for job postings, they had forced five publishers to institute new 
posting policies.
62
  This wide range of tactics, which 9to5 first tried in publishing, would 
serve as a toolbox for the group’s later efforts to force change at other Boston industries 
by the end of the decade.   
 
Local 925 – A New Kind of Union 
It was not long after founding 9to5 that the women went knocking on labor’s door, 
meeting with ten unions active in the Boston area. “It was never…that we only wanted to 
have a women’s work organization alone.  We wanted to use it to prompt union 
organizing among office workers,” remembers Selcer.  9to5’s founders saw the group as 
a precursor to unions, “a step in between,” and had originally envisioned raising women’s 
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consciousness and then shepherding them into existing unions.
 63
  A local labor educator 
urged them to rethink that formulation, and realize that the power they were building 
“was more precious than something to just give away,” remembers Nussbaum.
64
   When 
they knocked on labor’s door, they encountered a mixed reception.   “I don’t want any 
Communist cunts around here,” asserted Matt McGraw, the leader of SEIU Local 285 
representing city workers.
65
  Eddie Sullivan, a labor leader for university janitors and 
food servers, believed it was simply impossible to organize clerical workers.
66
  Yet 
District 65 was interested in a partnership with the clerical organization and the national 
union representing office workers, the Office and Professional Employees International 
Union (OPEIU), seemed interested in hiring Nussbaum and Cassedy.  It turned out that 
the national-level SEIU was the only union willing to charter the group as an autonomous 
local, and to fund three people as organizers.  9to5 thus formed a union with SEIU in 
1975 because it was important to the group that “we control how we use the money, 
where we organize, and how we organize.” 
67
    
The new union chose as its name SEIU Local 925, a clear play on the 
association’s name.   It had a close relationship with 9to5 and staff of both groups 
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attended weekly meetings together. Nussbaum served as director of both organizations 
until 1978, when she moved to Cleveland and began organizing nationally.
68
  
Nevertheless, Local 925 was its own separate membership organization.  From the start, 
the group set out to be a different kind of union that harnessed the power of collective 
bargaining and also built from many of the women-focused organizing forms they had 
developed through their work with 9to5.    “We started by making it personal, and that 
was different from the kind of organizing going on at the time,” remembered Nussbaum.  
“The typical organizing was you stood at the plant gate and handed out leaflets...Instead, 
we would use these surveys, talk to women individually.  We assumed there would be 
five conversations with each individual before you could get them to sign a card.”
69
    
They began to challenge clericals’ assumptions about unions much in the same way they 
had challenged their assumptions about gender roles. “Does a union mean time-clocks, 
limited wage scales and rigid working conditions?  No, in fact it can mean the opposite,” 
read one early organizing brochure.
70
  Though the union was open to male and female 
members, Nussbaum and the local’s leaders positioned it as a union addressing women 
office workers’ needs.  “We are being taken advantage of because we are women and 
because we are unorganized,” read recruitment literature. 
71
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The young local’s first campaign was among 40 librarians at Brandeis University 
and Local 925 found far more resistance from this liberal-minded university than it had 
anticipated.   The librarians had formed their own independent staff association in 1969 
because while they felt a “special kinship” to the institution, they also “felt increasingly 
ignored or even abused over the years.”
72
  Their pay was lower than that of other 
librarians (some of them made only $95 for a 35-hour week), medical costs had 
increased, and they wanted more job security.  Members of the association met with 
representatives from local unions and chose to launch a union organizing campaign with 
Local 925 which they found “sensitive to our cause.”
73
  Though publicly Brandeis said it 
“honors the right of its Library employees to choose freely to join or to refrain from 
joining a union,” in fact it trained supervisors to warn employees about strikes, dues and 
unions as “a third party.”  Supervisors were to make clear that “the law permits the hiring 
of a permanent replacement” in cases of economic strikes.
74
  Once 89 percent of the 
librarians voted for the union in early 1976, the university dragged its feet in negotiations, 
refusing for six months to move on a single major item.
75
  The women of Local 925 had 
to pull from many of the community campaign tactics developed by 9to5 the association 
in order to force the university’s hand.  Just as 9to5 had learned to leaflet downtown 
buildings, members of Local 925 began leafleting Brandeis alumni events in New York, 
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Chicago and Atlanta.   They kept the Brandeis cause in front of reporters, activated 
Brandeis students in a group called “Jewish Students for a Just Settlement,” and 
pressured the National Women’s Committee to stop raising funds for the library.  
“Union-busting isn’t Kosher,” read one solidarity leaflet.
76
   The university finally settled 
after nine months.  Local 925 had tapped 9to5’s broad array of non-traditional labor 
tactics, and had managed to bring home the first union contract covering university office 
staff in the Boston area.
77
 
Though the going was slow and employer opposition was strong, the young local 
managed to win a few union elections among small units of clericals at private-sector 
employers, like Allyn & Bacon, Educators Publishing Services and Rounder Records. 
They developed their own unique organizing tactics and contract demands, based in their 
experiences as working women.  Consider the campaign at Allyn & Bacon, one of the 
three publishers named in the joint affirmative action suit filed by Massachusetts 
Attorney General and 9to5. Even before the workers saw a settlement in that suit, the 
clericals started to explore unionizing.  When it became clear that some employees 
thought of themselves as non-union professionals, Nancy Farrell - - Women in Publishing 
activist and 925 supporter - - remembers developing a unique tactic to build solidarity.  
“The participants had to reveal their weight or their salary,” during a union meeting ice 
breaker.  “The numbers came tumbling out… and they were low, all over the 
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 Allyn & Bacon workers won an NLRB election and managed 
to get a legally-binding contract with more flexible schedules, an average 18 percent 
salary increase, and a standing union-management committee on job training, three years 
before the affirmative action suits ever settled.
79
   The Local 925 contract at Rounder 
Records included issues uncommon in contemporaneous contracts, like parental leave 
and a no-discrimination clause that included sexual preference.
80
   In other cases, Local 
925 found the union paradigm limiting. When the union reached an impasse in 
negotiations with Educators Publishing Services (EPS), the women formed a conga line 
picket and held signs reading “EPS – Every Person a Slave.”  The next Monday 
Nussbaum received a subpoena as such public actions were in violation of labor law once 
the parties had reached impasse.  Eventually, however, Local 925 did sign a first contract 
with EPS, winning a 25 percent wage increase and improved medical insurance that was 
completely financed by the employer.
81
 
Yet Local 925 quickly ran up against the increased private-sector employer 
resistance to unions that grew throughout the nation in the 1970s. Activists found that the 
door through which workers could enter the union was far narrower than the entryway to 
the association. When they tried to organize a small radio station, for instance, they 
discovered that Alfred DeMaria, one of the nation’s most notorious union busters, 
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  The small Massachusetts College of Pharmacy called in the 
national Three M firm to successfully defeat a clerical unionizing effort there, and Allyn 
& Bacon never stopped resisting the local, dragging out negotiations at every turn. 
83
 
Eventually, that publisher moved to Newton, laid off many of the original staff, and the 
union was decertified.
84
  “We were trying to organize in… this private sector where the 
companies had this whole union-busting industry…but we didn’t know anything about 
it… it was really psychological warfare,” remembers Local 925 organizer Dorine 
Levasseur.
85
  Local 925 found it had far more success with public-sector and non-profit 
sector workers where employer resistance was lighter, such as among teachers’ aides, 
public librarians, and legal services employees.
86
   The local never grew very large, 
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Testing the New Model of Organizing (1976 – 1980)  
Though Nussbaum and Cassedy had once thought that a union would negate the need for 
the association, they soon began to realize that there was enormous potential in the 
alternative labor organization they had brought into being.  It was “clearly apparent that 
you hadn’t exhausted the unbelievable opportunity that 9to5 the association created…you 
could let anybody in and hundreds of women would become activists and thousands 
would participate in one things and … hundreds of thousands would hear about it and be 
moved,” remembers Nussbaum.
88
  It turned out that in creating a separate, autonomous 
union in 1975 the organization had settled the question of whether 9to5 was a union, a 
point of confusion often raised by new recruits, the press and the public.
89
 Clearly, 9to5 
was not a union, because Local 925 was the union.  Ironically, this sharp separation freed 
up the association to move into deeper confrontations with corporate employers, 
including around “bread and butter” issues like wages and benefits. It was thus after the 
creation of Local 925, in the years between 1976 and 1980, that the association 9to5 
began to most fully explore the potential of its new model of labor organizing.   
In the first months following the creation of Local 925, the association’s first 
steps were down the affirmative action road it had paved with Women in Publishing.  In 
early 1976, 9to5 voted to make affirmative action enforcement its signature campaign for 
the year, and it set out to target the banks and insurance companies it so far had found 
elusive.  Janet Selcer played a lead role in the effort to target these private-sector 
companies. “We became very adept at making contacts on the inside,” remembers Selcer, 
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who passed out surveys in front of Boston’s banks and then held “endless numbers of 
lunches” with the women office workers who responded.  “I loved the one woman who 
would say, sure you can come to lunch in the First National Bank of Liberty Mutual.  
Then you felt like you were in the belly of the beast and all the people you wanted to talk 
to were right there.” 
90
 
9to5 used affirmative action suits as a mechanism to organize Boston’s banks and 
insurance company workers.  “Obviously, this is where 9to5 comes alive!” one member 
urged, noting 9to5 found 842 Boston-area companies with federal contracts exceeding 
$50,000, all of whom were legally required to have an affirmative action plan.
91
  “We 
decided we would do a campaign where we would teach people what affirmative action 
was.  We had a big conference in Boston…and had specific campaigns that each of our 
committees did…in their industry.  And then we did campaigns where we went after 
government agencies to enforce affirmative action,” remembers Nussbaum.
92
 9to5 sent 
out a mock engraved invitation to the May hearing labelled “an invitation to equal 
opportunity.”
93
  Women from insurance companies like Liberty Mutual and Aetna began 
to gather after work to read their companies’ affirmative action plans.
94
   Selcer and the 
other activists replicated the publishing survey in banking and insurance, and found 
ample evidence of discrimination by sex, race and even age.  After state officials and 
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9to5 held hearings on this issue, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee got involved, 
accusing the U.S. Treasury Department of not enforcing EEOC standards at financial 
institutions.   9to5 then filed a suit against New England Merchants Bank (NEMB), citing 
it as a prime offender.
95
  9to5’s charges did force a Treasury Department suit, but the 
women found it more disappointing than the publishing suits.  Though NEMB was found 
guilty in 1977, the Treasury Department was slower to force this major financial 
institution to move into compliance.
96
  Yet the suit had far-reaching implications when 
other banks, like Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company, voluntarily signed new 
affirmative action agreements. 
97
 9to5’s affirmative action campaign shifted into a 
defensive one when the new director of the national Office of Contract Compliance, 
Lawrence Lorber, announced plans to eliminate all but the largest firms from affirmative 
action requirements and to end compliance reviews in the pre-contract stage. 9to5 joined 
the group Women Employed and civil rights groups in a successful campaign to 
vigorously defend the existing affirmative action regulations. 
98
 
9to5’s leaders found that though an affirmative action strategy was fruitful, its 
focus on government agencies rather than on corporations was limiting as an organizing 
tool. “After we worked on government enforcement…we realized that we were teaching 
our members that government was the enemy,” recalls Nussbaum.  “We changed what 
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we did.  We did a whole set of campaigns focused on…the biggest employer in different 
industries.”
99
  9to5 began to run what it called “higher pay” campaigns, finally making a 
full-throated demand for increased wages and benefits across the board as well as 
increased job training and promotions. 
100
 Through these campaigns at specific 
corporations, the organization found it was often able to raise wages and improve 
working conditions, all outside the collective bargaining paradigm. For instance, the 
group launched a campaign at First National Bank on Secretary’s Day in April, 1979. 
101
  
The group publicized the fact that the bank’s own affirmative action report showed that 
women were underutilized in 15 of 36 job categories, that it had no job posting system, 
and that a file clerk made a mere $6800 a year.  They began meeting with First National 
employees, started a newsletter for the group, set up an employee “hotline,” launched a 
petition drive among depositors, reached out to community leaders, and held public 
demonstrations at stockholder meetings.
102
  The campaign worked.  The bank announced 
a new job posting system immediately after the campaign launch, and within a year 
workers had won raises amounting up to 12 percent, a larger increase than in previous 
years. 
103
  9to5 launched a similar campaign at the John Hancock insurance company 
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where women made up 60 percent of the workforce, including 85 percent of the lowest 
level clericals.
104
  Nussbaum later served on a panel with a high-level executive from 
John Hancock who recalled that on the day 9to5 launched the campaign he barricaded 
himself in his office and stayed there overnight, feeling under siege.
105
 The John Hancock 
campaign resulted in a 10.5 percent average pay increase, the raising of the lowest pay 
grade, and the formation of an ad hoc committee to develop career paths at non-
management employees.  These gains were comparable to what the Woodward & 
Lothrop workers won in their first union contract, though the Hancock workers never had 
a union.  The company even contributed to local child care centers when the workers 
demanded assistance with child care.
106
 
As they ran these major campaigns, the women of 9to5 re-defined organizing by 
borrowing and adapting the forms that grew out of the women’s movement.    Gone were 
house calls and the card signing routines of traditional union organizing.  Instead they 
held what they called “recruitment” or “nurturing” lunches.  These were like the 
consciousness-raising sessions popular among women’s movement activists but, Cassedy 
recalls, were far less intimidating.  Staff and leaders would sometimes have three such 
organizing lunches a day as they had the goal of meeting with every member or potential 
member at least once a year.  They prioritized leadership training and groomed members 
to take the lead in confronting power.   “This was an organization that would take you as 
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fast as you could go, even a little faster than you might be ready to go… to help change 
the world,” recalls Debbie Schneider who was recruited from her Boston-area publishing 
house and remembers the systematic training 9to5 provided her on public speaking.
107
   A 
9to5 conference on “Women for Economic Justice” offered skill development, coalition 
building strategies and workshops for displaced homemakers, alongside sessions on 




Taking the Dual Structure National  
The women of 9to5 had hit on a novel structure for helping women office workers effect 
workplace change, especially since by the end of the decade employers had so narrowed 
possibilities for organizing unions.  Activists balanced an association which “combines 
public action with legal action and advocacy work,” with an official union that allowed 
workers to tap the most secure tier of the U.S. social welfare regime, through legally-
backed collective bargaining.  They were “constantly re-adjusting the balance between 
outreach and activism on one hand, and consolidating power on the other,” in the union 
side, remembers Nussbaum.
109
   
Between 1977 and 1981, the group took this bi-furcated structure national, 
replicating a nationwide association and union that were independent, yet intertwined.   
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9to5 was already integrated within a larger network of women office workers’ 
organizations that were also experimenting with non-collective bargaining solutions, 
often learning from 9to5’s model.  Cleveland’s Working Women, founded in 1975, 
followed the 9to5 model of doing a survey and report on women in banks in order to 
force government action on discrimination and San Francisco’s Women Organized for 
Employment did the same in banking.  These groups shared ideas and tactics, but found 
that they often bumped up against one another in fundraising.  In order to amplify their 
efforts, they launched an informal joint organizing project and then officially launched 
Working Women: A National Association for Office Workers.  Karen Nussbaum served 
as its Executive Director from her new base in Cleveland. This new national association 
started with 13 membership organizations in 1977 and grew to 22 chapters by 1983 when 
it changed its name to 9to5: National Association of Working Women.  Boston 9to5 
continued as a separate, local organization, and was a chapter of this umbrella group.
110
  
Working Women tested its wings as an alternative labor organization, adopting 
9to5’s “higher pay” campaign in the late 1970s, as well as focusing on discrimination at 
banks and insurance.
111
  Yet it was in the cultural realm that Working Women was able to 
make the most of its national-level platform. The group invited women office workers 
nationwide to join them in laying bare the contradictions between the emergent cultural 
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shifts around gender and the stubborn reality of office sexism.  Humor was often their 
weapon of choice.  Consider, for instance, the group’s petty office procedure contest.  
The boss who required his secretary to vacuum up his fingernail clippings after he 
scattered them all over the floor won the personal hygiene award.  The boss who required 
his secretary to sew up his split seam pants – while he was wearing them – also was 
honored. Thirty-five women showed up at his office and presented him with an 
“executive sewing kit.”   Women nationwide read about the group under such headlines 
as “Have you heard the one about the boss who…?”    Their “Raises Not Roses” 
campaign redefined the annual Secretary’s Day rituals, as women turned out in rallies 
nationwide each year.  9to5 was helping to drive a cultural shift, even before it inspired 
the 9 to 5 movie which was the group’s crowning achievements on the cultural front.
112
   
The movie 9 to 5 launched at Christmastime in 1980 and changed the debate 
about whether there was discrimination in the workplace.  The film was a runaway hit, 
grossing more than $38 million in its first three weeks, and later inspiring a spin-off 
television show and musical.
113
 “Before that, we had had to argue carefully, make 
proof… and then Jane Fonda makes a movie that mocks discrimination in the workplace 
and the argument is over,” remembers Nussbaum.
114
  Nussbaum had gotten to know the 
acclaimed Fonda in the anti-war movement, and when Fonda approached her about the 
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idea of a movie, Nussbaum brought her to meet with 40 women clericals in Cleveland.  
The women spent a long night talking with Fonda about problems on the job and how 
they had dreamed about getting even with the boss.  Nearly every detail of the film grew 
out of Fonda’s conversations with the Cleveland women.
115
 The film itself is a revenge 
fantasy in which three clericals (played by Fonda, Lily Tomlin and Dolly Parton) get 
even with a bigoted boss (played by Dabney Coleman) who is prone to yelling, lying and 
“pinching and staring.”   After fantasizing about roping him like a steer, poisoning him 
and executing him, they then actually kidnap him and hold him captive with a device 
made from a garage door opener.  Some of the best moments of the film are the farcical 
depictions of women dealing with errant copying machines and fraught memo-taking 
sessions, laying bare the ludicrous machinations of sexism on the job.   The film made a 
deep imprint on the nation’s understanding of gender at work.  “The other day our lawyer 
saw the film,” said Fonda in a promotion interview in 1980.  “For the first time in all the 
years I’ve known him, when he wanted coffee, he went out and got it himself.”
116
  
Working Women built on the film’s popularity, launching the “Movement Behind the 
Movie” tour in 15 cities where leaders and members did interviews with morning 
television shows and held recruitment meetings and rallies after work.
117
 
Working Women amplified 9to5’s message about discrimination at work, and 
also deepened and challenged the original organization.   For instance, Working Women 
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helped Boston’s 9to5 mature as part of a more racially diverse organization.  All of the 
Boston group’s founders were white, as were most of the activists, and though the leaders 
asked each committee to build diversity into their plans, there was “some lack of 
consciousness on our part about what that task would look like and how to accomplish 
it,” remembers Janet Selcer, one of the original members.
118
  The group was conscious of 
racial issues and did include racial discrimination along with sexual discrimination as part 
of its charges against the publishers and banks, for instance, but its membership remained 
stubbornly white.  Part of the problem was a lack of diversity in Boston itself, where the 
clerical workforce was only four percent black.  Yet as in the case of the African-
American women who wanted to include child care in the Bill of Rights, the 
organization’s priorities often reflected those of its majority white, young membership. 
As Working Women expanded in the 1980s to other cities that had a more diverse 
population, it was able to attract more women of color as members and leaders, who in 
turn influenced the direction of the organization.  The Columbus, Ohio chapter, for 
instance, pushed for Ohio State University to include clericals among its discussions of 
affirmative action, which before had been confined to faculty and students.  The Atlanta 
chapter included a sharp focus on minority workers in its surveys and reports and 
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Working Women was changing cultural mores and challenging corporations on 
working conditions, but found that it also needed the sharp teeth of collective bargaining 
in order to win lasting workplace gains in wages and benefits at a national level.  By 
1979, leaders decided it was time to take Boston’s Local 925 national.  The group 
approached and evaluated five unions as potential national partners - - SEIU, UAW, 
UFCW, the Communications Workers of America (CWA), and the OPEIU.  Nussbaum 
and the members of Working Women wanted their partner union to commit resources to 
clerical organizing, establish a special structure in the union to address clericals’ needs, 
and “make a commitment to several years of ‘our’ approach to organizing.
120
  SEIU 
seemed the most willing.  They bargained hard with SEIU’s new national president, John 
Sweeney, and his male staff, insisting on salaries comparable to SEIU rates for other 
organizers.  The new union was chartered in 1981 as District 925, a stand-alone national 
local with its own officers, by-laws and autonomy. Nussbaum would serve as its 
president while continuing to direct Working Women, thus linking the two organizations.  
Former Local 925 organizer Jackie Ruff would serve as the District 925 Executive 
Director.
121
   “It was pretty revolutionary,” remembers Ray Abernathy, a public relations 
consultant for unions who had a good sense of labor’s attitudes.  “The very idea of having 
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a national union run by women was preposterous… women who were in positions of 
authority in the union were very often there as tokens.”
122
 
District 925 launched with great fanfare, holding rallies and major press events in 
a bi-coastal media launch in early 1981.  Dabney Coleman, the actor who played the 
villain boss in the 9 to 5 movie, helped launch the group by answering its toll-free line, 
fielding calls from union-minded clericals.  District 925 vowed to organize clericals 
nationwide, with a special focus on private-sector workers in insurance and banking.
123
   
In fact, while District 925 did make headway in its secondary goal to organize public 
sector workers, its organizing efforts almost universally failed in the private sector.   
The Equitable insurance campaign - - District 925’s earliest and largest national 
campaign in the private-sector - - offers a case study as to why the union floundered in 
the private sector. A few months after the union’s launch, a woman working as a claims 
adjuster at Equitable in Syracuse, New York saw District 925 mentioned on 60 Minutes, 
and reached out.  She and others were upset by having no voice in the way the company 
was switching from paper claims to using computers, and thought they were paid too 
little.  Nearly 70 percent of the 90 workers signed a card over a weekend.  Most were 
young, in their 20s and early 30s, and had a strong sense of both women’s and class-
based rights.   “They were really smart working-class women from a working-class town 
which had a big union tradition,” remembered Cheryl Schaffer, a District 925 organizer 
                                                             
122 Ray Abernathy and Denise Mitchell interview with Ann Froines, November 3, 2005, Washington DC, 
SEIU District 925 oral history transcripts.   
123 Ray Abernathy to Bob Welsh, January 29, 1981, folder 25, box 5, SEIU District 925 records; “Bosses 
Watch Out: Office Workers Have Inside Line,” n/d c 1981, folder 11, box 3, SEIU District 925 records; 






  Equitable, meanwhile, hired Raymond Mickus Associates (a spin off 
from Three M) to fight the unionization effort, and the consultant trained all the 
supervisors in its tactics.  Nevertheless, the workers voted 49 to 40 for District 925 on 
February 4, 1982. When Equitable dragged its feet in contract negotiations, District 925 
launched a national boycott that was under the auspices of the AFL-CIO, and endorsed 
by NOW.  A thousand demonstrators marched in New York City, many of whom were 
construction workers, to protest Equitable’s “corporate policy of anti-unionism.”  The 
group set up pickets in 41 cities.
125
  District 925 did finally win a contract, after 20 
months of negotiations and after taking the corporation before the NLRB in Washington, 
DC, but it could never make headway in the corporation’s other national offices.  
Equitable closed the Syracuse claims office in 1987 and laid off all the unionized 
workers. 
126
   
District 925’s struggles to organize in the private sector financial sector were not 
unique. SEIU boasted that the Equitable campaign was the first time “a group of low-
paid, traditionally powerless clericals…has taken on a giant of the insurance industry,” 
but the claim was overblown. 
127
 In fact these 100 workers’ union campaign was just one 
of many efforts by clericals to organize in the nation’s financial firms.  For example, 
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NLRB monthly reports reveal that OPEIU won the right to represent 1266 clericals at 
Blue Cross in Oakland, California in July of 1977, and tried to organize at Mutual 
Hospital Insurance in Indianapolis and Blue Shield in New York and Alabama, all around 
the time District 925 was getting started.
128
  
 District 925 ran into the same resistance that other bank, insurance and financial 
workers faced when they tried to form unions.
129
 Employers were deeply alarmed by such 
clerical organizing, and pushed back with force.  Calling union organizing efforts among 
female office workers “the most significant trend in labor-management relations today,” 
Martin Payson, a partner in a law firm notorious for countering union organizing, warned 
that “the allegiance of millions of female workers is at stake.”
130
  Stephen J. Cabot, a 
well-known union avoidance lawyer, asserted that despite its lack of immediate NLRB 
election success, District 925 “is driving companies in the Northeast crazy…it’s been 
very effective.”
131
  Employers were not willing to allow this new workforce to step into 
the collective bargaining relationship.  Employers flocked to seminars focused on rolling 
back clerical workers’ organizing efforts, like the “Managing White Collar Women” 
seminar held by the Georgia Chamber of Commerce, and made liberal use of union 
avoidance consultants.
132
  Jon Hiatt, a lawyer for SEIU who later served as the AFL-
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CIO’s chief of staff, remembers that many employers fought their female clericals with 
even greater vehemence than those in other sectors:  “It was almost universally that they 
were up against tremendous employer resistance in units where employers felt that their 
managerial prerogatives had been the rule… for 20, 25 years ago, (it) was more than the 
norm.”
133
     District 925 did have success organizing public sector workers, such as at the 
University of Washington in Seattle, the University of Cincinnati, and among county 
workers in Ohio and Illinois.  But its attempts to organize private sector workers at banks 
and insurance companies did not get off the ground.
134
 
Meanwhile, by the early 1980s, the association side of the dual structure also 
began to flounder.  The association’s Achilles heel was the same that weakened so many 
non-union labor organizations:  funding. Unions were more self-sustaining because they 
had a dues base. While 9to5 had a dues structure, in fact only about four percent of the 
organization’s revenue came from membership dues.  By far, the greatest source of 
funding was grant money from foundations, followed by grassroots fundraisers and, 
eventually, canvassing.
135
  For a time under the Carter administration, the organization 
had received some government funding, including for Vista volunteers, but those 
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governmental funds dried up under the Reagan Administration.
136
  Foundations, 
meanwhile, lost interest as the women’s movement succeeded at advancing many 
women’s access to better jobs in the workplace.  “By the 80s, we were not the shiny new 
object for foundations,” remembers Cassedy.  Many saw that there was “less of a need 
for an organization that screamed and yelled about women’s rights in the office.”
137
  
Unless chapters could raise their own funds, 9to5 was forced to turn them into to all-
volunteer chapters rather than staffed organizations, which blunted the organization’s 
effectiveness.  The Boston chapter was forced to move into this all-volunteer model, and 
in 1985 the chapter closed its office.
138
   
9to5 also weakened when many of the middle-class women who had bolstered its 
ranks, like those in Women in Publishing, discovered they had less need for an 
organization demanding job promotions and equal access. Middle-class, college-educated 
women found that the nation’s workplaces began steadily to open their doors to them.  
“The power that came from this compression of middle-class women and working-class 
women in the same workplaces … was released once the demand to access to higher pay 
jobs was allowed to the economic status women,” recalls Nussbaum.
139
 During the 1970s 
the lowest-paid women had seen the greatest increases in their wages among all women.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the highest-paid women’s incomes took off and 
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working-class women remained stuck in low-paying, dead end jobs.  By 2003, wages had 
grown twice as fast among women in the top wage percentiles than at the median and 
bottom, helping the drive the new inequality so pervasive by the early twenty-first 
century.
140
     
9to5 continues to operate in 2015 as an important voice for progressive 
employment policies for all women, not only office workers.  The organization has 
played an especially important role in places where unions are traditionally weak, like in 
Atlanta, where it has helped win a minimum wage ordinance for workers paid with city 
funds.  Yet the organization remains small, with four chapters, and does not have the hold 
on the public’s imagination that 9to5 once did.
141
   
 
The New Door 
The women who started 9to5 in the early 1970s did not envision the inequality that would 
impact working women by the close of the 20
th
 century.  Instead, they had envisioned 
workplaces that would bend to the new women workers’ needs, guaranteeing fair wages 
alongside equal access to jobs, offering working-class security alongside career ladders.  
The 1980s would belie those hopes.  Yet the women of 9to5 fought hard for their vision, 
just as did the millions of working people who tried to organize unions in the 1970s.     
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Yet the labor movement did not stop organizing or fighting back in the face of the 
1980s employer push back against labor.  By the late 1980s, it changed tactics, adopting 
some of those first tried by 9to5 the association.  9to5 had essentially run what the labor 
movement would come to call “corporate campaigns” against John Hancock insurance 
and First National Bank, campaigns enlisting the support of the community, shareholders, 
and other stakeholders to force corporate action for workers’ rights.   9to5 was the first 
organization to run such corporate campaigns among service workers, though unions had 
used this tactic with other blue-collar workers in the 1970s, such as the UMWA against 
Duke Power in support of Brookside miners, the clothing workers at Farah and ACTWU 
at J.P. Stevens. Such corporate campaigns became much more common by the late 1980s 
and 1990s.
142
  9to5 also built a model of putting pressure on multiple employers 
simultaneously within a given industry, such as among Boston publishers or banks, and 
this helped to inspire other industry-wide campaigns, like Justice for Janitors.  SEIU 
started Justice for Janitors in 1985, using community support to pressure building 
cleaning contractors to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, without workers ever 
having to go through the fire of an NLRB election. 
143
  9to5’s community organizing 
tactics also would be adopted by Jobs with Justice, a coalition of labor and community 
supporters founded in 1987.  
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What was unique about 9to5, however, was that the organization did not enlist 
these community and corporate campaigns only to bring women into unions.  Collective 
bargaining was one path to power, but it was not the ultimate goal of 9to5’s campaigns, 
as was the case with Justice for Janitors.  Rather, 9to5 used a host of non-traditional labor 
tactics to try to force change for women office clericals outside the collective bargaining 
structure. As a result, the most important impact of 9to5 showed up in neither union 
membership tallies nor in the Department of Labor’s annual review of declining union 
membership statistics: women office workers experienced far less overt sexism on the job 
by the late 1980s than they did in the years of 9to5’s founding.  9to5 was a leader in 
expanding the national conversation on gender at work and that conversation 
fundamentally changed the societal expectations for women working in an office.    
Nussbaum and Cassedy were a new breed of labor organizers, seeking to build an 
organization that would “build the women’s movement in the working class with the boss 
as the target for change” while also allowing them to “use the momentum of the drive for 
women’s equality to build class power,” according to Nussbaum.
144
 The women of 9to5 
made such progress by building an entirely new door into the labor movement, a door 
which employers could not close as easily as that into collective bargaining. 
  
                                                             






During the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Day in Washington, DC on September 19, 1981, Jan 
Hooks, Edward Coppedge and other members of USWA Local 8888 marched alongside 
Karen Nussbaum and the clericals of SEIU District 925, Woodward & Lothrop workers 
from UFCW Local 400, and a quarter of a million other union members and their 
supporters.  Solidarity Day was the largest labor rally ever staged by the American labor 
movement, and was equal in size to the 1963 March on Washington.  “Behold your 
numbers, as far as the eyes can see,” boomed AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland’s voice 
over a crowd that filled the streets from the Capitol building to the Washington 
Monument.
1
   
Bearded mechanics, hard-hatted carpenters, secretaries in collared blouses and 
actors in hip blue jeans made the pilgrimage to Washington, DC to protest the Reagan 
Administration’s social spending cuts and attacks on labor and civil rights.  Participants 
rode on 3000 chartered buses, a dozen specially-chartered Amtrak trains and the free 
subway trains the AFL-CIO universally subsidized in the hours leading up to the rally.
 
 
For many, it was their first trip to the nation’s capital city.  They wore paper hats and ball 
caps advertising their unions and toted signs with a dizzying array of messages: “Health 
Care for All,” “Hands off Social Security,” “ERA Now,” “A Clean and Healthful 
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Environment,” “Export Goods, Not Jobs.”   Had such a march taken place thirty years 
earlier, the union members would have made for a far less diverse crowd.  In 1981, 
however, the working men and women gathered in Washington, DC were a cross-section 
of the nation’s workforce, and so embodied the changes wrought by the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act’s opening of America’s workplaces and unions.  America’s re-shaped 
working class gathered together because it understood that it was under vicious attack. 
“We’re tired of working people falling further and further behind while, it seems, the rich 
get richer,” summed up Mary Jo Vavra, the first woman ever to work at the Hercules 
chemical plant in Jefferson, Pennsylvania.
2
   
Though elected leaders were invited to attend Solidarity Day, they were not given 
access to the podium.  Instead, union members heard from leaders of allied organizations 
such as Eleanor Smeal of NOW, Benjamin Hooks of the NAACP, Reverend Jesse 
Jackson of People United to Serve Humanity (PUSH) and Reverend Joseph Lowery of 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), among others.   A disparate 
group of allies, including the Sierra Club and the United Methodist Church, joined the 
throngs of union members.
3
    The broad support for the march signified a confluence, 
rather than a conflict, between the goals of civil and labor rights.  Coretta Scott King, 
civil rights leader and widow of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., drove home that point in her 
speech to the crowd: “In a very real sense, Solidarity Day is a continuation of the great 
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march on Washington, the latest stop in our long journey toward fulfilling the American 
dream of freedom, justice and equality for all.”
4
  
Scholars rarely feature Solidarity Day in histories of labor’s late twentieth-century 
decline.  Most historical narratives focus instead on another contemporaneous event: the 
August 1981 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike and the 
Reagan Administration’s decision to fire these federal employees.  A surprising number 
of labor history textbooks and studies have no mention at all of labor’s largest public 
gathering in history. 
5
  Yet Solidarity Day reminds us that though the union movement 
was under attack, it still held enormous sway as late as the early 1980s and union 
members and leaders believed that they had the power to change the direction of the 
nation.   
The Solidarity Day march capped off more than a decade of deep class ferment 
over the terms that would shape American labor relations during the nation’s slow 
transition out of industrially-centered capitalism - - a transition that began in the 1970s 
and is still happening today.  We have seen how as part of that class struggle, a diverse 
American working class - -  nurses, clericals, auto workers, ship builders, textile workers 
and retail clerks - - sought out unions for economic security.   These workers recently had 
won full access to the U.S. employment market following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
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and their turn toward private-sector union organizing marked the 1970s as a decade of 
working-class promise.  Increasingly, however, these workers failed in their organizing 
attempts.  Their efforts to form unions were undermined by a weakness in the post-World 
War II welfare state:  unions negotiated with employers for a higher social wage, but 
employers simultaneously had the ability to limit workers’ access to those same unions.   
Faced with increased global competition, employers sought to rid themselves of their 
social wage obligations and to close off workers’ access to unions. They began to roll 
back labor law in the late 1960s and increased their law breaking and use of anti-union 
consultants on union organizing campaigns throughout the 1970s.  This battle raged 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.  The tide did turn, but not in the direction the 
Solidarity Day marchers had hoped.  The years from 1982 to 1985 turned out to be dark 
ones for the American labor movement and, by 1985, the employers had effectively 
rolled back workers’ access to forming labor unions through the NLRB.   
The failed PATCO strike was only one of a bevy of forces working against labor 
in the early 1980s.   The recessions of 1981-82 brought in unemployment rates of ten 
percent, the highest the nation had seen since the Great Depression. Much of the job loss 
was concentrated in the traditionally-unionized manufacturing sector, causing unions to 
face steep membership losses in plant closures.
6
  Membership in both the UAW and 
USWA, for instance, dropped by more than 400,000 between 1979 and 1984, and UAW 
membership plunged by a full third. 
7
   Employers, meanwhile, began to demand and win 
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massive contract concessions in nearly every industry - - heavy metals, autos, 
newspapers, oil, meat cutting, rubber and airlines.
8
  Employers perfected the union- 
breaking strategies, first pioneered by firms like Seyfarth and Shaw in the mid-1970s, of 
bargaining to impasse, provoking a strike and then replacing the striking union 
membership.  Seyfarth and Shaw counseled employers, for instance, to cross-train 
supervisors to break strikes and even hold strike drills.  Bus drivers at Greyhound, hotel 
workers in Las Vegas, and copper miners in Arizona all waged massive strikes in these 
years to try to hold on to the gains they had won over previous decades, but to no avail.  
Management gained major concessions across the board.
9
  In 1984, the Supreme Court 
upheld the right of employers to use bankruptcy procedures to abrogate union contracts, a 
tactic used successfully by Frank Lorenzo at Continental Airlines.
10
  The Reagan 
Administration, meanwhile, appointed conservative ideologue Donald Dotson to head the 
NLRB in 1983, and the agency began to issue a series of decisions rolling back workers’ 
organizing rights even further.  It gave employers more room to threaten plant closings, 
strikes and layoffs if workers formed unions, deeming such threats an accurate portrayal 
of the “economic realities” of unionization. It even gave employers more free rein to 
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change location and open up nonunion.
 11
  The NLRB also slowed down the entire 
apparatus governing labor-management relations by decreasing its own activity.  The 
Dotson NLRB issued decisions at a rate less than half of that at which the NLRB had 
issued decisions in 1976 and 1980 under Carter, for instance.
12
     The effect of all these 
employer and government strategies, according to one prominent university leader, was 
to “redefine the current limits of acceptable behavior” for employers.
13
    
After more than a decade of increased employer resistance to organizing, unions 
were not prepared to meet the confluence of the 1981-1982 recession, the Reagan NLRB 
and steep membership losses.  Starting in 1982, unions abruptly pulled back from 
organizing efforts. The number of workers whom unions brought to election plummeted 
sharply from an average of half a million a year in the 1970s to half that level in 1982. By 
1983, a mere 165,000 workers voted in NLRB elections.
14
  By 1982, both the UAW and 
USWA, for instance, were running at least 55 percent fewer elections than they had in the 
recent 1977 to 1979 period.
15
  Union elections in the Southeast alone dropped nearly 40 
percent in just the year from 1981 to 1982.
16
 Unions suddenly had far fewer resources for 
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organizing at the very same moment that they faced tremendous pressure on existing 
contracts and employer-forced strikes.  They found themselves unable to both invest in 
growth and fulfill the larger social welfare role on which the nation’s economy had come 
to depend.   Yet even unions that did not face membership loss abruptly slowed their pace 
of organizing.  SEIU for instance, grew by more than 200,000 members between 1979 
and 1984, but it pulled back its participation in NLRB elections by 40 percent in 1982 
compared with the late 1970s.
17
   
Unions thought that the change in activity was temporary and that they would be 
able to turn the tide around once they got past the Reagan administration and the 
recession.  “Traditionally, since World War II, economic recessions have been 
accompanied, initially, by a decline in NLRB election activity.  Unions encountering 
membership decline sometime must re-align staff assignments - - few unions, in such 
circumstances, hire additional organizers,” AFL-CIO Organizing Director Kistler assured 
the Executive Council in 1982 as he explained the sharp drop in elections.
18
  However, 
the early 1980s turned out to be marked by a fracturing of the old organizing pattern, not 
an episodic interlude.  Unions never jumped back in at the same level of organizing in the 
private sector, and the numbers of workers eligible to vote in NLRB elections never again 
topped even a quarter of a million.  (By 2010, fewer than 100,000 workers lined up to 
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vote in NLRB elections.)
19
  A vicious cycle ensued. As unions pulled back from 
organizing, workers had less chance to form unions. Workers began to be less sure that 
unions could still deliver access to the most secure tier of the social welfare state, and so 
were less willing to join.  Working people’s interest in unions dropped in the early 1980s, 
and while union workers still firmly believed that unions raised wages, workers without a 
union became less likely to believe this than they once had.
20
   
Labor leaders did begin to wrestle with the magnitude of the challenge they faced, 
but missed a pivotal opportunity in the 1980s to restructure the doorway through which 
America’s working people could enter unions.  The AFL-CIO’s Executive Council 
founded a high-level Committee on the Evolution of Work in August of 1982 to study the 
shifting economy and the shrinking union membership. The committee sought to 
“establish the degree of change, analyze its impact and develop possible solutions.”
21
  
The committee of 27 of the nation’s most powerful union officers issued three reports, in 
1983, 1985 and 1994.
22
  While the 1983 report was mostly limited to a description of 
structural changes in the economy, the 1985 report was more expansive and reflected a 
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series of intensive meetings with a wide range of academics, pollsters and analysts.  In 
that report, entitled “The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions,” the labor 
leaders agreed to fundamentally reconsider “our notions of what it is that workers can do 
through their unions.”
23
  Because employers had so effectively manipulated labor law to 
narrow workers’ entryway to unions, “tinkering is futile,” AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer 
Thomas Donahue told the leaders in a closed-door meeting.  “We must consider whether 
radical change is possible.”
24
  The leaders began to study an entirely new model for 
representing workers outside the increasingly fraught collective bargaining paradigm: 
associational membership.  Under this model, workers would not have to go through the 
difficult NLRB election process to join a union - - they could just sign up.
 
 However, 
under associational membership, workers would not be covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement and the union movement would have to find other ways to leaven 
workers’ social welfare.  As a first step, the AFL-CIO began to negotiate a series of 
consumer-focused incentives with which to entice workers to join unions, such as a credit 




Unions’ interest in growing their own individual memberships, however, trumped 
their willingness to pool resources to launch such a movement-wide initiative for the 
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broader public.  A USWA officer worried that “open membership” would leave unions 
“banging into one another,” and an IUE office posited that the extra benefits for non-
members would “milk unions” of precious resources.  Though some of the leaders, like 
the American Federation of Teachers’ (AFT) Albert Shanker, were open to a “wide-open 
associate membership,” others worried whether they could institute such changes under 
their organization’s constitutions or were wary of giving the broad public voting rights.  
Above all, they wanted to make sure that their organization received revenue from any 
associational membership program. 
26
  
By 1986, the AFL-CIO had adopted the path of least resistance and left the 
decision on whether to form new associate membership programs up to each affiliate 
union.  Some unions did dive into experiments with this form. The AFT and AFSCME, 
for example, both used the associational status to recruit public-sector workers in states 
where collective bargaining was prohibited, such as in Texas. On the whole, however, 
leaders did very little to broaden workers’ access to unions beyond the traditional 
collective bargaining model. The AFL-CIO’s consumer-based “Union Plus” program 
turned out to mainly be a perk of traditional union membership.  Some unions used the 
credit cards and discounts to incentivize membership among the so-called “free-riders” - - 
workers in right-to-work states who benefitted from a union on their job but who chose 
                                                             






   Even as late as 1989, the AFL-CIO pushed for a union-movement wide 
associational membership, but a number of affiliate unions scuttled the attempt.
28
    
The 1994 report by the Committee on the Evolution of Work was far less 
ambitious than the 1985 report in matters of new organizing.  Like the 1983 report, it was 
a high-level look at the changing economy with an added focus on “new labor-
management partnerships,” but with no mention of the thorny question of alternative 
membership structures.
29
  The AFL-CIO did finally establish a community-based, 
associational model of membership - - Working America - - but it did not do so until 
2003.  By then, union density in the private sector had been cut in half, to 8.2 percent, 




After 1985, workers and their unions increasingly put aside the New Deal tools of 
NLRB elections and began to explore new doorways through which workers could enter 
collective bargaining.  They ran strategic campaigns that were more community-based, 
like the groundbreaking Justice for Janitors campaign which used militant demonstrations 
- - such as blocking bridges - - and savvy public pressure to convince building owners to 
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force their cleaning contractors to recognize the SEIU.
31
    Many unions focused on what 
they termed “comprehensive campaigns” or “corporate campaigns” which used multiple 
levers of power to persuade employers to recognize workers’ collective bargaining rights, 
such as enlisting support from consumers, shareholders and the general public. 
32
  The 
UFCW, for instance, claimed that by the mid-1980s, less than a sixth of its organizing 
wins came through the NLRB election process.  More typical was its 1985 win at 
Magruder’s supermarkets in Washington DC, in which UFCW Local 400 threatened to 
picket stores, informing customers of the below-standard wages and benefits.  Though 
this company agreed to come to the bargaining table, these tactics never worked with 
larger chains like Food Lion.
33
  Unions began to use the successful shareholder-based 
tactics of the JP Stevens campaign more broadly in the service sector, filing shareholder 
proposals and holding annual meeting demonstrations to support the nursing home 
workers at the nationwide chain Beverly Homes, for instance.
34
   Unions also recruited 
and trained more young and college-educated organizing staff, pooling resources to form 
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a new Organizing Institute in 1989.
35
  They also began to put less emphasis on single-
shot elections and deepened long-term community ties, such as those established through 
Jobs with Justice, an organization dedicated to building city-wide community coalitions 
to support workers’ rights.
36
  
Most of these late twentieth century campaigns and organizations, however, were 
still designed to bring workers into a traditional collective bargaining relationship within 
industrial capitalism.   It has only been in the early twenty-first century that a broad array 
of workers’ organizations have begun to experiment with alternative models of worker 
power outside collective bargaining.  Capitalism’s latest transmutation demands it.  
Corporate structures in early twenty-first century workplaces - - in what one scholar titles 
the “fissured workplace” - - are increasingly determined by the breakdown of the 
vertically-integrated firm, which means workers often do not have clearly-defined 
employers with whom to negotiate.  Employers have relinquished not only their social 
welfare roles but often the employer-employee relationship itself. Workers find that they 
work for sub-contractors, sometimes layers away from the parent corporation, or they 
find they are legally considered independent contractors - - even when they drive the 
same truck on the same route each day, or sweep the same office floors.  Labor law, 
meanwhile, has not kept up with the changing workforce, and millions of U.S. workers 
hold positions that exclude them from the Wagner Act’s protections: they are part-time 
workers, low-level managers, international guest workers, temporary staff or are 
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otherwise contingent. The result is that a new breed of worker organizations - - 
sometimes called “alt-labor” - -  are struggling to shore up workers’ economic security in 
new ways, such as through workers’ centers, new occupational alliances, public 
campaigns to raise wages, and coalition efforts to demand increased state-provided social 
welfare provisions.   It is likely that the future workers’ movement will be a hybrid of 
traditional collective bargaining-based unions and these new alt-labor forms.
37
 
 When workers faced U.S. capitalism’s late twentieth-century shifts - - shifts 
toward more global, less industrial structures - - they fought vehemently for economic 
security.  America’s working women and men did not acquiesce.  Their collective 
struggle did not fade away.  Instead, a newly-diversified workforce demanded full access 
to collective bargaining and tried to organize private-sector unions, making a massive 
push for broadly-shared economic prosperity.  Finally, it seemed, women and people of 
color would be able have full access to the New Deal’s economic promise.  Working 
people chose to wage their fight, however, with what were revealed to be increasingly 
weak weapons - - government-sanctioned NLRB union elections.  The fact that 
employers were able to effectively shut down union organizing and close the door to 
workers’ access to unions reverberates far beyond the labor movement.  Employers have 
essentially blocked private-sector workers’ entry into what functioned in the mid-
twentieth century as the most secure tier of the nation’s social welfare system.  Collective 
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bargaining once lifted wages and benefits not only for union members, but for much of 
the broader public.  Today, unions are too small to play this equalizing role, and the state 
has neither strengthened workers’ access to unions, tapped another entity to pull citizens’ 
social welfare provisions from employers, nor robustly increased state-provided social 
welfare.  The result is a twenty-first century economy that is far more unequal and 
precarious than that once envisioned by Jan Hooks, Edward Coppedge, Rosa Halsey, 







Figure 1: Number of Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB Elections (RC) (1949-1999)  
 
Source: NLRB annual reports, Table 11 and Table 13, 1949 – 1999.   
 
Table 1: Number of NLRB Elections (RC), Number of Eligible Voters, and 
Percentage of Private and Nonsupervisory Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB 
Elections, 1949-1999 
YEAR # Elections # Eligible Voters  # private 
production and  
nonsupervisory 
workers 
% of private 
production and 
nonsupervisory 
workers eligible to 
vote in NLRB 
elections 
     
1949 5282 541283 -  
1950 5251 604006 34349000 1.76 
1951 6271 651651 -  
1952 6612 746817 -  
1953 5886 726620 -  
1954 4445 494620 -  
1955 4003 471709 37500000 1.26 
1956 4694 448115 -  












# Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB Elections (RC)  




1958 4099 333935 -  
1959 5022 395635 - - 
1960 6021 461985 38516000 1.20 
1961 6042 436181 37969000 1.15 
1962 6916 514394 38979000 1.32 
1963 6512 468116            39553000                        1.18 
1964 6940 517661 40576000 1.28 
1965 7176 512159 42303000 1.21 
1966 7637 551408 44293000 1.24 
1967 7496 592309 45186000 1.31 
1968 7241 517372 46519000 1.11 
1969 7319 552037 48247000 1.14 
1970 7426 575464 48178000 1.19 
1971 7543 546632           48145000                        1.14 
1972 8066 556100 49961000 1.11 
1973 8526 506289 52228000 .97 
1974 7994 506047 52843000 .96 
1975 7729 533576 51012000 1.05 
1976 7736 435171            52921000                          .82 
1977 8308 519102            55210000                          .94 
1978 7168 424481           58189000                          .73 
1979 7026 528798 60402000 .86 
1980 7021 471651            60370000                          .78 
1981 6439 395573            60956000                          .65 
1982 4031 244292 59463000 .41 
1983 3241 164925 60001000 .27 
1984 3336 205717            63313000                          .32 
1985 3545 211161            65434000                          .32 
1986 3495 217110            66800000                          .33  
1987 3149 198865            68697000                          .29 
1988 3377 208394 71026000 .29 
1989 3670 243045 72923000  .33 
1990 3536 229015 73689000 .31 
1991 3089 192257 72529000 .27 
1992 2927 183865 72799000 .25 
1993 2991 203674 74616000 .27 
1994 3020 186339 77416000 .24 
1995 2860 191825 79883000 .24 
1996 2738 191929 81817000 .23 
1997 3029 215562 84225000 .26 
1998 3289 227390 86397000 .26 





Sources:  For number of private production and nonsupervisory workforce in years 1950 to 1963 
see DOL, BLS, Table 64, Handbook of Labor Statistics, Issue 2217 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1985) 176.  Note that data is only available in this chart for 1950, 
1955, and 1960-1963.  Numbers of private production and non-supervisory workforce in years 
1964 to 1999 (seasonally adjusted), are found in DOL, BLS, Employment, Hours and Earnings 
from the Current Employment Statistics Survey.  Number of workers voting in RC election from 
NLRB annual reports, various years.   
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Production and Nonsupervisory Workforce Eligible to Vote 
in NLRB (RC) Elections, 1949-1999 
 
A Note on Data: Why the number of workers eligible to vote in NLRB (RC) 
elections is the key variable for this study 
For my examination of the level of workers’ union organizing efforts in the 1970s, the 
most relevant variable is the number of workers eligible to vote in NLRB “RC” 
representation elections.  “RC” (certification of representative) elections are those 
triggered by the employees at a workplace who are trying to form a union.  I exclude the 
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which are elections in which employees attempt to decertify their existing union.
1
  Before 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, there were only “R” cases - - there were no RC, RM 
or RD categories of elections.  The need for the distinction grew when Taft-Hartley 
allowed management to trigger an election (an RM election) if a) workers who did not 
already have a union demanded recognition without an election or b) if it could produce 
substantial evidence the existing union was no longer representative of the bargaining 
unit.
2
 Also for the first time, Taft-Hartley allowed workers to decertify their existing 
union (RD).  
I look at the number of workers eligible to vote in RC-type NLRB elections over 
the post-Taft-Hartley period, including as a percentage of the production and 
nonsupervisory workforce over time.  Some scholars choose other variables by which to 
measure labor’s activity.  Some favor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) union density 
numbers or the percentage of NLRB elections won by unions, but both numbers are 
problematic for measuring workers’ organizing efforts.
3
  Union density figures include 
only the people who already have unions, not those trying to form them.  Density figures 
also mask union organizing because they also include not only new members who 
organized a union, but also the loss of union membership due to plant closures and job 
                                                             
1 The NLRB defines an “RC” case election as “a petition by a labor organization or employees for 
certification of a representative for purposes of collective bargaining.”  An “RM” case election is “a 
petition by an employer for certification of a representative for purposes of collective bargaining” and an 
RD case is a “petition by employees…asserting that the union previously certified or currently recognized 
by their employer as the bargaining representative, no longer represents a majority of the employees in the 
appropriate unit.”  “R Cases” are petitions for certification under the NLRA, prior to the Taft-Hartley 
amendment. See “Definitions of Types of Cases Used in Tables” found in NLRB annual reports, various 
years.     
2 Lisa M. Lynch and Marcus H. Sandver, "Determinants of the Decertification Process: Evidence from 
Employer-Initiated Elections," Journal of Labor Research 8, no. 1 (Winter, 1987) 85. 




loss.  The union win rate (or the number of elections won by unions) is also problematic. 
It  reflects the results of the campaign period - - the period between the time the union 
files for election and the election date -- when employers routinely broke labor law and 
intimidated employees.
4
   
I might have chosen the absolute number of NLRB elections as the studied 
variable.  After all, as indicated in Table 1, the 1970s marked the peak of NLRB 
elections. However, many of these elections were among a smaller number of workers 
than in previous decades.  The best and most consistent indicator, then, by which to 
measure workers’ union organizing efforts over time is the number of workers who were 
eligible to vote in RC union elections.
 
 My chosen variable is not a perfect one because 
many of the workers who were eligible to vote in elections never showed interest in a 
union.  Rather, their co-workers signed cards and won the right to the government-held 
election.  Nevertheless, it is important to remember that unions cannot just call elections 
of their own accord.  At least thirty percent of workers in a workplace must sign cards or 
petitions for the NLRB to hold an election, and many unions will not file for election 
with less than half signed up.  Thus, the number of workers eligible to vote remains the 
best one available for measuring worker interest in organizing new unions prior to the 
employer pressure campaign.  By using this constant variable, I can measure changes in 
the volume of worker interest, and shifts by geographic region and economic sector. 
I have also included in Figure 2 the proportion of the production and 
nonsupervisory workforce that unions brought to NLRB election.  A number of scholars 
argue that the key variable by which to measure workers’ organizing efforts is not the 
                                                             
4 For more information on employer behavior in union elections, see chapter three.  Also see 




number of workers voting in elections, but the rate at which workers were voting in union 
elections compared to the potential pool of workers.
5
  Figure 2 reveals that while there 
was a slow decline in this ratio of voting workers to the U.S. workforce that is eligible for 
unionization over the 1970s, it is clear that the 1980s, not the 1970s, is the period of sharp 
decline on this front. Some scholars include all workers in their analysis, including 
supervisory and managerial workers who are ineligible for NLRB representation.
6
  I find 
that a better variable to use is the production and nonsupervisory workforce, or the pool 
of workers actually eligible for unionization.     
My data for the number of NLRB elections held and the number of workers 
eligible to vote in NLRB elections differs from that of Michael Goldfield in The Decline 
of Organized Labor for the 1949 to 1964 period. In the 1949 to 1964 period, Goldfield 
uses a figure that the NLRB labels “collective-bargaining elections” and that reflects the 
number of elections and eligible voters in both RC and RM elections. Starting in 1965, 
Goldfield’s data only reflects RC elections, presumably because the NLRB changed its 
reporting format.
7
  In order to avoid this inconsistency in the reporting of the data, I 
                                                             
5 Henry S. Farber and Bruce Western, Round Up the Usual Suspects: The Decline of Unions in the Private 
Sector, 1973-1998 (Princeton, N.J.: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 2000). Richard B. 
Freeman, “Why are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB elections?” in Thomas A. Kochan, Challenges and 
Choices Facing American Labor (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985) 50. 
6 Richard Freeman uses the entire non-agricultural workforce in “Why are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB 
elections?” This figure is also used in  Freeman and Medoff , What Do Unions Do?, 229.  Freeman 
concludes that in the early 1950s unions organized one percent of the workforce annually, but only .3% by 
the 1970s. He does not indicate whether he is studying RC elections or the amalgamated number used by 
Goldfield.   Paula Voos, however, in "Trends in Union Organizing Expenditures, 1953-1977," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 38, no. 1 (Oct., 1984), 59-60 chooses the same variable that I do, the 
production workers, rather than the entire non-agricultural workforce.   
7 Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 90 – 91.  (The NLRB reports an 
amalgamated number for eligible voters under the heading “collective bargaining election.” See the NLRB 
definition for “collective-bargaining election,” for example, in fn 1, Table 13, in the 1955 NLRB Annual 
Report.  However, the data for each of the three kinds of election is available in each annual report, though 




instead use the number of eligible voters in RC elections for the entire 1949 to 1999 time 
period.  Starting in 1965, when Goldfield switches to using only data from RC elections, 
our data does not differ.   
Goldfield’s inclusion of the RM election numbers in the “collective bargaining 
elections” before 1965 serves to inflate the numbers of elections and workers eligible to 
vote in election in the 1950s and early 1960s, as compared to the 1970s and later.  The 
inclusion of the RM statistics in the 1947 to 1964 period especially skews the statistics 
for the 1950s because RM elections were much more common during the height of the 
Cold War than in the 1970s and beyond.  For example, in 1950, Goldfield reports data 
found in Table 15 B of that year’s NLRB report reflecting that there were 890,374 
eligible voters in “collective bargaining elections,” which includes RC and RM elections.   
Table 13 of that year’s report shows, however, that there were 604,006 workers eligible 
to vote in RC elections, 284,281 eligible to vote in RM cases (and another 2081 who 
voted in elections in the “R case” category left over from before Taft-Hartley.)
8
   The 
bulk of the voters in RM elections in that year voted in the elections at GE and 
Westinghouse. Roughly 250,000 workers voted that year to choose between the United 
Electrical workers (UE) ( which had been red-baited and ousted from the CIO in 1949), 
and the newly-created, CIO-sanctioned International Union of Electrical, Radio and 
Machine Workers (IUE).  The GM and Westinghouse elections were RM elections, 
triggered by management seeking to assist the IUE in its effort to oust the more radical 
UE.  The IUE was having trouble getting enough workers to sign cards to trigger its own 
                                                             






 Or consider 1955, when Goldfield reports that 515,995 workers were eligible 
to vote, a figure found in Table 13A of the annual NLRB report.  Table 11 of the 1955 
report reveals, however, that this figure includes the 471,709 workers elible to vote in RC 
elections as well as the 44, 286 who were eligble to vote in RM elections.
10
   
When you consistently look at RC elections alone, it becomes clear (see Figure 1) 
that the number of workers voting in NLRB elections was not significantly higher in the 
1950s compared to the 1970s.  In fact, the number of workers eligible to vote in union 
elections was fairly steady throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, though there were 
some ups and downs.  The numbers dropped sharply in 1982, and never rebounded. 
  
                                                             
9 Ronald L. Filippelli and Mark McColloch, Cold War in the Working Class: The Rise and Decline of the 
United Electrical Workers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) 139 - 148. See also page 32 
of the 1950 NLRB annual report’s discussion of its precedent-setting decision at Westinghouse that a union 
(the IUE) need not “make a showing if it is claiming to represent a unit substantially the same as that 
requested by a petitioning employer.” (Westinghouse Electric Corp, 89 NLLRB, no . 11, General Electric 
Co, 89 NLRB no. 120.)   
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% of total 
NLRB 
eligible 




1960 53404 26367 45553 2346 3562 171 33111 164514 483964 33.99  
1961 62131 24680 33246 2246 2097 969 33194 158563 450930 35.16  
1962 70491 28342 43135 2403 3535 713 40139 188758 536047 35.21  
1963 64800 32575 36653 1553 5302 1252 36542 178677 489365 36.51  
1964 72152 32550 40050 1058 2691 1362 52855 202718 551751 36.74  
1965 73256 37085 44283 2264 2029 1299 41122 201338 544,536 36.97  
1966 90801 53706 56632 973 2852 682 36925 242571 592,722 40.92  
1967 85312 51520 50014 1238 2315 1988 49337 241724 623711 38.76  
1968 76679 59943 48444 1587 3696 546 59639 250534 566164 44.25  
1969 81895 53384 51447 1308 2570 480 47415 238499 592761 40.24  
TOTAL 
1960s 
       2067896 5431951 38.07  









Percentage  of Total NLRB (RC) Eligible Voters Who 
Were in the South / Sunbelt States,  
by Decade (1960-1989) 





1971 100377 45381 51487 1336 3911 841 55749 259082 586155 44.20  
1972 103650 47708 43797 885 2622 1866 54385 254913 591636 43.09  
1973 92552 54383 45272 2567 3041 1375 54712 253902 541445 46.89  
1974 95342 54386 49224 2853 3990 721 43535 250051 544331 45.94  
1975 94180 54265 45665 4184 6884 2063 48140 255381 568920 44.89  
1976 53104 51717 40057 2127 2903 1299 54163 205370 475404 43.20  
1977 68521 54296 49387 1137 4638 1996 62440 242415 570716 42.48  
1978 60898 41482 41207 1512 5425 1066 46565 198155 471819 41.99  
1979 109941 47686 40691 1809 5403 1190 59026 265746 577942 45.98  
TOTAL 
1970s 
       2441894 5536926 44.10  
1980 71240 44720 35413 2343 4220 2267 47488 207691 521602 39.82  
1981 62208 33191 34436 797 6497 2440 57755 197324 449243 43.92  
1982 46779 19034 17535 1458 3112 3234 37419 128571 297764 43.18  
1983 23597 14760 10246 727 1578 1481 25577 77966 209918 37.14  
1984 49759 18700 14149 595 1737 1591 29502 116033 249512 46.50  
1985 34355 23264 17116 678 2256 2317 23790 103776 254220 40.82  
1986 45142 19421 12330 726 2203 887 22923 103632 259239 39.98  
1987 28786 23741 12475 632 4816 645 21883 92978 241825 38.45  
1988 31174 26608 13988 1104 3124 927 24297 101222 243692 41.54  
1989 35585 23574 13912 448 3038 2712 35735 115004 273775 42.01  
TOTAL 
1980s 
       1244197 3000790 41.46  
  
*South Atlantic: DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL 
*East South Central:  KY, TN, AL, MS 
*West South Central: AR, LA, OK, TX 
Source: Table 15 or 15a : Geographic Distribution of Representation Elections Held in 
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Source: NLRB Annual Reports, 1965-1985, Table 16 
 
 










1965 438832 10112 24869 52193 18530 
1966 466518 8154 47939 49355 20756 
1967 475553 7351 70372 48461 21974 
1968 432047 9552 41708 54593 28264 
1969 475587 6504 32240 50149 28281 
1970 429994 6429 87862 54472 29801 
1971 396268 6810 58228 78378 46471 
1972 401169 8812 64284 61776 55595 
1973 374021 7308 37747 68713 53656 
1974 385504 5397 37201 66847 49382 
1975 346343 7505 52773 74695 87604 
1976 273399 5387 31060 60483 105075 






















Number of Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB Elections 
(RC) by Sector (1965-1985) 
Service







1978 290019 4563 33069 60002 84166 
1979 372182 5760 38602 70660 90738 
1980 296808 8547 46738 54274 115235 
1981 240052 5683 33972 61689 107847 
1982 141128 10989 24634 41668 79345 
1983 92905 4316 17182 32231 63284 
1984 136116 4543 15137 32097 61619 
1985 130953 4391 19020 38326 61530 
 
 
Source: NLRB Annual Reports, 1965-1985, Table 16 
 
Note that in 1972, there were a small number of workers each year who voted in elections in 
the US postal system, and starting in 1975 the NLRB added a “public administration” category. 
These have been folded into the “services” category. 
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Source: NLRB Annual Reports, 1950 -1990.  For years 1954 – 1990, see Tables 2 and 4.  For 1950, see Table 3A and 
Table 10.  For 1952, see Table 2 and 3.   
 
Table 4: Number of Unfair Labor Practice Charges Against Employers (8(1)1 and 
8(a)3), 1950-1990 
    Year     8(a)1      8(a)3 
1950 4472 3213 
1952 4306 2972 
1954 4373 3072 
1956 3522 2661 
1958 6068 4649 
1960 7723 6044 
1962 9231 6953 
1964 10695 7654 
1966 10902 7203 



























































Number of Unfair Labor Practices (ULP) 






1970 13601 9290 
1972 17733 11164 
1974 17978 11620 
1976 23496 15090 
1978 27056 17125 
1980 31281 18315 
1981 31273 17571 
1982 27749 14732 
1983 28995 14866 
1984 24852 13177 
1986 24084 12714 
1988 22266 11196 
1990 24075 11886 
 
Source: NLRB Annual Reports, 1950 -1990.  For years 1952 – 1990, see Table 2.  For 
1950, see Table 3A.   
Note: Section 8(a)1 of the NLRA “forbids an employer to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights” guaranteed by the NLRA.  Examples may 
include threats, interrogation or spying on union activity.  Section 8(a)3 of the NLRA 
“makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against employees ‘in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment’ for the 
purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor organization.”  Examples 
may include firing and demoting workers.  All 8(a)3 violations are also counted as 8(a)1 
violations.
11
   
 
Unfair Labor Practice charges may be filed against either an employer or a union.  
Charges against unions are not included in these numbers.  They are filed under Section 
8(b) of the NLRA.  The vast majority of charges are filed against employers.   
  
                                                             
11 NLRB, “Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act: General Principles of Law Under the Statute and 
Procedures of the National Labor Relations Board,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1997) 14-15, https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-
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Source: Table 5, NLRB Annual Reports, 1950 – 1980.  
 
Table 5: Number of ULPs Filed Against Employers (CA cases) and Union Elections 
Cases (RC) in the Manufacturing, Retail and Service Sectors, 1950-1980 
            MANUFACTURING                                    RETAIL                                              SERVICE 
Year          
 ULPs  Elections  Ratio 
ULPs / 
Elections 










1950 2760 5188 .5 406 937 .4 187 238 .8 
1953 2772 5455 .5 438 854 .5 148 243 .6 
1955 2755 4243 .6 242 488 .5 80 149 .5 
1958 3438 4149 .8 417 674 .6 154 170 .9 
1960 4009 5067 .8 756 1089 .7 544 497 1.1 
1963 5223 5272 1 1080 1324 .8 693 687 1 

















1968 6386 5510 1.2 1308 1410 .9 921 983 .9 
1970 7223 5117 1.4 1422 1455 1 1086 1143 1 
1973 8093 5509 1.5 1981 1580 1.3 1949 1614 1.2 
1975 8913 4137 2.2 2210 1480 1.5 2939 2543 1.2 
1978 12381 4367 2.8 2746 1253 2.2 3878 1867 2.1 
1980 14205 3847 3.7 3034 1114 2.7 4783 2183 2.2 
Source: Table 5, NLRB Annual Reports, 1950 – 1980.  
Note: A CA case is “A charge of unfair labor practices against an employer under section 8 (a)” of 
the NLRA, according to NLRB annual reports’ definitions of types of cases used in tables.  The 
total number of CA cases is equivalent to the total number of 8(a)1 cases listed in Appendix D.  
Appendix E looks at sectoral subsets of this number.   
An RC case is “a petition by a labor organization or employees for certification of a 
representative for purposes of collective bargaining.”  See Appendix A for an explanation of the 






















Figure 7: Growth in Average Number of Retail Workers Voting in Union Elections 
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Table 6: Number of Retail Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB Elections (RC) and 
Total Number of Retail Workers (1960-1989) 
Year # retail workers 
eligible to vote  
# retail workers 
1960 31098 8238000 
1961 32825 8195000 
1962 31888 8359000 
1963 34717 8520000 
1964 34770 8812000 
1965 32097 9239000 
1966 29871 9637000 
1967 30367 9906000 
1968 34483 10308000 




   
1970 33899 11034000 
1971 50945 11338000 
1972 40388 11822000 
1973 42928 12315000 
1974 38167 12539000 
1975 46248 12630000 
1976 34435 13193000 
1977 41011 13792000 
1978 37922 14556000 
1979 42728 14972000 
Average 
1970 – 1979  
41167 12819100 
   
1980 31625 15018000 
1981 34792 15171000 
1982 20422 15158000 
1983 17467 15587000 
1984 16264 16512000 
1985 19617 17315000 
1986 17895 17880000 
1987 14965 18422000 
1988 15160 19023000 




Sources:  NLRB Annual Reports, 1960-1989; BLS, National Employment, Hours and Earnings, Not 





Figure 8: Number of Retail Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB Elections (RC) 
(1960-1989) 
 
Source for NLRB Election Data: NLRB Annual Reports, 1960-1989. Source for Total # Retail 
Workers: BLS, National Employment, Hours and Earnings, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Retail 







































Number of Retail Workers Eligible to Vote in NLRB 
Elections (RC)  (1960 - 1989) 





Figure 9: Average Weekly Wages, Retail and All Private Production Workers 
(1947-2002) 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted, (Retail Trade and Total Private), Average Weekly Earnings of Production Workers, 
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Table 7: Average Weekly Wages, Retail and All Production Workers, 1947-2002 









































































































































































































































      
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted, (Retail Trade and Total Private), Average Weekly Earnings of Production Workers, 
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